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FOREWORD
This document presents the results of a· contract study performed for the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) by the Douglas Aircraft
Company, McDonnell Douglas Corporation. This work was part of the Energy
Efficient Transport (EET) project of the Aircraft Energy Efficiency (ACEE)
program. Specifically, the study was one task in the contract - Selected
Advanced Aerodynamic and Active Control Concepts Development. The reported
study includes the formulation and evaluation of control laws and system
arch)tectures with respect to reliability, flying qualities, and aircraft
flightpath tracking performance.
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SECTION 1
INTRODUCTION t SUMMARY t AND CONCLUSIONS
Introduction
It has long been recognized that penalties in weight and trim drag t along
with the resultant increase in energy usage t are incurred by utilizing the
conventional solution to provide adequate longitudinal stability in aircraft.
These penalties could be reduced somewhat by incorporating artificial stability
through an active control system. However t it is difficult to determine the
best combination of aircraft configuration and control system design because
the process involves an interrelationship of flying qualities t reliability
and safetYt and the design and development of the control system. The design
must be governed also by certification and cost factors.
Anticipating that a significant gain could be realized in the next generation
of aircraft t it was proposed to consolidate into one study the principal
considerations that would guide the selection of an acceptable standard. It
would seem logical that the flight integrity of the next generation of
aircraft would not be allowed to depend completely upon the augmentation
system. AccordinglYt in the event of any failure of the systemt the aircraft
should be so configured as to permit the pilot to fly and land safely. In
this sense t the augmentation system is described as having "low risk."
The aircraft configuration chosen as the basis for this study is representative
of a family of commercial transports which t being the largest t is therefore
the greatest user of fuel. The aircraft is the Douglas DC-X-200 - a major
derivative of the DC-I0 - d~signed for a nominal seat capacity of 230 t with
a design range of 5844 km (2620 n mi); the study evaluation mission t typical
of a large class of operations t has a block distance of 1389 km (750 n mi).
The aircraft has a shortened DC-I0 fuselage t with twin engines mounted
conventionally under a high-aspect-ratio wing with supercritical sections. An
advanced high-lift system is included t consisting of a full-span variable
Krueger leading-edge flap and an 80-percent-span t high-extension t two-segment
flap. Because preliminary design studies for this aircraft revealed a benefit
for relaxed static stabilitYt the configuration was arranged with a design
minimum aerodynamic center margin of zero. This baseline aircraft is sub-
sequently referred to as the Energy-Efficient Transport (EET).
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The objective of this study is the development of the system required to
augment the aircraft's relaxed static stability. This system is referred to
as the RSSAS (relaxed static stability augmentation system). The study com-
prises three distinct elements. The first element includes the definition of
the design constraints related to the aircraft flying qualities and reliability/
safety criteria. Flying qualities criteria were established and verified
primarily with an evaluation of the unaugmented EET on a six-degree-of-
freedom motion-base simulator. System reliability requirements are based on
the existing capabilities of the DC-10. The safety criterion is an interpre-
tation of the various commercial transport regulatory requirements. The second
study element is the system design. From control law synthesis and verification,
the RSSAS was architecturally constructed and analyzed at the individual
component and system level. In the third element of the study, selected
systems were established for evaluation. Using the motion-base simulator, the
flying qualities of the augmented aircraft were demonstrated. Quantitative
system performance was analyzed and compliance with the established reliability
and safety criteria was shown. Finally, the anticipated impact of relaxed
static stability on certification of the aircraft was determined.
Summary and Conclusions
An aircraft parametric study which analyzed the effect of decreasing levels of
stability provided a prime motivation for the development of an RSSAS for the
EET. In this study, the same basic aircraft configuration was sized for
three different center-of-gravity operating ranges, with the aerodynamic
center margin at the aft limit in these cases being +10, 0, and -14.3 percent
of MAC (mean aerodynamic chord). The positive case represents current
practice. Fuel usage was then determined for a fixed, average mission length
of 750 nautical miles, assuming realistic profiles and loading conditions. As
the stability went from the conventional level to neutral, a 2-percent fuel
savings was projected. For longer missions, the savings would be greater.
The actual stability level to be recommended was developed from the RSSAS
flying-qualities evaluation.
The first phase of the flying-qualities evaluation was conducted using the
unaugmented aircraft on the Douglas six-degree-of-freedom motion-base
simulator. Various center-of-gravity locations, flight conditions, aircraft
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configuration changes, and environmental conditions were demonstrated. The
results of the solicited pilot ratings established a relationship of flying
qualities -- in terms of Cooper-Harper ratings -- to aircraft static margin
for the approach condition, and to maneuver margin for the cruise case.
These parameters were chosen because of their strong association with center-
of-gravity location and relaxed stability. These margins were converted to
aerodynamic center margin for determination of fuel savings. To achieve the
maximum acceptable mean pilot rating of 6.5, the corresponding aerodynamic
center margin was determined to be:
• In the approach phase, an aerodynamic center margin more than -3.1 percent
MAC.
• In the nontermina1 phase, an aerodynamic center margin more than -4.5
percent MAC.
It was determined, by virtue of the critical tail-sizing requirements, that
the nontermina1 phase was critical, thus establishing a potential fuel savings
for the evaluation mission of 2.8 percent.
The pilot rating results reflect an interpretation of the pilot opinions that
weigh the results to the worst mean ratings in the array of tests. This
interpretation recognizes that the worst means are probably representative of a
significant proportion of the pilot population and that a safety-related
requirement should take this factor into consideration. The severity of the
interpretation has a significant effect on the allowable stability margin. It
is concluded that future studies in this area should carefully evaluate pilot
ratings. in the stabi1i~y area of interest~
Using existing Douglas modern control analysis and simulation programs,
augmentation control laws were developed, employing an imp1icit-mode1-
following technique with the conventionally stable DC-10 aircraft as the
flying-qualities model. The neutrally stable EET 40 percent MAC center-of-
gravity configuration was augmented with several different control laws
using various combinations of aircraft dynamic feedbacks representing
existing DC-10 sensor arrays. The static margin of the EET configuration
was approximately zero while the static margin of the DC-10 model was about
20 percent MAC. With these multiple control laws, it was shown that:
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I Performance of the DC-lO "model" was duplicated by the augmented EEl.
I Control law redundancy provided a technique ~o increase the system
functional availability.
A flying-qualities evaluation of three of these control laws (eeua,eea,a) was
performed on the motion-base simulator. The pilot ratings achieved with the
augmented EET showed a significant flying-qualities improvement, with the
augmented 40-percent MAC center-of-gravity, neutrally stable aircraft dupli-
cating approximately the ratings of the unaugmented 25-percent MAC center-of-
gravity EET. The augmentation system was additionally evaluated for a
negative statically stable center-of-gravity location, compensation of the
pitching moment characteristics resulting from thrust changes, and failure-
reversion configurations. It was successfully demonstrated that:
.1 The proposed control laws provided equally satisfactory augmentation for
neutral (design point) and negative static stability, and
I Thrust pitching moments were adequately controlled for all flight
maneuvers.
The total RSSAS functional design was accomplished, including definition of
the major system elements: the sensors, computers, actuation, and interfaces.
Then, based upon the Douglas interpretation of the regulatory reliability and
safety requirements, plus the Douglas requirements, candldate architectures
were formulated and evaluated. Two augmentation system configurations were
selected which differ only in the computer redundancy. One has two computers;
the other has three computers. Both use existing aircraft sensors (three
vertical gyros, two air-data computers, and two angle-of-attack transducers),
and both achieve control through the two inboard elevator actuators which are
modified to accept dual-series augmentation commands. The computers are
either dual- or triple-redundant, depending upon the dispatch-inoperable
capability desired.
A complete reliability analysis was performed on the selected systems. The'
functional reliability was calculated for the normal system configurations
and for the worst-case dispatch-inoperable configurations. Significantly,
compliance with the regulatory requirements was verified for both the dual-
and triple-redundant system configurations. For the system requirements that
the EET RSSAS must meet, compliance was interpreted to mandate a probability
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of function loss of less than 1 x 10-5 per flight hour. Also, the total EET
flight control system with the RSSAS was found to equal the established
reliability standard of the DC-I0 flight control system.
Finally, to provide some insight as to the impact of incorporating an RSSAS
into a commercial transport, the pertinent FAA regulations were listed, a
validation plan proposed, and a typical airframe manufacturer's cost (including
RSSAS hardware) estimated.
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SECTION 2
AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATION, CRITERIA, FLYING QUALITIES, AND EVALUATION
2.1 Stability and Control Considerations
Relaxed static stability offers some of the more significant benefits
that may be derived from active control technology. For a transport aircraft,
the primary benefit is reduced aircraft drag and weight for a given payload
and mission, arising from a reduction in tail volume.
Relaxed static stability is accomplished through a more aft center-of-
gravity location and/or a smaller horizontal tail size. The reduced stability
results from the decreased aerodynamic restoring-moment with respect to
angle of attack. This alteration of static stability naturally has a sub-
stantial impact on the aircraft longitudinal dynamics, affecting both the
short-period and phugoid modes. As the inherent stability is reduced, flying
qualities tend to degrade. Therefore the deficiencies, both in static and
dynamic stability, must be compensated for by a relaxed static stability
augmentation system (RSSAS). While, for the next generation of commercial
transports, it might be possible to devise an RSSAS reliable enough to,
maintain the flight integrity of an inherently unstable aircraft, such a system
was not considered in the present study. The aircraft t~at was considered
would allow the pilot to fly and land safely if the system failed. The
study did, in fact, conclude that a negatively stable aircraft could provide
these qualities.
Basic design considerations influencing wing location, center-of-
gravity range and limits, and horizontal tail size are affected by the
requirements of both augmented and unaugmented modes of flight. The
considerations germane to this study are discussed below.
Tail area requirements for the forward center-of-gravity limit
typically have been set by trim capability or by the degree of control
required to develop maximum lift in the landing configuration. The
critical condition depends on the type of control system selected, i.e.,
separate trim and control surfaces, or a single surface providing both
control and trim. Aft center-of-gravity limit requirements have generally
been set by minimum levels of static longitudinal stability. For the
active-control relaxed stability design, the horizontal tail area may be set
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by one or more of the following: the landing case, the pitching moment
required for takeoff rotation at forward center-of-gravity locations, the
reduced level of stability, the pitching acceleration required for control
in the presence of gusts, or high angles of attack at aft center-of-gravity
locations. These points are illustrated in Figure 2-1, which shows the' typical
active-controlled aircraft rebalanced with a farther-aft center-of-gravity
range and a smaller horizontal tail. The dashed lines in the figure show
requirements not yet critical for the reduced tail size. Further reduction
and a more aft rebalancing may emphasize these requirements. Other
requirements may also become critical. An example from the nonflight mode,
where aerodynamic controls become ineffective, is the requirement for
ground stability and control. This condition determines criteria for nose-
wheel steering and for tipback stability, and in turn leads to requirements
determining location of the main landing gear. The landing gear location
is closely interrelated with the aerodynamic and structural design of the
wing, unless the penalties associated with a fuselage-mounted gear are
dccepted.
The typical' variation of airplane drag with center-of-gravity position is
illustrated in Figure 2-2. This variation results from an interchange between
the tail-induced drag, the drag component of the tail lift vector, and the wing-
induced/compressibility drag characteristics (i.e., the basic .components of the
trim drag formulation). As the center of gravity is moved aft, the tail load
required to trim (download) is reduced until it finally reaches zero and then
"'becomes an upload. The trim drag is not necessarily a minimum at the point
where the tail load goes to zero, since an upload on the tail will help the
wing-induced/compressibility drag, thus continuing to reduce the trim drag
until the tail contribution begins to dominate. The exact center-of-gravity
location for minimum trim drag is largely dependent upon the aircraft
configuration.
Three areas of interest must be examined to determine the acceptable
longitudinal stability characteristics of the unaugmented aircraft. The
first is where the stability is measured by II static margin. 1I Static margin
relates the neutral point to the center of gravity. The neutral point is
the center-of-gravity location at which the static stability is neutral and
the elevator deflection per knot of speed is zero. All three longitudinal
degrees of freedom - speed, attitude, and angle of attack - are involved.
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This form of stability is of importance in determining pilot opinion of
flying qualities. The second area of interest is the lI aerodynamic center. 1I
The aerodynamic center is the point about which pitching moments are
invariant with angle of attack. It is not the same as the neutral point.
No other degrees of freedom are involved; it is a single degree-of~freedom
parameter. There is no commonly accepted term describing the distance
between the center of gravity and the aerodynamic center, but in this
report, the term lI aerodynamic center margin ll will be used. Similarly, the
term i'aerodynamic center stabilityll will be used when referring to this
type of stability. It is this area of stability which is of importance in
determining fuel savings due to the relaxed-static stability concept. The
third type of stability of interest in this study is IImaneuvering stability,1I
measured by elevator angle per load factor. Like aerodynamic center stability,
maneuvering stability is determined at constant speed. The difference
between the two arises from pitch damping effects, which cause the maneuver
point to fall aft of the aerodynamic center. This type of stability is of
particular 1nterest for flight conditions in which load factor changes
provide important cues to the pilot.
2.2 Aircraft Configuation Studies and Baseline Definition
2.2.1 Initial Investigations. - The explorations giving rise to the
aircraft baseline for this study centered on a major derivative of the DC-10.
The guideline for this derivative defined a nominal seat capacity of 230,
with a design range of 5844 km (2620 n.mi.). The range capacity encompasses
a fleet class which has the largest number of commercial transports. This
class is therefore the greatest user of fuel.
The aircraft mission design requirements are shown in Table 2-1. For
the class of aircraft described, the most representative operation has a
block distance of 1389 km (750 n.mi.), and this was chosen for the study
evaluation. The mission rules are defined in Table 2-2.
The aircraft family which resulted from the guidelines and requirements
was generically known as the DC-X-200, .subsequently referred to in this report
as the Energy Efficient Transport (EET). The family is characterized by a
shortened DC-10 fuselage, and twin engines mounted conventionally under a
high-aspect-ratio wing with supercritical sections.
10
Payload
Range
TABLE 2-1
AIRCRAFT MISSION REQUIREMENTS
21,390 kilograms (47,150 pounds)
(230 passengers and baggage)
5844 kilometers (2620 nautical miles)
equivalent still air distance
Initial Cruise Altitude
Initial Cruise Mach No.
Approach Speed
10,363 meters (34,000 feet)
0.80
76 m/s (148 knots)
F1 ight Seg!'lent
Taxi Out
Takeoff
C1 imb
Cruise
Descent
Approach
Taxi in
TABLE 2-2
EVALUATION MISSION PROFILE
Requirements
5 minutes at taxi thrust
Climb to 457 meters (1500 feet)
MaKimum climb thrust, long-range climb schedule
to initial cruise altitude
Constant Mach number, step cruise technique
(31,000, 35,000,39,000 feet)
1389-ki10meter (750-nautica1-mi1e) mission
at best constant odd altitude
Employ long-range speed schedule to sea level
4 minutes at approach thrust
3 minutes at taxi thrust
Reserve fuel based on FAR 121.639 as follows:
Climb from sea level to 9144 meters (30,000 feet) using maximum-climb
thrust and long-range speed schedule, cruise at 9144 meters (30,000
feet) at 99-percent maximum specific range, descent to sea level for
total distance to alternate of 370.4 kilometers (200 nautical miles),
and cruise for 45 minutes at 9144 meters (30.000 feet) at 99-percent
maximum specific range.
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Prior to the definition of the EET baseline aircraft s a parametric
study was conducted to assess the configuration characteristics of EET
family aircraft as a function of aerodynamic center margin. Three aircraft
of this family were sized and configured to reflect an aerodynamic .center
margin at aft center of gravity of 10 percents 0 percents and -14.3 percent.
The 10 percent margin aircraft represented an aircraft of currently
conventional levels of natural longitudinal stabilitys for examples the DC-10 .
. The 0 percent margin aircraft s having neutral stability at the aft limits
represented a class which the current pace of technology development might
make acceptable for the next generation. The -14.3 percent margin aircraft
represented an aircraft with natural instabilitys the margin value being an
arbitrary product of other design requirements. Each parametric design was
checked for realistic design conditions and layout. Payload arrangement
and fuel usage effects on the flight center of gravity were included in the
definition of the mission aircraft.
The characteristics of the three configurations are shown in Table 2-3 s
together with the block fuel required for the evaluation mission defined in
Table 2-1.
The fuel savings due to relaxed static stability relative to the
inherently stable aircraft have been plotted as a function of aerodynamic
center margin in Figure 2-3. The neutrally stable aircraft would save
2 percent of fuel. The inherently unstable aircraft would save just over
4 percent. For missions longer than the evaluation missions the fuel savings
would be greater.
The data shown in Fi gure 2-3 indi cate that further fuel savings wi 11
accrue with an even more unstable configuration. In order to pursue such
savings, a number of design conditions would have to be altered s and a new
family of configurations would emerge. For example, as explained in
Paragraph 2.1 s difficulties are apparent with the more unstable aircraft in
the installation of a wing-mounted landing gear. A different wing having a
thicker airfoil with more conventional sections might be justified to house
the required gear. A lower design cruise Mach number, allowing a wing with
less sweep or more thickness, might also help if market requirements permitted.
No such changes were considered in this report.
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TABLE 2-3
COMPARISON OF PARAMET,RIC CONFIGURATIONS
AERODYNAMIC CENTER MARGIN
+10 PERCENT -14.3 PERCENTAT AFT CG LIMIT +0 PERCENT
ENGINE SLST RATING KN (LB) 209,73 (45,950) 200.17 (45,000) 195.68 (43,990)
PASSENGERS 230 230 230
PAYLOAD, KG (LB) 21,387 (47,150) 21,387 (47,150) 21,387 (47,150)
RANGE, KM (N MI) 4,854 (2,621) 4,854 (2,621) 4,854 (2,621)
CRUISE MACH 0.80 0.80 0.80
ASPECT RATIO 10.85 10.85 10,85
TRAPEZOIDAL WING AREA M2 (sa FT) 213,2 (2,295) 208,1 (2,240) 201.1 (2,165)
HORIZONTAL TAIL AREA M2 (sa FT) 75.5 (813) 63.5 (684) 49,0 (527)
MAX TAKEOFF WEIGHT KG (LB) 135,669 (299,100) 133,809 (295,000) 131,768 (290,500)
OPERATING EMPTY WEIGHT KG (LB) 80,256 (176,930) 79,239 (174,690) 77,997 (171,950)
BLOCK FUEL FOR 1,389 KM (750 N Mil
MISSION, KG (LB) 8,447 (18,623) 8,276 (18,245) 8,096 (17,849)
5,..--------------....,
BLOCK FUEL
SAVINGS
(PERCENT)
4
3
2
OL..- ---I~ ___" ...
-20 -10 0 10
AERODYNAMIC CENTER MARGIN
(PERCENT MAC)
FIGURE 2·3. FUEL SAVINGS FROM PARAMETRIC STUDY
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After consideration of the initial studies, it was determined that the
EET baseline should be configured with zero aerodynamic center margin until
any recommendation to the contrary could be made.
2.2.2 Baseline Definition. - The EET baseline aircraft is shown in
Figure 2-4, with its principal geometry summarized in the tabular inset of
the figure. The aircraft conformed to the family characteristics previously
described, but is the product of further study and refinement. The wing
. includes an advanced high lift system consisting of a full-span variable
Krueger leading edge flap and an 80 percent span, high-extension, two-segment
trailing-edge flap.
2.3 Development of Aerodynamic Data
Aerodynamic data for the study were developed in. two phases. In the
first phase, data were generated and put in the form of linear small-
perturbation equations of motion for application to control system design.
In the second phase, more complete large-flight-envelope (LFE) characteristics
were developed for use in programming the motion-base simulator. The LFE
data were presented as functions of such parameters as Mach number, altitude,
and angle of attack. The methods used for both forms of estimation were
normal for preliminary design, e.g., DATCOM procedures and references to
DC-10, limited DC-X-200 wind tunnel data, and other empirical data. A
comparison was made of the LFE with the equations of motion previously written
and only negligible differences were noted. The LFE data were then programmed
on the motion-base simulator host computer. Concurrently, a second set of
equations of motion were developed for the control system design effort
using the LFE data in a linearized form.
The aircraft mass used for the bulk of the study was 115,666 kg
(255,000 lb). This is representative of high weights in cruise. As a
result of past experience and judgment, two flight conditions were selected
for use in the design effort: a low-speed (72 m/s (140-kn) landing approach
case, and a cruise flight case. It may be noted that the approach and cruise
flight phases were subsequently judged to be of critical interest in the
piloted simulations (see Paragraph 3.1). A description of the design cases
is tabulated below:
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Ve
Sea Level
Landing
= 72 m/s (140 kn) M
h
Cruise
= 0.8
= 10,668 m (35,000 ft)
Center-of-Gravity Center-of-Gravity
Location = 40 percent MAC Location = 40 percent MAC
wnSp = O. 509 rad/ s wnsp = 0.967 rad/s
sSP = 0.969 sSP = 0.533
wnpH = 0.051 rad/s wnpH = 0.226 rad/s
spH = -0.092 spH = 0.250
n/a. = 3.79 g/rad n/a. = 11.82 g/rad
dy/dV = 0.0088 rad/m/s dy/dV = 0.0020 rad/m/s(0.260 deg/kn) (0.059 deg/kn)
Data for other conditions were generated for use in the flying qualities
analysis and for motion-base simulation. Fifteen combinations of five center-
of-gravity locations (25-, 35-, 40-, 45-, and 50-percent MAC) and three
horizontal tail sizes (100, 85, and 70 percent of basic) were selected. The
100 percent of basic tail area size corresponds to the baseline configuration.
While both center-of-gravity location and horizontal tail size have a
direct effect on the static stability of the aircraft, variations in tail size
were included in the test matrix with the idea of identifying problems that
might be attributed to deficient pitch control at different stability levels.
However, tail size has a significant effect also on pitch damping, thereby
complicating the task of identifying potential control problems.
Linearized equations of motion were developed from the LFE data for the
combinations of center-of-gravity and tail-size cases at the cruise flight
condition and a normal landing approach condition eVe = 76 mls (148 knll. The
effect of center-of-gravity location and tail size on aircraft stability for
the landing approach case is shown in Figure 2-5a. A similar presentation
for the cruise condition is given in Figure 2-5b, except that maneuver margin
is used for the stability metric. A tabulation of the flying qualities
characteristics of these 30 cases is presented in Tables 2-4 and 2-5. Root
locus diagrams for variations of center-of-gravity location are presented for
the three tail sizes in Figures 2-6, 2-7, and 2-8 for the landing approach
condition. Similar presentations are made in Figures 2-9, 2-10, and 2-11 for
the cruise condition.
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TABLE 2-4
SUMMARY OF FLYING QUALITIES CHARACTERISTICS IN LANDING APPROACH
- UNAUGMENTED AIRCRAFT -
CENTER-OF-GRAVITY TAIL wnSp Z;;SP wnpH Z;;PH T2 STATIC n/a. dy/dVLOCATION AREA MARGIN
(% MAC) (% OF BASIC) (RAD/S) ( RAD/S) (SEC) (% MAC) (g/RAD) (DEG/KN)
25 100 0.849 0.641 0.146 -0.028 15.8 4.02 0.178
35 100 0.657 0.813 0.114 -0.065 5.8 4.11 0.174
40 100 0.524 0.992 0.051 -0.007 0.8 4.16 0.172
45 100 o. 191 0.695 5.41 -4.2 4.21 0.170
-
50 100 0.202 0.460 3.25 -9.2 4.25 o. 168
.0
25 85 0.722 0.705 O. 137 -0.052 10.2 4.02 0.178
35 85 0.030 0.090 0.2 4. 11 0.174
40 85 0.189 0.603 4.77 -4.8 4.16 0.172
45 85 0.198 0.407 2.96 -9.8 4.21 0.170
50 85 0.198 0.311 2.17 -14.8 4.25 0.168
25 70 0.568 0.833 o. 114 -0.085 4.6 4.02 0.178
35 70 0.187 0.510 4.12 -5.4 4.11 0.174
40 70 0.193 0.355 2.65 -10.4 4.16 o. 172
45 70 0.193 0.277 1. 99 -15.4 4.21 0.170
50 70 O. 192 0.231 1. 60 -20.4 4.25 0.168
TABLE 2-5
SUMMARY OF FLYING QUALITIES CHARACTERISTICS IN CRUISE FLIGHT
- UNAUGMENTED AIRCRAFT -
CENTER-OF-GRAVITY TAIL wnsp 7;Sp wnpH 7;PH MANEUVER AERO n/a
LOCATION AREA MARGIN CENTER
(% MAC) (% OF BASIC) (RAD/S) (RAD/S) (% MAC) (% MAC) (g/RAD)
25 100 1.509 0.377 0.156 0.192 27.8 49.3 10.91
35 100 1. 181 0.455 o. 190 0.229 17.8 49.3 11. 14
40 100 0.967 0.533 0.226 0.250 12.8 49.3 11.27
45 100 0.676 0.741 0.315 0.199 7.8 49.3 11.40
N 50 100 0.392 -0.175 2.8 49.3 11.520
25 85 1.303 0.397 0.160 O. 191 21.3 43.3 10.90
35 85 0.899 0.536 0.218 0.232 11.3 43.3 11.14
40 85 0.600 0.807 0.316 0.128 6.3 43.3 11.27
45 85 0.374 -0.276 1.3 43.3 11.39
50 85 0.384 -0.579 -3.7 43.3 11.52
25 70 1.055 0.441 O. 168 0.189 14.5 36.8 10.90
35 70 0.526 0.909 0.310 0.017 4.5 36.8 11.14
40 70 0.348 -0.404 -0.5 36.8 11.27
45 70 0.353 -0.718 -5.5 36.8 11.39
50 70 0.351 -0.989 -10.5 36.8 11.53
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FIGURE 2~6. LOCUS OF ROOTS AS CG IS MOVED AFT, IN LANDING APPROACH - BASIC
TAIL AREA
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FIGURE 2-7. LOCUS OF ROOTS AS CG IS MOVED AFT, IN LANDING
APPROACH - 85 PERCENT OF BASIC TAIL AREA
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FIGURE 2-8. LOCUS OF ROOTS AS CG IS MOVED AFT IN LANDING
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2.4 Flying Qualities Criteria
In this study, flying qualities criteria were required for two purposes.
First, there was the need to specify the flying qualities that would be
acceptable in the event of total augmentation system failure, i.e., flying
qualities of the unaugmented vehicle in the most critical condition. The
second purpose was to establish the flying qualities desired with the
augmentation system in normal operation.
In the first case, acceptable unaugmented aircraft flying qualities were
determined on the basis of safety considerations. It is usual for flying
qualities to be described in terms of either Cooper-Harper pilot rating
values (Figure 2-12 and Reference 1) and/or the military flying qualities
"Levels" (Reference 2). Safety considerations for commercial transport
aircraft dictate a maximum acceptable pilot rating of 6.5, which corresponds
approximately to the boundary for Level 2 from the military specification. In
the second case, the desired flying qualities of the normal augmented aircraft
are those of military Levell, which corresponds to a pilot rating of 3.5 or
better.
At the outset of the program it was decided that satisfactory (Levell)
flying qualities for the augmented vehicle could be ensured by requiring the
augmentation system to provide a match with the proven good flying qualities
of the DC-lO in terms of phugoid-mode time histories and short-period
characteristics measured by the "Bandwidth Model." In addition, other
criteria were considered for application to this task to furnish confidence
in the final characteristics. The "Bandwidth Model" is a pitch-tracking
criterion originally developed by Calspan (Reference 3) which has been modified
and adopted by Douglas for use in transport design work. The Douglas work is
reported in Reference 4, and briefly described in Appendix 1, and the criterion
is depicted in Figure 2-13. The criterion considers the amount of compensation,
lead or lag, that the pilot must apply to achieve a given level of pitch-
tracking performance without encountering pilot-induced-oscillation tendencies.
The types of aircraft response expected from pilot commands are noted in
each section of the chart. While this criterion may be used for both landing
approach and cruise flight conditions, there is less confidence when it is
applied to cruise cases, particularly in the left side of the diagram. In
developing the criterion, there were relatively few data available to construct
the boundaries in this area.
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A criterion often mentioned for application to unstable aircraft in-
volves the time-to-double-amplitude of the most unstable first-order root
of the longitudinal characteristic equation. For example, Reference 5, which
reported an inflight simulation of a supersonic transport configuration,
cites a minimum acceptable time-to-double-amplitude of 2.5 seconds .in light
turbulence and 4.25 seconds in moderate turbulence, for the landing approach
task. The configurations of this study have been used in Figure 2-14 to
show the effect of static margin (as varied by center-of-gravity location
and horizontal tail size) on time-to-double-amplitude. If the times indi-
cated above are used to enter the chart, a minimum static margin of about
minus 11 or minus 12 percent MAC is indicated for the light turbulence case
and about minus 6 percent MAC for the moderate turbulence case. It should
be noted,however, that in Reference 5 the authors cautioned about effects
of pitch-control sensitivity, pitching-moment nonlinearities, pilot train-
ing, and visibility conditions.
The military flying qualities specification, Reference 2, sets down
requirements. for longitudinal short-period dynamics. The short-period fre-
quency requirement is given as a function of the acceleration sensitivity,
n/a., which is not dependent upon center-of-gravity location. The Level, 2
boundaries are shown in Figures 2-15 and 2-16 for the landing approach and
cruise flight cases, respectively. It is seen in Figure 2-15 that in the
landing approach case the Level 2 frequency requirement is not met at centers
of gravity aft of approximately 35 percent MAC. The most aft center-of-
gravity location for compliance with the Level 2 frequency requirement in
cruise flight is about 43 percent MAC, as shown in Figure 2-16.
2.5 Flying Qualities Analysis of Candidate Augmentors
Section 5 contains description of the control-law development process
which in the early stages involved more than 25 laws. This section contains
an evaluation of those control Jaws which were selected in Section 5.
Satisfactory long-period, or phugoid, characteristics were obtained
by matching the time response to that of the DC-10. Short-period dynamics
were investigated through use of the "Bandwidth Model. II Because it was
found that the selected control laws (augmentors) provide the same short-
period characteristics, they are discussed collectively in this pa~agraph.
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In Figure 2-17 the effect of augmentor operation on pitch-tracking is
shown for the landing approach case with the center of gravity located at
40 percent MAC. The unaugmented aircraft is well in the Level 2 area, and
in fact received a mean pilot rating of 5.4 in the first simulator test.
With the RSSAS in operation, the predicted flying qualities fall into Levell.
Further validation of the short-period characteristics is furnished by
reference to the frequency and damping requirements given in the military
flying qualities specification, Reference 2. In this case, the minimum
frequencies are specified in terms of the normal acceleration sensitivity,
n/u. However, because the augmentation system has no direct lift controller,
n/u is fixed for each flight condition (see Tables 2-4 and 2-5). It should
be noted that frequency requirement is regarded as unduly strict with respect
to large aircraft. Many such aircraft with demonstrated good flying
qualities have difficulty meeting this requirement. In Figure 2-18 the effect
of augmentation system operation on the aircraft in landing approach is shown
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for the design center-of-gravity location of 40 percent MAC. The augmented
aircraft is marginally Level 1, using this criterion. In the less critical
cruise flight condition, use of the augmentor brings the frequency well into
the Level 1 area, as shown in Figure 2-19.
While all of the control laws provided satisfactory performance in
terms of response to elevator inputs, there was concern regarding the response
to other inputs. There was particular concern about thrust inputs because of
the large thrust-moment arm associated with the wing-mounted engines (see Figure
2-3). To illustrate the effect, Figure 2-20 is presented showing the response
of the unaugmented aircraft (solid line) to a sudden thrust reduction while
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in the landing approach. The thrust reduction amounts to approximately
half of the thrust required for the landing approach. The most obvious
effect is the immediate pitch-down and loss of altitude that occurs. The
incorporation of a thrust compensation feature in the augmentors effectively
controls the thrust pitching moments as shown by the dashed line in "Figure
2-20. The response for control law Number 5 is shown in this figure, but
the other control laws are similarly effective.
2.6 Summary of Aerodynamic Center Margin Results
from the Motion-Base Tests
The results of the motion-base simulator tests discussed in Section 3 are
summarized below. The results reflect an interpretation of the pilot opinions
that weigh the results to the worst mean ratings in th~ array of tests. This
interpretation recognizes that the worst means are probably representative of
a significant portion of the line pilot population, and that a safety-related
requirement should consider this portion of the population. The severity of
the interpretation has a significant effect on the allowable stability margin.
For example, in the landing approach, the use of mean pilot ratings would
allow a negative 6-percent static margin compared to a negative 2.5 percent
based on the worst mean ratings.
From the simulation, the minimum acceptable aerodynamic center margin for
landing approach was determined to be a negative 3.1 percent MAC. The aero-
dynamic center margin is determined by subtracting from the static margin the
difference between the neutral point and aerodynamic center, defined by the
distances from the aft limit of the aircraft center of gravity. The static
margin as determined from the simulator was negative 2.5 percent MAC; the
difference between the neutral point and aerodynamic center was negative
0.6 percent MAC. For the nonterminal flight phases, the minimum acceptable
aerodynamic center margin is a negative 4.5-percent MAC. Although less
instability can be tolerated during landing approach, it is not necessarily
the critical condition for tail sizing and setting the aft center-of-gravity
limit. For a fixed tail size and center-of-gravity position, an aircraft
has more static stability (or less instability if unstable) at landing speeds
than it does at high-speed conditions. The reduction in static stability
as airspeed is increased is caused by the variation in aeroelastic effects
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with variations in airspeed. As a result, the critical condition for tail
sizing is determined by how the stability level naturally varies with flight
phase, as well as how the requirement for stability varies with flight phase.
This is shown graphically and in a typical fashion in Figure 2-21. In this
figure, the decrease in aerodynamic center margin - as speed is increased from
the landing-approach range to the high-speed end of the nonterminal range - is
greater than the change in the allowable margin. In this typical case, the
critical tail sizing condition would be at high speed in the nonterminal flight
phase, even though the actual level of required stability is not as great.
As previously mentioned, the minimum allowable aerodynamic center margin
is a negative 3.l-percent MAC for landing approach and a negative 4.5-percent
MAC for the nonterminal flight phases, a difference of 2.6-percent MAC. The
normal variation of the actual margin with airspeed for a subsonic jet trans-
port is orders-of-magnitude greater than 2.6-percent MAC, when the extremes of
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the speed range are considered. Therefore, the critical condition for tail
sizing in actual practice is high speed in the nonterminal flight phase.
Within this phase, the most critical point occurs at the highest equivalent
airspeed/dynamic pressure within the operating envelope where aeroelastic
losses are great, and at relatively low altitudes and Mach number where stabil-
ity has not increased significantly due to compressibility effects.
2.7 Fuel Savings
The fuel savings relative to an EET-type aircraft configured with current
levels of inherent stability can be determined from Figure 2-22. This figure
uses data from the study described in Paragraph 2.2. The fuel savings are
based on the tail size which provides the required aerodynamic center margins
at the critical condition of high airspeed and relatively low altitude.
Using the aerodynamic center margin recommendation from Paragraph 2.6 of
minus 4.5 percent, the fuel savings are 2.8 percent. Relative to the EET
baseline described in Paragraph 2.1, the fuel savings would be three-quarters
of one percent. The savings are significant.
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SECTION 3
MOTION-BASE SIMULATOR TESTS
3.1 Test Facility and Methodology
Simulations of the aircraft and of the system were conducted in order
to explore the relationship of flying qualities and aircraft characteristics
with and without the RSSAS.
The tests were conducted on the Douglas six-degree-of-freedom motion
simulator. The mechanism supports a complete simulated transport cockpit and
provides realistic motion cues. Visual simulation for the cockpit is
available from a Redifon visual flight attachment. A detailed description
of the simulator facility is given in Appendix 2.
In the first simulation, flying qualities of the unaugmented aircraft
were examined through most of the flight envelope. This examination led
to emphasis being placed on the cruise flight and landing approach conditions.
Pilot ratings were obtained for a number of configuration variations and in
conditions of turbulence or calm. Five test pilots, experienced in DC-10
and other transport handling evaluations, participated in the experiment.
In the second simulation, flying qualities of the augmented aircraft
were examined in landing approach and cruise flight. Some reversion
conditions were examined, together with configuration variations and turbulence.
Six test pilots took part in the test.
The programming for the simulation utilized the large-flight-envelope
data previously developed, thereby permitting simulated flight through most
of the flight envelope as well as permitting flap, leading-edge-device,
and landing gear extension and retraction. In this way, representation of a
realistic transport fltght was attempted. The scope of the study did not
permit investigations to revise the aircraft configuration. However, relatively
minor improvements in the aerodynamic characteristics were made through the
program in response to adverse comment.
In analyzing the test results, it was necessary to use mean (average)
pilot ratings to define the trends of the data. All the data points
describing the pilot rating results represent the mean of a number of
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individual pilots. One interpretation of a curve fairing through these
points weights the data equally. However, it has been argued that, for the
purpose of establishing stability limits or boundaries, the worst averages
should be used to fair the interpretive curve. The argument states that
each of the "worst" points in the sample represents a significant portion of
the airline pilot population, and that the boundary should consider these
pilots. Such an interpretation is also included in the presentations of
pilot ratings, and is used for the final evaluation of fuel savings. The
presentations which follow indicate "mean" curves with solid lines and "worst
mean" curves with dashed lines.
3.2 Tests of the Unaugmented Aircraft
3.2.1 Test Description. - The pupose of the first test was to
determine the longitudinal condition which met the minimum standard of
flying qualities laid down for the unaugmented aircraft.
In the 1nitial procedure, each evaluation pilot became familiar with
the basic configuration (center of gravity at 25 percent MAC) by performing
approaches, landings, go-arounds, climbs to altitude, maneuvers at altitude,
descents, and stalls. Additional familiarization was provided by having
the pilots repeat the process for an aft center-of-gravity case (center of
gravity at 40 percent MAC). No pilot ratings were taken during this portion
of the experiment, but pilot comments were solicited. From the commentary it
was determined that the remainder of the test should concentrate on the landing
approach and the cruise flight conditions. The lateral-directional character-
istics were recognized as unsatisfactory during this per-jod but time did not
permit the problem to be pinpointed and corrections to be made. The
problem was later indentified as being due to improper spoiler -- aileron
mixing. The result was low lateral control sensitivity for small wheel
deflections.
All configurations were evaluated in both a calm air environment and in
the presence of simulated atmospheric turbulence. The turbulence model used
is in the Dryden form and is a slightly -modified version of that described
in Reference 6. For the landing approach cases, the RMS vertical gust
intensity was 2.13 m/s (7.0 ft/sec). Pilots described this level as "moder-
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ate," or "moderate to heavy," but their opinion is probably based to a large
extent on motion cues, and in any ground-based simulator there is necessarily
considerable motion attenuation. It is believed that this intensity of tur-
bulence would be more accurately described as "heavy" or "severe" if full
motion cues were felt by the pilot. In fact, the proposed revision (Refer-
ence 7) to the military flying qualities specification suggests that aRMS
vertical gust component of 2.3 m/s (7.6 ft/sec) be used for the threshold
of "severe" turbulence for low altitude flight. For the cruise condition,
the RMS turbulence value was 1.5 m/s (5.0 ft/sec). This was generally
described as "moderate" which corresponds to the "moderate" stated in
Reference 7.
Following the familiarization stage, the formal evaluations commenced.
Five Douglas pilots participated. The configurations.tested were the 15
combinations of center-of-gravity location and tail size previously de-
scribed. Variations in tail size were included in the matrix to identify
problems that might be attributed to deficient pitch control at various
stability levels. As mentioned previously, a listing of the more pertinent
flying qualities parameters for the 15 test configurations, for landing
approach and for cruise, is presented in Table 2-4.
A description of the pilot task for the landing approach condition is
presented in Figure 3-1. The conditions for the cruise flight evaluations
are: altitude = 10,668 m (35,000 ft), Mach number = 0.80, in the clean
configuration. In the cruise condition, pilots were asked to make altitude
changes of 457 m (1500 ft), speed changes of ±10 m/s (20 kn), and steep turns
using about 0.785 rad (45 degrees) of bank. The evaluations were made with
both smooth air and with a moderate turbulence level [ow = 1.5 m/s (5.0 ft/sec)).
During the experiment, three pilots evaluated all of the 15 configurations,
one evaluated 13 of the configurations, and one evaluated 7 of the configurations.
An evaluation consisted of flight at the cruise condition, with calm air and
with turbulence, and landing approaches, with and without turbulence. Several
approaches could be made if the pilot felt it necessary. At the conclusion of
each run, the pilot was interrogated by the test engineer who recorded
the comments on a debriefing form. Pilot ratings were given for each of the
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FIGURE 3-1. DIAGRAM OF LANDING APPROACH TASK
configurations and turbulence conditions. The Cooper-Harper scale was used
(see Figure 2-12 and Reference 1).
3.2.2 Flying Qualities Evaluation. - Figure 3-2 shows the effect of
static margin on mean pilot rating for the landing approach task in turbu-
lence. The data represent the mean of five individual pilots. As previously
explained, two fairings through the data have been made: one considering all
the means (solid line), and the other considering only the worst of the
means (dashed line). Reading the dashed curve at a mean pilot rating of 6.5
establishes the minimum acceptable static margin at minus 2.5 percent MAC.
The corresponding minimum time-to-double-amplitude, T2, is found from Figure
2-14 to be approximately 7 or 8 seconds, depending on the tail area. It will
be noticed that the curve in the area of interest (where pilot rating is
approximately 6.5) is relatively flat. This flatness causes the acceptable
limit to be very sensitive to the manner in which the curve is faired.
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In the 1and.ing approach condition, the aerodynamic center is only
0.6 percent MAC forward of the neutral point. Therefore, the acceptable
aerodynamic center margin for landing approach is minus 3.1 percent MAC
[(-2.5) + (-0.6)).
No firm conclusions can be drawn regarding the effect of horizontal tail
size, although there is some indication that the smallest tail tested (70
percent of basic) develops too little control power for the very unstable
cases. It should be noted however, that the values of maximum pitch
acceleration which each of the tails can produce, noted in Figure 3-2, are
not particularly low by transport aircraft standards. Pitch acceleration
capability is seldom critical for transport aircraft in which the tail is
sized by stability considerations. Therefore, the few pilot comments
relating to poor controllability may have had more to do with decreased pitch
control sensitivity than with inadequate maximum control power. This
sensitivity is of no concern for the stability range of interest in this
study. The reduced tail area also provided less pitch damping, which possi-
bly contributes to degraded pilot ratings. However, no pilot comments re-
lated to this specific effect.
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The effect of turbulence on pilot rating is shown in Figure 3-3 where
the two curve fairings have been constructed using equally weighted data points
(the upper curve corresponds to the solid curve in Figure 3-2). The turbu-
lence effect for the stable cases is approximately one pilot rating unit
while the increment for the unstable cases is about two units.
In Figure 3-4 the pilot rating d~ta for the landing approach case in
turbulence is shown on the pitch-tracking criterion chart. The agreement
between the ratings and the boundaries of the criterion is generally good,
- - .
particularly near the Level 2 boundary. The ratings near the Level 1
boundary are somewhat worse than expected, probably because of the poor
lateral-directional characteristics.
For the cruise flight condition, maneuver margin was chosen as the metric
of stability rather than static margin. Maneuver margin is more appropriate
for this condition, in which load factor changes provide important cues for
the pilot. In Figure 3-5 the effect of maneuver margin on mean pilot rating
is shown for flight in turbulent air. As before, two fairings have been
drawn through the data. Using the upper (dashed) line, which weights the
poor ratings more heavily, the minimum acceptable maneuver margin for a pilot
rating of 6.5 is found to be approximately minus 1 percent MAC.
The effect of turbulence on pilot opinion of maneuver margin is
presented in Figure 3-6 for the cruise flight condition. The effect is quite
small, with the stable cases indicating an incremental pilot rating of
less than half a unit and increasing to nearly one unit for the unstable
cases. This small effect is attributed to the rather low precision required
in the cruise piloting task.
Knowledge of the minimum acceptable aerodynamic center stability is
necessary to determine fuel savings due to relaxed stability from the
parametric data of Paragraph 2.6. In Figure 3-7, the effect of aerodynamic
center margin on the mean pilot rating is presented for cruise flight in
turbulent air. Using the curve faired through the poorer mean ratings
yields a minimum acceptable aerodynamic center stability level of about minus
4-1/2 percent MAC. While these ratings are for a piloting task involving
cruise flight at 10,668 meters (35,000 feet), the limit of minus 4-1/2 percent
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MAC also is judged appropriate for other nonterminal flight phase tasks in
commercial transport operations.
3.3 Tests of the Augmented Aircraft
3.3.1 Test Description. - A second motion-base simulator test was
conducted with the purpose of examining the flying qualities and pilot
evaluations of three control laws, certain augmentation system features,
and several reversion conditions. The control laws tested were seua,
sea, and a in landing approach and a in cruise flight. Evaluations were
made of the augmentor performance with varying levels of augmentor elevator
authority: full, 0.087 rad (5 degrees), and 0.035 rad (2 degrees). (A
limited augmentation elevator authority is normally desirable to minimize
the consequences of augmentor failure. The primary pilot elevator authority
was not limited during these tests.) Tests were conducted in which the
pilots evaluated a simulated auto trim failure, i.e., the pilot was forced
to manually trim the aircraft during large trim change maneuvers. Failure
of the thrust compensation feature of the augmentor (O/thrust damper off)
was also simulated with the critical case being the go-around maneuver. Other
failure conditions which were evaluated included passive total failure of each of
the augmentors and augmentor failures in which a reversion from one control
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law to another occurred. During individual test runs, the pilot was not aware
of which sensor had been failed.
Evaluations of the unaugmented aircraft were made at two center-of-
gravity locations: 25 percent MAC and 40 percent MAC, except for a'brief
look at an off-design case with the center of gravity at 50 percent MAC.
The basic horizontal tail was used in all cases.
The simulated aircraft was the same as used in the first simulation,
except that the troublesome lateral-directional characteristics were im-
proved by an increase in lateral control sensitivity for small deflections.
Most of the evaluations were made in the presence of turbulence as described
for the fir~t test. The flight conditions used in this experiment were,
again, landing approach and cruise, but some additional conditions were
investigated. Several emergency descents with speed brakes extended were
made and approaches to stalls at an intermediate altitude were performed.
Six Douglas pilots participated in the evaluations.
Table 3-1 lists the minimum test configurations sequence that was
provided for each of the evaluation pilots.
3.3.2 MBS RSSAS Configuration. - The RSSAS simulation for the
augmented motion-base flying qualities evaluation was a single computational
channel configuration as shown in the simplified block diagram of Figure 3-8.
This included: (1) control law computation and elevator control to provide
aircraft static stability and to cOmpensate for the pitching moment re-
sulting from engine thrust changes, and (2) trim commands, both automatic and
manual, to offload steady-state elevator augmentation commands. Three
different control laws, 0 0 Ua (control law No.1), 0 8a (control law No.3)
and a ,(control law No.5), were implemented from the 8eua
control law family. They represent a progression of sensor failures starting
with a full-up array, then airspeed (u) failed and finally the attitude
sources (8e) failed, leaving the single type, angle-of-attack (a) control
law. Effects of variations in sensor characteristics were not evaluated on
the MBS, but have been studied during the DETAC analysis (Reference 5.5.3).
To present the status of the system in the cockpit, a combined RSSAS caution/
warning annunciator and trim director indicator, as shown in Figure 3-9,
was installed on the left side of the pilot's forward instrument panel.
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TABLE 3-1
MBS TEST SEQUENCE
I. Landing Approach/Go-Around (if noted)
Center of
Augmentor Gravity Turbulence Control Law Other
1. Off 25% 0=0w
2. Off 40% Ow = 0
3. Off 40% Ow = 2.3 (7)
4. On 40% Ow = 2.3 (7) 1
5. On 40% Ow = 2.3 (7) 3
6. On 40% Ow = 2.3 (7) 5
7. On 40% Ow = 2.3 (7) 5 RSSAS off @
91m (300 ft)
8. On 40% Ow = 2.3 (7) 3+5 @137M GA(450 ft)
9. On 40% Ow = 2.3 (7) 5+1 @ 137M GA, 0.087 rad(450 ft) (50) Auth
10. On 40% Ow = 2.3 (7) 5* GA, 0.035 rad(20) Auth
11. On 40% Ow = 2.3 (7) 5* a/Thrust damper
off
12. On 40% Ow = 2.3 (7) 5* Trim INOP
13. On 40% Ow = 2.3 (7) 5* Trim INOP, GA
14. On 50% Ow = 2.3 (7) 5*
II. Cruise
1. Off 40% Ow = 1. 5 (5)
2. On 40% Ow = 1. 5 (5) 5
3. On 40% Ow = 1. 5 (5) 5 Emer. Desc.
4. On 40% Ow = 1.5 (5) 5 C1 ean Stall.
4.6km (15K ft)
5. On 40% Ow = 1. 5 (5) 5 Approach Config.
Stall
*or option of test pilot
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Control of the RSSAS configuration was accomplished by means of a
programmable test operator panel shown in Figure 3-10. The configurations
evaluated and the control unit-augmentor interface are described with the
aid of the RSSAS diagram shown in Figure 3-11. (This diagram is developed
in Section 6 of this report.) Selection of the augmentor control law was
accomplished by pushing one of the top three control panels' pushbuttons,
which in turn provided an input to the select logic (Point A, Figure 3-11)
corresponding to the sensor validities necessary for the desired control
law. With the use of the thumbwheels, the maximum augmentor series elevator
command authority at point B could be set to 0.035 rad (20), 0.087 rad (50),
0.1745 rad (100) or full authority.
The toggle switches along the left side of the control unit
inserted failure. conditions. The top switch input corresponded to a series
actuator failure by opening the signal path at point C. This resulted
in an "RSASS inop" light on the RSSAS caution/warning panel. The middle
toggle switch opened the thrust input to the augmentor at point D. The
au,gmentor responds to this by "holding" the last Nl value in the pitch/thrust
compensation calculation and provides a "Thrust Damper lnop" warning. The
bottom switch opens the horizontal stabilizer position feedback at point E,
which is detected by the trim actuator failure detection circuit. This pro-
vides an RSSAS Trim lnop warning and activates the manual trim director
i ndi cator.
The toggle switches on the right side of the controller were used to
make minor changes to the augmentor configuration. The top switch opened
the horizontal stabilizer signal path at the feedforward input to the
observer at point F. This configuration was examined in an attempt to
simplify the RSSAS-horizontal stabilizer interface. This is desirable,
since not all stabilizer movement (only pilot-initiated)should be input to
the observer and it may be difficult to extract the necessary data with the
accuracy needed, especially during failure conditions. All pilot ratings
were, however, taken with the stabilizer input in its normal position. The
middle switch was used to change the feedforward gain at point G from the
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value calculated by the augmentor, to a fixed value of 1. The augmentor
gain is selected to provide the DC-I0 pitch rate to control column de-
flection while the unity gain results in the normal EET pitch rate to
control column deflection. Pilot evaluation indicated a preference for
the EET response and most tests were flown with the gain set to 1..
3.3.3 Flying Qualities Evaluation. - In Figure 3-12, pilot ratings
obtained in the second simulator test are shown together with data from
the first test. The data are for the landing approach case in the presence
of turbulence.
Although the pilot commentary indicated that the lateral control
characteristics were considerably improved over those used in the first
test, the pilot ratings did not reflect a significant change for the
two center-of-gravity locations which were evaluated.· It is believed
that although the lateral characteristics during the first test were
objectionable, because longitudinal properties were the major concern the
pilots atte~pted to overlook the deficiencies when assigning pilot ratings.
The slightly higher (worse) mean pilot rating that was obtained for the
near neutral stability case tends to support the upper, more conservative,
curve fairing that was used to establish the minimum acceptable stability
level at 2-1/2 percent MAC (pilot rating of 6.5). A similar presentation
is made for the calm air case in Figure 3-13. Again the task is the
landing approach. The curve from the first test is based on equal
weighting of the data points and shows good correlation with the two data
points from the second test.
In the cruise flight condition, only a brief evaluation of the
unaugmented aircraft was conducted. With the center of gravity located
at 40 percent MAC, this case represents an augmentor failure during a prolonged
flight, and the question asked of the pilots was, "Would you continue to
your destination or land as soon as possible?" Of the five pilots who
evaluated this condition, only one had doubts that the flight should
be continued. He commented that some pilots might want to discontinue
the flight if the conditions persisted ,(moderate turbulence and the
center of gravity located at the aft limit, 40 percent MAC). The other
four evaluation pilots felt that there would be no problem. Opinions
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varied from "not bad," to "OK", and "flies great." Actually, no problems
should be expected since the maneuver margin at this center-of-gravity
location is nearly 13 percent MAC. In Figure 3-5, the results of the first
test showed a mean pilot rating of less (better) than 4.0 for the same
center-of-gravity location and flight condition.
Three augmentors, No.1, No.3, and No.5, were evaluated in the
landing approach in the presence of turbulence. These are described in
Section 5. It is interesting that although several of the evaluation pilots
indicated a clear preference for one augmentor over another, the pilot
ratings for each of the three averaged 3.8. For a similar center-of-gravity
location and flight condition, it was shown in Figure 3-12 that the mean
pilot rating for the unaugmented aircraft was 6.0. In the same figure,
the mean pilot rating for a center-of-gravity location of 25 percent MAC is
4.0, about the same as the 3.8 given for the augmented aircraft for
a center-of-gravity location of 40 percent MAC.
In cruise flight, only augmentor No.5 was evaluated. Because the
unaugmented aircraft was rated satisfactory in this flight condition, there
was little room for improvement, and none was observed. The pilot who
expressed slight doubts about the unaugmented aircraft in cruise, observed
the same weakly damped oscillation with the augmentor in operation.
Simulated stalls were performed at about 4600 m (15,000 ft) altitude
in clean and landing configurations, both with augmentor No. 5 in operation
and unaugmented. All of the stalls were easily recoverable (no lateral-
directional separation effects were simulated). The only problems
encountered involved the addition of thrust when recovering from power-off
stalls with the unaugmented aircraft. Unless the thrust was added care-
fully, the nose-up thrust pitching moment made it difficult to get the
nose down.
For the test involving simulated autotrim failure, the manual RSSAS
trim director (see Paragraph 3.3.2) was used. The manual RSSAS trim
director was activated whenever the autotrim system could not properly
off-load the augmentor series elevator displacement. The command display
can present an unusual situation for the pilot, since the RSSAS trim
requirement may be in direct conflict with the pilot's primary trim
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requirement. As an example, while the pilot may be holding nose-up
elevator with the control column, the RSSAS trim director could command
nose-down trim to off-load a steady-state nose-down-series elevator de-
flection.
The trim director was evaluated in several approaches. The pilot was
instructed to (a) respond to the trim command, but immediate action was
not necessary, and (b) if the trim command was in opposition to the desired
primary trim requirement, satisfy both in any order that was comfortable.
The test demonstrated the following: (a) trim commands are a new idea and
not immediately natural to respond to, (b) the pilot should first satisfy
primary trim requirements and then the RSSAS trim command, (c) the trim
director threshold must be carefully selected to minimize nuisance or
reversing-trim commands, and (d) a manual trim director could increase
the pilot's workload. It is concluded that development is needed in this
area.
3.3.4 Other Results. - Besides establishing levels of flying quality
for the augmented aircraft, the following significant conclusions resulted
from the tests.
Required Elevator Deflection - Figure 3-14 is a bar chart
reflecting the nominal and maximum observed pilot elevator control required
to perform specified piloting tasks with and without the RSSAS. All
data were observed in a moderate level of turbulence. The effect of the
augmentation was to significantly reduce the magnitude of the required
pilot elevator command during the landing/approach and go-around maneuvers.
The large deflections in go-around are required because of the pitching
moment resulting from the engine thrust change. These elevator deflections
are trimmed out if unaugmented, or satisfied by the augmentor if the RSSAS
is engaged. During this testing, it was observed also that the augmentation
provided control for all higher frequency aircraft disturbances; therefore,
the higher-frequency pilot elevator response to the turbulence was
eliminated with the RSSAS.
Authority-Limiting - The maximum observed augmentor elevator command
did not exceed 0.07 radian (40 ) except during the thrust change of the
go-around maneuver. With the authority limit set to 0.035 radian (20 ),
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no noticeable degradation in performance was observed and the pilot flying
qualities ratings were unchanged. Authority-limiting during go-around had
the effect of allowing more of the natural pitching moment due to the
thrust change. At the O.035-radian (20 ) limit~ the pitch-up during go-around
was significant but not objectionable. Some pilots~ in fact~ preferred the
positive pitch-up in this situation. With no augmentation~ however~ the
go-around pitch-up requires immediate and constant pilot attention. This
would indicate that the amount of lead in the initial augmentation
command is more important than its authority for this condition.
Ground-Air Transition - One of the "po int" design conditions to
be evaluated was the ground-air transition. This is of interest since it
is a situation where the augmentation system may not have sufficient
aerodynamic data with which to make its necessary calculations. This is
due to the fact that the augmentation system~ upon engagement~ has synchronized
to the conditions of a trimmed aircraft. The aircraft~ however~ makes a
large positional and dynamic change in order to establish a trimmed flight
path.
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The ground-air transition was accomplished by making a touch-and-go
maneuver out of a landing sequence. During the first test, the augmentor
was allowed to continuously compute and control during the landing, ground
roll, and liftoff. The result was a large nose-down elevator command out of
the augmentor after rotation. What had actually happened was that the RSSAS
autotrim had continuously run nose-down during the ground roll in response
in the augmentor elevator command to maintain the approach trim conditions.
The solution to this problem was to synchronize the augmentor during
the ground roll and then again allow control at landing gear liftoff. With
this mechanization, the augmentor provided the proper control for all
subsequent ground-to-air tests. No additional time delays after liftoff
were judged necessary in order to allow the aircraft time to settle on a
trimmed condition.
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SECTION 4
RELIABILITY AND SAFETY CRITERIA AND ANALYSIS
4.1 Baseline and Criteria
4.1.1 System Definition
DC-10 Baseline. - The reliability goals established for the EET stability
augmentation system are based on comparable DC-10 systems capability. The
addition of a totally new and somewhat complex system impacts the aircraft
flight control system and it is on this level that the goals and comparisons
have been made. The flight control system evaluated includes the primary con-
trol components (surfaces, actuators, cables and controllers), the flight
guidance systems (automatic controls, dampers and limiters) and primary sensor
systems (attitude, air data, etc.). Simplified schematics of the DC-10 system
components are presented in Figures 4-1, 4-2, and 4-3.
Items Considered. - Using the DC-10 master component list, more than 240
components were identified as significant to consider in the reliability study.
Appendix 3 provides a list of these items identified by name and ATA Code num-
ber. The EET components are in most cases similar to or identical to those used
on the DC-10.
Major Differences. - The major differences are in (1) the flight guidance
system where a greater degree of functional integration is used, (2) the pri-
mary control elevator and stabilizer trim actuation, and (3) the addition of
the augmentation system.
4.1.2 Reliability Data Source. - The quantitative DC-10 reliability has
been determined using in-service data recorded by Douglas. The Douglas DC-10
data base includes over 2-1/2 million flight hours by major domestic and for-
eign airlines. All operational and maintenance actions are recorded and
itemized to the specific aircraft component. The specific desired system and
component reliability data may be manipulated and extracted with the use of the
Douglas computer program THESYS.
THESYS is a computerized data management system. It has been specifically
tailored for storage and retrieval of component failure data gathered from
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FIGURE 4-1. GENERAL ARRANGEMENT - PRIMARY CONTROLS
commercial airline service. More than a file maintenance program, THESYS is a
complete software package providing the create, update, and query functions,
report generation programs, and special purpose programs necessary to support
our data requirements. THESYS was written exclusively in FORTRAN IV to provide
for easy modification, updating, and to preclude obsolescence. Because compara-
tive information is often desired on other than Douglas airplanes, THESYS was
designed to provide a repository for data obtained on any commercial aircraft.
The THESYS Flow Chart (Figure 4-4) shows the path that data follows from
the raw airline reports through the data system and subsequently to various
output programs.
The bulk of data input to THESYS comes from monthly airline removal
reports. To facilitate the processing of this data, an airline data conversion
program was written. This program, when combined with airline data reformatting
programs (each tailored to a particular airline's unique reporting practices),
is designed to process the removal reports and update the master file with a
minimum of clerical intervention.
58
RADIO ALT
INDICATOR
34-42
ATTITUDE
DIRECTOR
INDICATOR
34-23
1
FIRST OFFICER'S INSTRUMENTS
RADAR
INDICATOR
34-41
....~-I-------SLO-FAST-2_
-
t WEATHERRADAR-2
34-41
NOT INSTALLED AALI
VERTICAL
GYRO-I
34-23
AT/SC-I
22-31
t
:-SLO-FAST-I--------I_-~
VERTICAL I I VERTICAL IGYRO- 3 GYRO-2
L-.....;34~-;:;23;;,-......J L.....:.34,;.-.:2r:3_.J[}l\:d .~; ,,,,£l"ru~ I
I-- -ATTITUDE I CO_NO SWITCHING UNIT I ATTITUDE-I-
i-- - COMMANO--------+-~I_I_------_+--_7-..., 84-24 r--7-++--------I_+----+------- COM"""-I-
i-- -ALTITUDE-I __-u__lj~--<=S=':::x=S2~~-l~l_+_W===::::::;Tti-I---r- ;"\ ALTITUDE-2_'"
1 I 1,1 11
RADAR
INDICATOR
34-41
ATTITUDE
DIRECTOR
INDICATOR
34-23
NOTE' SEE 34- 10
FOR AIR DATA
INPUTS. j:FLI GHT GUIDANCECOMPUTERS - I22-10 PERFORMANCE a FAILURE ASSESSMENTMONITOR22-41 FLIGH,T GUI DANCEICOMPUTERS - 222-10
MACH/lAS
INDICATOR
34-13
+---+--+---IA5 SELECT-2
L't-'====++=tt~+::j:=t:==t::;:===:.ILOC DEV- 2-GS DEV-2 - .....------'VERT GYRO FD CMDNORM NORM
CAPT ON FlO ON BOT~TH
+- --' AUX ?Q)AUX ONV;N 2
L..--+--+-_-+-+ -, r--------!'--t--+--+---'
lAS SElECT-I---+-+---....MACH liASINDICATOR
34-13
I-- LDC ~V-I :==:::;rl=~:::+=+=+=~'It'+=1====::::''J~T..... ............. 65 DEV-I
HORIZONTAL
SITUATION
INDICATOR
34-22
RADIO MAGNETIC
INDICATOR
34-21
HORIZONTAL
SITUATION
INDICATOR
34-22
~ HEADING ERROR-'--tt-----.....t--ttr======f--1f--~= __--+-_+=====,tt--r.....---il--HEADING EFlROR-2-
_ COURSE ERROR-I SEE 22-31 COURSE EAROR-2......III;~ ~~l i i~Vw ~:=~OR~~~,OEV~-~I-==~:_t-l MSl L_ ~ _J r',~ 11i:==~VO~R/Lg~~~=~:::
if l' ~f-©"1 \ i ,/ ~e-- "j C-:r~
I :~~ I I..;_~_s_;_~_-' l~~3~~~~5':::rIt-1-~R /) G~~::c~ ~r;;~R~L-P~~~L l R>r-t--.t~Llv::~ff~~5:..:~ I ~~~;:II :~;~ I
'---t'---..J ,..J '-- +-__~SEE;;;.S;;.;,4.;;;-22"--__+-__-..J L-I.-.._~ ........,t;-~
~ g:~:~~~=======l======F=======::t::J!!iI:==:::><:::=====+=======l======t======~~= =:~::::
L.. .....I-- HEADING -I HEADING-2 -L.. .....
FLUX H COMPASS DG-I I I DG-2 COMPASS FLUX
VALVE-I COUPLER-I COUPLER -2 VALVE-2
RADIO MAGNETIC 34-21 34-21 34-21 34-21 34-21 34-21IN~~~~R ::::~~~..RI~i======~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~=~~~~~~~=~~~~~~~~~~~~~~======-V~OR:~Nl:::__ VOR -2 BEA ING VCR·IBEARl,.; -
r- - ..., I'NOT INSTALLED DLTI ADF-I I ADF-2
L_34T~~ ~~3
--AOF-I:==========~~============]Aill£:==::::>C===============~~===========ADF-2-. .__ AOF -2 AOF- I......
---_...... ---_......
FIGURE 4-2. DC-10 FLIGHT GUIDANCE SYSTEM
IFLIGHT DATA I ELV LOAD FEE~IACQUISITION a FLAP LIMUNIT PROGRAMMER-231-31 27- 32
lAS 2B VERTICAL SPEED-
VERTSPO I -ALT MACH---.• t t~T I PITCH FG I I AT/SC I I ROLL FG II YAW FGCMPTR-2 CMPTR-2 CMPTR-2 CMPTR~2r 22-11 22-31 22-12 22-1.3
lAS IB ..
VERTSPD ..
1AiT ....
PITCH FG
CMPTR- I
22-11
VERTICAL
SPEED
VERTICAL ISPEED
INDICATOR
34-14I I~~~:~ II34-15 L..-..:..:....r:--1
TL
SAT
I
DIGITAL
BUS
Y
MAX
AlS
DIGITAL
i
Ils J. B~2B NORM'ACC 282
2B VERT ~ ATTITUDE II' LINEARSPO MON I TORING ACCELEROMETER
a SW UNIT UNIT-2
34-23 22-19
HOLDS ~I,(ALT.A!s,MACH)
MACH
CENTRAL AIR DATA COMPUTER-2
34-16
1
DIGITAL
BUS
2C
BARO DIGITAL
;1\ 1 T BUST lAS2t
TAT
I PROBE I34-16
~ l:INTRAL ~URALW~~~'fH AUTO PITCH r--TRIM CMPTR
22-22
t:1 PAFAM ~22-41
~ ~1'62~JE ~~~k
ALT-I ALT-2
"\1i
;:. ~ ~
;'I~-I~~I
J"i'E~jj!t:?millmmq::¥illmmmm±~~~! ~
, I CAPTAIN'S FIRST
STATIC OFFICER'S
SELECTOR STATIC
~~E SELEcrOR
VALVE
PI CAPTAIN'S 3·D P3 FIRST OFFICER'S \
PITOT PITOT PITOT
34-11 34-11 34-11
II STANDBY I EPR I STANDBY IALTIMETER PT2 AIRSPEEDXDUCER INDICATORSEE 34-11 77-13 SEE 34-11
H
1
DIGITAL
BUS
IC
I
I HO~DS(ALT, A/S,
MACH)
MACH
I,ELV LOAD FEE~Ia FLAP LIMPROGRAMMER-I27-32
II C~~~C_I I I22-31 L- --'
CENTRAL AIR DATA COMPUTER-I
34-16
r-MACH t
YAW FG II ROLL FGCMPTR - I CMPTR - I
22-13 22-12
0'
o
~. CAPTAIN'S STATIC
SIL("""""""',,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, """""""""""""""""; ,.:'; :'"""""",., .
~ FIRST OFFICER'S STATICS2Cf""""'""""",,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,""""., ,.,.",,,,,,,,,,;,;,;,;,,,,.,., .
................................. ;.;.,.;.;.;.:-:.; .....;.;.;;:,:;:;:;:;:;:;:;:;:::::::;:;:;:;:;:;:; ;:::;:::;::::::::;:::TIs
'""S2
FIGURE 4-3. DC-10 FLIGHT ENVIRONMENTAL DATA
AIRLINE
REMOVAL
REPORT
(HARD COPY)
AIRLINE DATA
REFORMATTING
PROGRAM
AIRLINE
DATA
REPORT
AIRLINE DATA
REFORMATTING
PROGRAM
AIRLINE DATA
CONVERSION
PROGRAM
MASTER FILE
UPDATE
PROGRAM
REVISIONS TO
MASTER FILE
DATA
INPUT DATA
PREPROCESSING
PROGRAM
VENDOR
GUARANTEE
FILE
DC·10
COMPONENT
GUARANTEE
PROGRAM
REPORTS
MASTER
FILE
(DISK)
MASTER FILE
INTERFACE
PROGRAM
THESYS
REPORT
PROGRAMS
REPORTS
FIGURE 4-4. THESYS FLOWCHART
61
An example of one of the many report formats available from THESYS is
shown in Figures 4-5 and 4-6 for the DC-10 Yaw Computer and Auto Throttle Speed
Computer. This report provides the Mean Time Between Unscheduled Removals
(MTBUR) for a selected component by airline and total fleet for a calendar year.
For each month and airline, the component flight hours and removals-are printed
so the user is aware of the sample size and any gaps that may exist in the
reports received from the airlines~ The fleet MTBUR in the far right column
is a three-month moving average. The component MTBUR for each airline for the
year and from initial use to date is given across the bottom row. In the
examples shown, these two values are the same because only one year's data was
interrogated.
4.1.3 Reliability Factors of Interest. - There are primarily three reli-
ability terms of interest in specifying the required system capability. The
first is Dispatchability - the minimum capability required to begin a mission.
The next is Mission Reliability - the probability the system will not cause an
abort in flight. The third is Economic Reliability - the frequency of mainte-
nance actions on the system components.
4.1.3.1 Dispatchability. - Dispatchability, the probability that a
scheduled flight will not be delayed or cancelled due.to equipment malfunctions,
is a relatively complex conditional probability with many influencing parameters.
Somewhat oversimplified, it is the combined probability of one or more faults
occurring between the last takeoff and the next, and the probability these
faults will be repaired in time, given that the next flight cannot dispatch
with the fault existing. If it can, this changes the probability that the next
succeeding flight will be delayed.
The probabil i ty a fault will occur is influenced by the 1ength of the
previous flight, condition of the aircraft system, weather, and other factors.
The probability of repair in the al10ted time is influenced by such things as
the type of station, type of flight, ground time available, spares availability,
maintenance policy and staffing. Each of these factors has a unique distribu-
tion pattern and these patterns vary from airline to airline.
To establish an average condition for this study, the Dispatchability
goal was determined using a one-year data sample from 1 October 1975 through
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30 September 1976 which included 217,535 revenue DC-10 departures. The follow-
ing data represent all events affecting departures and flights attributed to
the aircraft systems being compared.
CONSEQUENCE NUMBER -3RATE x .10
Delays 0-15 minutes 159 0.73
Delays > 15 minutes 458 2. 11
Cance11 ati ons 27 0.12
Aborts 11 0.05
Out of Service 5 0.02
TOTAL 660 3.03 x 10-3
This tota1 corresponds to approximately one event per 330 departures. A
goal of 3x10-3 was thus established as a maximum acceptable delay or cancella-
tion probability for a new configuration including the addition of RSSAS
functions.
4.1.3.2 Mission Reliability. - Mission Reliability is the probability that
a flight after takeoff will continue to its planned destination. It is the com-
plement of abort probability. For the systems of interest, the DC-10 value for
the probability of inf1ight abort is shown in the preceding table. A review of
the individual aborts, however, indicates that none of the recorded aborts can
be justified as required by the aircraft system or hardware state but were
based on pilot judgment of the situation. The eleven aborts included in the
data sample are itemized in Table 4-1. A review of these descriptions shows that
a truly critical flight safety issue was not involved. Although pilot judgment
will continue to produce aborts of the type listed for any new aircraft, it is
anticipated that improved fault detection and monitoring should reduce the fre-
quency by providing the crew with better information. Therefore, for the
Mission Reliability we have used the goal of one abort in 100,000 flights, or
a single flight abort probability of 1x10-5. This number is an interpretation
of the regulatory requirements and is more stringent than the five in 100,000
derived from the data. For a further discussion on flight safety see Para-
graph 4.1.4.
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2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
B.
9.
10.
11.
TABLE 4-1
REASONS FOR ABORTS
BOTH ATSC COMPUTERS MALFUNCTIONED SHORTLY AFTER TAKEOFF. CAUSED STALL WARNING AND
AUTO SLAT TRIP.
ONE ATSC FAILED DURING OR SHORTLY AFTER TAKEOFF. CAUSED STICK SHAKER TO ACTUATE AND
SLAT DISAGREE LIGHT TO COME ON WHEN FLAPS WERE RETRACTED. PULLED CIRCUIT BREAKER AND
REDISPATCHED FLIGHT.
RETURNED AFTER TAKEOFF BECAUSE OF ANGLE-OF-ATTACK SENSOR PROBLEM. UNABLE TO REPAIR
LOC~LLY SO AIRCRAFT DISPATCHI:D AND SENSOR REPLACED AT MAIN BASI;:.
RETURNED AFTER TAKEOFF DUE TO ATSC FAULT WHICH ACTUATED STICK SHAKER. ATSC CIRCUIT
BREAKER PULLED AND FLIGHT REDISPATC.HED. ...
NUMBER 3 HYDRAULIC SYSTEM LOST FLUIQ DUE TO LEAK AT A HORIZONTAL STABILIZER TRIM
MOTOR.
NUMBER 1 HYDRAULIC SYSTEM LOST FLUID DUE TO LEAK IN A HORIZONTAL STABILIZER TRIMMOTOR. . .. .
RETURNED AFTER TAKEOFF BECAUSE HORIZONTAL STABILIZER TRIM WAS INOPERATIVE. COUPLING
HAD COME LOOSE, ALLOWING QUILL SHAFT TO DISENGAGE. ..
AFTER TAKEOFF AND FLAP RETRACTION, SELECT FLAP-LIMIT OVERRIDE LIGHT CAME ON. REPLACED
ACTUATOR. . .
NUMBER 1 HYDRAULIC SYSTEM LEAKING. FOUND LEAK AT A SPOILER SERVO.
RETURNED AFTER TAKEOFF DUE TO A VIBRATION IN LEFT WING AREA. FOUND INBOARD SLAT
TRAILING EDGE RUBBING ON WING SURFACE AREA. REPOSITIONED SLAT AND AIRCRAFT CHECKED OK.
MACH AIRSPEED INDICATOR FAILED. AFTER INFLIGHT CONSULTATION WITH COMPANY, AIRCRAFT
RETURNED AND INDICATOR WAS REPLACED. .
4.1.3.3 Economic Reliability. - MTBUR is often used as an indicator of
economic reliability because it indicates the frequency of maintenance actions
performed on a system, and suggests the level of spares, staffing, skills,
etc., required to support the system.
All of the items listed in Appendix 3 were interrogated through THESYS to
determine the contribution their overall combined MTBUR has on DC-10 economic
• .. , • c ,"" ". ,- . . "
reliability. Based on this evaluation, an MTBUR of close to 70 hours was
established. This means that one of the listed items is removed from a DC-10
or the average of once every 70 flight hours. Using the DC-10 as the baseline
for ac~eptab1e economic reliability, the goal for the systems considered in
this study was set at a total MTBUR of no less than 70 hours. The additions,
deletions, and changes to the DC-lO components resulting from the study con-
figurations were tabulated and researched to provide an estimate of the equiva-
lent EET MTBUR.
4.1.4 Definition of Safety Factors. - Various approaches are in use
among civil and military agencies for controlling the safety level of active
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or augmented primary control systems. These approaches have required evaluation
and reconciliation. Generally, the current status of these approaches is as
follows:
(a) No special civil regulations or advisory circulars currently exist
that are directed specifically at relaxed stability designs. FAR
25.671 and 25.672, together with the prevailing interpretation of
25.1309, must be extrapolated to cover relaxed stability designs
with active controls.
(b) Civil regulatory agencies do not define flying qualities in the
detail that MIL-F-8785 and MIL-F-9490D do, but rather relate the
allowable degradation to the effect on the outcome of the flight.
For example, FAR 25.671 states the airplane must be "capable of
continued safe flight and landing ... within the normal flight
envelope, without requiring exceptional piloting skill or strength."
This condition must prevail after any single failure or combination
of failures not shown to be extremely improbable. Likewise, FAR
25.672 states that after any single failure of a stability augmenta-
tion system or other powered control system the airplane must·be
"safely controllable" and its basic flight characteristics must not
be "impaired below a level needed to permit continued safe flight
and landing. 1I
(c) The British Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) and the European Joint
Aeronautical Regulations (JAR) have published quantitative probability
requirements for use in analytical safety assessment of systems. The
FAA philosophy is basically in agreement with CAA Paper No. 670 and
JAR 25.1309, but no official publication quantifying the probability
expressions found in various FAR's has yet been issued. Figure 4-7
depicts the apparent consensus of the three organizations. The FAA
is currently endorsing the view that the approximate lxlO-9 proba-
bility of catastrophic loss is "per flight or flight-hour."* This
means that if the aircraft is exposed to the hazard for a flight
*Occasionally this has been expressed as IIFor each trial or hour of exposure. II
The interpretation is the same for both.
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duration longer than one hour, the event risk probability for a
flight may be greater than lxlO-9. For additional discussion on
this subject, see Appendix 4.
(d) In contrast to (a) through (c) above, the two military specifications
are relatively precise in relating specific quantitative probability
requirements to subjective flying quality criteria such as the Cooper
Rating Scale. The military is also, understandably, somewhat more
lenient in their quantitative requirements for the probability of
undesired events.
4.1.5 Formulation of Safety Factors. - Figure 4-8 illustrates the various
measures for rating aircraft safety as they relate to flight control systems
and handling qualities. The figure attempts to correlate the civil and mili-
tary quantitative risks with a suitable qualitative measure of flying quality
such as the levels defined in MIL-F-9490D. The Cooper-Harper Rating, as
evolved from NASA TN-D-5153 dated April 1969, is also correlated.
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JAR-25 AND CAA PROBABILITY OF ENCOUNTERING (TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT)
COOPER MIL-F-8785B MIL-F-9490D FCS PAPER NO. 670 CURRENT APPARENT OUTLOOKHARPER FLYING QUALITIES OPERATIONAL OCCURRENCE
RATING. LEVEL STATES EFFECTS MIL-F-8785B MIL-F-9490D FAA CAA/JAR L1KELY OUTCOMES
1 TO 3.5 1 I NORMAL NORMAL NORMAL NORMAL NORMAL FLIGHT PLAN OR
NORMAL STATE (OPE RATIONAL MISSION COMPLETED
FOR OPERATIONAL ENVELOPE)
ENVELOPE
3.5 TO 6.5 2 I (SERVICE MINOR <1 x 10-2 <1 x 10-3 UNDEFINED >lx10-5 FLIGHT PLAN DR
NORMAL STATE ENVELOPE) PER FLIGHT PER FLIGHT PER FLIGHT OR MISSION COMPLETED
FOR SERVICE II (OPERATIONAL (FCS ONLYl FLIGHT HOUR
ENVELOPE ENVELOPE)
6.5 TO 9- 3 II (SERVICE MAJOR <1 x 10-4 NOT <lx10-5 1 x 10=; TO FLIGHT PLAN
ENVELOPE) SIGNIFICANT PER FLIGHT SPECIFIED PER FLIGHT OR 1 x 10 PER ABORTED; POSSIBLE
III FLIGHT HOUR FLIGHT OR INCIDENT
FLIGHT HOUR
10 WORSE THAN 3 IV MAJOR NOT NOT UNDEFINED -7 INCIDENT OP1 x 10-9 TO
(EMERGENCY HAZARDOUS SPECIFIED SPECIFIED 1 x 10 PER ACCIDENT; INJURIES
LANDING FLIGHT OR POSSIBLE LOSS OF LIFE
POSSIBLE) FLIGHT HOUR
WORSE WORSE THAN 3 V CATASTROPHIC NOT <5 x 10-7 -1 x 10-9 PER <1 x 10-9 TOTALLY DESTROYED;
THAN (AIRCRAFT LOST) SPECIFIED PER FLIGHT FLIGHT OR PER FLIGHT OR MULTIPLE DEATHS
10 (FCS ONLY) FLIGHT HOUR FLIGHT HOUR
OPERATIONAL ENVELOPE (MIL-F-8785B)
THE BOUNDARIES IN TERMS OF SPEED, ALTITUDE AND LOAD FACTOR
WITHIN WHICH THE DEFINED MISSION FOR EACH FLIGHT PHASE MAY
BE ACCOMPLISHED.
SERVICE ENVELOPE (MIL-F-8785B)
THE BOUNDARIES IN TERMS OF COMBINATIONS OF SPEED, ALTITUDE,
AND NORMAL ACCELERATION DERIVED FROM AIRPLANE LIMITS.
FIGURE 4-8. FLIGHT SAFETY CRITERIA, COMPARISON OF CURRENT GOVERNMENT STANDARDS
Figure 4-8 is intended to stimulate discussion and generate comments
from interested parties. It illustrates several points that must be recon-
ciled in the near future. The civil agencies are, understandably, more con-
servative in the quantified risk probabilities for undesired events than the
mil ita ry • The mi 1itary does, however, corre1ate hand1i ng qual i ti es ·and
envelope restrictions to quantified risk probabilities. This the civil
agencies have not as yet done. Some "force fitting" of civil scales to
military scales was necessary to establish an initial handling qualities scale
which correlates with the civil quantified risk scale. Guidance for the cor-
relation of the Cooper-Harper scale with the two military specifications, and
the two specifications with each other, was taken from the user's guides for
these two specifications.
It was necessary to identify "worse than 10" and "worse than 3" conditions
because both 10 on the Cooper-Harper Scale and 3 in MIL-F-87858 are conditions
from which the aircraft may be recovered to at least an emergency landing.
The civil risk probability of lxlO-9 applies to catastrophic loss, which is
postulated to be even worse than 10 or 3. MIL-F-9490D, State V, also implies
conditions worse than 10 or 3.
Although the comparison of standards in Figure 4-8 is somewhat subjective,
it does reveal uniformity of philosophy among agencies. Variations are encoun-
tered in such specifics as the level of risk, and the descriptors of a particu-
lar condition or event. Therefore it is possible to judge design configurations
being considered in this study in an orderly, unambiguous manner. The quanti-
tative scale selected is that of the more conservative civil agency, specifi-
cally the eM/JAR scale. This is defined in more detail than the FAA scale,
and aligns both with the Cooper-Harper Rating and the well-defined flying
qualities scales of the two military specifications. An example of the use of
the data may be offered. Since the unaugmented EET was designed to exhibit
Level 2 or better flying qualities for all flight regimes, the probability of
functional failure of the augmentation system should be in the area of lxlO-5
for one hour of flight.
4.2 Selected System R~liability Analysis
The RSSAS function and architecture are developed in Section 6 of this
report. In this section, the reliability of those selected architectures is
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analyzed with a Flight Augmentation Computer (FAC) configuration which per-
forms only the RSSAS function and another which integrates several augmenta-
tion functions including the RSSAS. The probability of individual function
loss will be shown for various mission lengths assuming a fUlly operative
system at dispatch and then again for a minimum equipment dispatch •. Compli-
ance with safety criteria established in Paragraph 4.1.5 will be verified.
Finally, the reliability of the total EET flight control system including
integrated flight augmentation functions and two versions of the flight guid-
ancesystem to be defined, is compared with the DC-10 reliability criteria of
Paragraph 4.1.3.
4.2.1 Definition of the EEl Augmentation System
4.2.1.1 Selected RSSAS Architecture. - Two candidate RSSAS architectures
were selected as a result of the evaluation studies described in Section 6.
They differ only in the redundancy of the Flight Augmentation Computer (FAC),
one using three computers and the other only two. The triple redundant FAC
configuration is shown in Figure 4-9. The dual configuration would eliminate
FAC
2
RIGHT
INBOARD
ELEVATOR
8 FAC3 LEFT
INBOARD
ELEVATOR
FAC
1
NOTE: TRIPLE-REDUNDANT SYSTEM
SHOWN, FOR DUAL-REDUNDANT
SYSTEM, REMOVE FAC 3 AND
REWIRE AS DASHED LINES
INDICATE.
FIGURE 4-9. SELECTED RSSAS BLOCK DIAGRAM
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the No. 3 FAC and rewire the elevator interface so that both inboard elevators
received an input from both FACs.
The required sensor array is based upon the selection of the control law
family. Pitch attitude (e) is provided the the vertical gyros, pitch rate
(8) is obtained by differentiating the pitch signal, airspeed (u) by the air
data computer, and angle of attack (a) from the angle of attack sensors.
4.2.1.2 Additional Augmentation Functions. - Additional augmentation
functions were considered for integration into the FAC. These include yaw
damping, elevator load feel programming, flap limiting, and stall warning.
On the DC-10these functions are spread out among several different computers
as shown in Figure 4-10. Yaw damping is performed by the yaw computer which
also provides the autoland flight guidance function of runway alignment and
rollout guidance. Elevator load feel programming and flap limiting computa-
tion is performed by two, dual ELF/FL computers. The two Autothrottle/Speed
Control (AT/SC) computers provide the stall warning calculations.
Figure 4-11 shows the integrated triple redundant flight augmentation
system proposed for theEET. This configuration is expanded in Figure 4-12 to
identify the individual elements to be considered in this reliability analysis.
4.2.1.3 Flight Guidance Systems. - The automatic flight control functions
on the DC-10 are performed by a large complement of computers as shown in Fig-
ure 4-13. These computers are all analog and represent the state-of-the-art
technology for the time period in which the system was designed. For the EET,
digital technology will be used to integrate and perform these automatic
control functions. As shown in Figure 4-14, two digital Flight Control Com-
puters will replace the 10 analog computers required for the DC-10.
Reliability comparisons of the EET flight control system with that of the
DC-10 baseline will consider:
(a) An EET with a DC-10 type automatic flight guidance system to estab-
lish the individual effect of the revised flight augmentation
functions, and
(b) An EET with a new digital automatic flight control system to evalu-
ate the actual expect configurations.
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4.2.1.4 Failure Rate Data For Selected Systems. - To enable a quantita-
tive reliability analysis of the selected configurations, failure rates are
required at the appropriate level to be used in a math model of the system.
Table 4-2 summarizes the failure rates derived for the 34 identified elements
included in the analyses discussed in the next section. With the exception of
the computer, the values were taken from current operational aircraft experi-
ence or were adjusted for changes at the element or piece-part level where
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FIGURE 4-11. EET FLIGHT AUGMENTATION SYSTEM BLOCK DIAGRAM
design changes were deemed necessary for the RSSAS function or because the new
computer performs the function differently from current systems.
The computer failure rates are derived from a study of digital systems
currently under development such as the DC-9 Super 80 autopilot, and design
level estimates provided by vendors based largely on generic sources such as
~lIL-STD-2l7B. Two sets of failure rates were used for the SCDP and CPU to
account for performing only the RSSAS function or to incorporate all the other
functions also. The analyses considered both cases,
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fABLE 4-2
FAILURE RATES FOR SELECTED SYSTEM elEMENTS
ANALYSIS FAILURE FAILURE
CODE RATE IN RATE
NUMBER NAME FAILURES/HR SOURCE
Xl, X2, X3 VERTICAL GYROS 510 x 10~ CURRENT AIRCRAFT
X4,X5 AOASENSORS 330 x 10~ CURRENT AIRCRAFT
X6,X7 AIR DATA COMPUTER 100 x 10~ IMPROVED DC-l0 TYPE
X8,X9 YAW RATE GYRO 86 x 10~ CURRENT AIRCRAFT
Xl0, Xll FLAP·POSITION SENSING 2 x 10~ DERIVED FROM DC-l0 ELEMENTS
X12,X13 SLAT·POSITION SENSING 61 x 10~ DERIVED FROM DC-l0 ELEMENTS
X14,X15,X16 SCDP WITH ALL FUNCTIONS 80 x 10~ lY14, Y15, Y16 SCDP FOR RSSAS ON LY 62.5 x 10~ GENERICALLY DERIVEDX17, X18, X19 CPU WITH ALL FUNCTIONS 260 x 10~ FROM STUDIES ANDY17, Y18, Y19 CPU FOR RSSAS ONLY 188 x 10~ SYSTEMS UNDER DEVELOPMENT
X20 STICK SHAKER 2.4 x 10~ DERIVED FROM DC·l0 ELEMENTS
X21, X22 RUDDER ACTUATION 5 x 10~ MODIFIED DC·l0
X23,X24 ELEVATOR ACTUATION 5 x 10~ MODIFIED DC·l0
X25,X26 ELEVATOR-LOAD FEEL 35 x 10-6 DERIVED FROM DC-l0 ELEMENTS
X27,X28 FLAP·L1MITING 35 x 10~ DERIVED FROM DC·l0 ELEMENTS
X29, X30, IEHV, MOO, LVOT, I DERIVED FROM DC·l0 AND
X3l, X32 AND VALVES COMBINED 9 x 10~ VENDOR'S DESIGN DATA
X33,X34 INFLIGHT HYDRAULIC SYSTEM LOSS 15 x 10~ CURRENT AIRCRAFT
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4.2.2 Reliability Analysis
4.2.2.1 Program Description. - The Network Reliability Analysis Model
(RAM) is a computer program designed to calculate the reliability of complex
systems. The program, written in Fortran IV for the IBM 370 computer, is
capable of analyzing any system that can be described by a reliability logic
di agram•
.The inputs required to run the program include:
(a) Mission time (and total exposure time, if different)
(b) Component failure rates
(c) System success criteria.
With this information RN~ systematically IIfails ll different combinations
of components, utilizing the success criteria to determine which combinations
cause system failure. The probability of each such combination is then
computed (using the product rule for independent events) and these are added
together to produce the total probability of system failure. To ensure that
the calculations are II mutually exclusive and exhaustive ll a binomial expansion
method is used. That is, the model first examines all lI one failure ll combina-
tions, then all combinations of exactly two component failures, and so on until
all probable combinations have been examined. A simplified flow chart of RAM
is given in Figure 4-15.
The success criteria are entered by means of logic equations. The use
of this method is best explained by giving some examples.
Table 4-3 shows some typical system networks and the logic equations that
describe the successful operation of the networks. An lI andll condition is
symbo1i zed by the character 11*11 and an lIor" conditi on by the symbol "+. II
RAM is capable of analyzing one or several systems or system functions
during the same run by entering a set of logic equations for each system func-
tion to be analyzed. This feature is of.value in evaluating alternative
systems and determining the effect of varying component failure rates.
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READ COMPONENT NAMES,
FAILURE RATES, AND LOGIC
EQUATIONS
SELECT A K FAILURE
COMBINATION
COMPUTE PROBABILITY
OF THIS EVENT
DETERMINE WHICH
FUNCTIONS (IF ANY) ARE
FAILED WITH THIS
COMBINATION
NO
ADD PROBABILITY TO EACH
SUCH FUNCTION AND STORE
INCREASE K BY 1
YES
K = 1,2, ...,N
*N = THE MAXIMUM NUMBER OF
COMPONENT FAILURES TO BE
EXAMINED IN COMBINATION
FIGURE 4-15. RAM "FLOWCHART
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LOGIC DIAGRAM
TABLE 4·3
EXAMPLES OF RAM lOGIC EQUATIONS
LOGIC EQUATION ENGLISH EQUIVALENT
(SERIES)
THE SYSTEM(S) WORKS IF A AND
BANDCWORK .
(PARALLEL)
(TWO OF THREE REQUIRED)
S=A+B+C
S = A * (B + C) + (B * C)
THE SYSTEM(S) WORKS IF A OR B OR
CWORKS
THE SYSTEM(S) WORKS IF A WORKS
AND EITHER B OR C WORKS, OR
BOTH BAND C WORK
(CROSSTIE) .
S = C * (A + B) * (D + E) + THE SYSTEM(S) WORKS IF THE CROSSTIE (C)
(A * D) + (B * E) WORKS AND EITHER A OR B WORKS AND
EITHER D OR E WORKS, OR (IN CASE
C FAILS) ·EITHER A AND D MUST
WORK OR BAND E MUST WORK
The output from the model includes a listing of the components with their
associated failure rates, and the probability of failure for each function
requested. Appendix 5 provides these for some of the runs conducted in this
study.
4.2.2.2 Reliability Logic Diagrams. - The reliability logic diagrams in
Figures 4-16 through 4-19 are for the trip1e- and dual-redundant architectures
discussed in Paragraph 4.2.1. The numbers in the blocks correspond to the
elements listed in Table 4-2.
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RAM ANSWE R CODE
A COMPUTERS PROV' DE RSSAS FUNCTIONS ONLY
AA COMPUTERS PROVIDE ADDITIONAL FUNCTIONS ALSO
FIGURE 4-16. RELIABILITY LOGIC DIAGRAM FOR RSSAS TRIPLE-REDUNDANT COMPUTERS
Reliability logic diagrams are used to provide visual insight into the
mathematical calculations performed by RAM. They illustrate the various paths
available for successful performance of the function of interest as determined
by the system architecture. In this sense they are usually clearer and less
ambiguous than system schematics.
Each function of interest is diagramed separately although many elements
are common to several functions. Wherever the same number appears in more
than one block it represents the same physical element, not another like it.
When identical elements are physically duplicated each is uniquely identified
as indicated in Table 4-2. Thus, if an element bearing a particular identifi-
cation number fails, that failure affects every location where that number is
used. The RAM answer code is merely to aid correlating the computer printouts
provided in Appendix 5 to the proper logic diagrams.
4.2.2.3 Functional Reliability Calculations. - The logic equations for
each of the diagramed functions were entered in RAM as previously discussed.
Failure rates from Table 4-2 were used and probability calculations were made
for exposure times of one, two, and five hours for each of the configurations.
Complete computer printouts for these ru~s are provided in Appendix 5.
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FIGURE 4-17. RELIABILITY LOGIC DIAGRAM FOR NOTED FUNCTIONS - TRIPLE·REDUNDANT
COMPUTERS
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RAM ANSWER CODE
A COMPUTERS PROVIDE RSSAS FUNCTIONS ONLY
AA COMPUTERS PROVIDE ADDITIONAL FUNCTIONS ALSO
FIGURE 4-18. RELIABILITY LOGIC DIAGRAM FOR RSSAS DUAL-REDUNDANT COMPUTERS
Additionally, calculations were made for a postulated worst case minimum
equipment dispatch. The aircraft was presumed to depart with all of the items
listed below inoperative at the start of the flight.
One of three vertical gyros
One of two angle-of-attack sensors
One of two yaw rate gyros
One of two flap position monitors
One of two slat position monitors
One of three computers (SCDP and CPU)
One of two rudder actuators
One of two ELF actuators
Table 4-4 is a tabulation of some of the results of these analyses. Fig-
ure 4-20 is a plot of the RSSAS function failure probability versus exposure
time. It illustrates the sensitivity of the configurations considered in this
study to the one-hour standard discussed in Paragraph 4.1.4. Even for the
worst case minimum equipment dispatch, the goal of lxlO-5 failure probability
is not exceeded.
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ANSWER
CODE
YAW DAMPER
STALL WARNING
ELEVATOR LOAD FEEL
FLAP-LIMITING
FIGURE 4-19. RELIABILITY LOGIC DIAGRAMS FOR NOTED FUNCTIONS - DUAL-REDUNDANT
COMPUTERS
A further analysis was conducted to determine the reliability sensitivity
of the functions with a single-selected element inoperative at dispatch. Tables
4-5 and 4-6 show the results of this analysis in terms of a multiplier to the
loss probabilities calculated for "all up" dispatches shown in Table 4-4.
Finally~ an analysis of the impact on dispatch delays and economic relia-
bility was conducted. Two possibi,lities were considered. First~ that RSSAS
would be added but the baseline DC-10 flight guidance system would remain.
Second, the new computers would integrate both RSSAS and FGS functions. The
basis for this analysis is the components listed in Appendix 3. Those cQmpo-
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TABLE 4-4
PROBABILITY OF FUNCTION LOSS
DURING ONE-, TWO-, AND FIVE-HOUR EXPOSURES
3-COMP CONFIGURAT'ON 2-COMP CONFIGURATION
RAM 1 HR
CODE FUNCTION 1 HR 2 HR 5HR MIN D'SP 1 HR 2HR 5HR
A RSSAS (ONLV) 0.259 x 10-9 1.07 X 10-9 7.37 x 10-9 255 x 10-9 41.4 x 10-9 166 x 10-"3 1030 x 10-"3
AA RSSAS (ALL FUNCTIONS) 0.272 x 10-9 1.18 x 10-9 8.98 x 10-9 294 x 10-9 76.8 x 10-"3 307 x 10-"3 1920 x 10-9
B VAWDAMPER 0.858 x 10-7 3.43 x 10-7 21.4 x 10-7 3660 x 10-7 0.922 x 10-7 3.69 x 10-7 23 x 10-7
C STALL WARNING 0.258 x 10-5 0.552 x 10-5 1.65 X 10-5 39.5 x 10-5 0.259 x 10-5 0.555 x 10-5 1.67x10-5
D ELF 0.970 x 10-7 3.88 X 10-7 24.2 X 10-7 2950 x 10-7 1.03 x 10-7 4.14 x 10-7 25.8 x 10-'-7
E FLAP LIMITING \.~ 0.970 x 10-7 3.88 x 10-7 24.2 x 10-7 2950 x 10-7 1.03 x 10-7 4.14 x 10-7 25.8 x 10-7
ALL ALL FUNCTIONS 0.018 x 10-9 0.144 x 10-9 2.22 x 10-9 74 x 10-"3 74 x 10-9 296 x 10-9 1850 x 10-9
AAB RSSAS AND VAW DAMPER 0.245 x 10-9 1.06 x 10-9 8.10 x 10-9 85.9 x 10-9 74.2 x 10-9 297 x 10-"3 1860 x 10-"3
~
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TABLE 4-5
EFFECT OF VARIOUS SINGLE COMPONENTS INOPERATIVE-
3-COMPUTER CONFIGURATION
SINGLE-eOMPONENT INFLIGHT FAILURE PROBABILITY IMPACT ON:
TYPE INOPERATIVE ONLY YAW DAMPER (B) STALL WARN (C) ELF (D) FL (E)
RSSAS (A)
VERTICAL GYRO INSIG NONE NONE NONE NONE
AOFA INSIG NONE 127 TIMES WORSE NONE NONE
AIR DATA COMPUTER INSIG NONE NONE 1030 TIMES WORSE 1030 TIMES WORSE
YAW RATE GYRO NONE 1000 TIMES WORSE NONE NONE NONE
FLAP POSITION NONE NONE 1.8 TIMES WORSE NONE NONE
SLAT POSITION NONE NONE 24 TIMES WORSE NONE NONE
SCDP AND CPU (1 OR 3) 173 TIMES WORSE 3255 TIMES WORSE 100 TIMES WORSE 3093 TIMES WORSE 3093 TIMES WORSE
SCDP AND CPU (2) 158 TIMES WORSE INSIG INSIG INSIG INSIG
STICK SHAKER NONE NONE CRITICAL NONE NONE
RUDDER ACTUATION NONE 3255 TIMES WORSE NONE NONE NONE
ELEVATOR ACTUATION 20,000 TIMES WORSE NONE NONE NONE NONE
ELEVATOR LOAD FEEL ACTUATION NONE NONE NONE 3093 TIMES WORSE NONE
FLAP LIMITER ACTUATION NONE NONE NONE NONE 3093 TIMES WORSE
EHV, MOD, LVDT AND SOV (COMP 2) 16 TIMES WORSE NONE NONE NONE NONE
HYDRAULIC SYSTEM 60,000 TIMES WORSE 3255 TIMES WORSE NONE NONE NONE
EHV, MOD, LVDT AND SOV 157 TIMES WORSE NONE NONE NONE NONE
(COMP 1 OR 3)
THIS TABLE I LLUSTRATES THE FAILURE PROBABILITY SENSITIVITY OF FUNCTIONS WITH SELECTED COMPONENTS INOPERATIVE
FOR THE TOTAL FLIGHT. IT REFLECTS THE RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF THESE COMPONENTS TO THE FUNCTIONAL CONFIGURATIONS
ANALYZED. IT SHOULD NOT BE CONSTRUED TO ENDORSE ANY SPECIFIC DISPATCH-INOPERATIVE CRITERIA.
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TABLE 4-6
EFFECT OF VARIOUS SINGLE COMPONENTS INOPERATIVE-
2-COMPUTER CONFIGURATION
INFLIGHT FAILURE PROBABILITY IMPACT ON:
SINGLE-COMPONENT
TYPE INOPERATIVE RSSAS (A) YAW DAMPER (B) STALL WARN (C) ELF (D) FL (E)
VERTICAL GYRO INSIG NONE NONE NONE NONE
AOFA INSIG NONE 127 TIMES WORSE NONE NONE
AIR DATA COMPUTER INSIG NONE NONE 1000 TIMES WORSE 1000 TIMES WORSE
YAW RATE GYRO NONE 934 TIMES WORSE NONE NONE NONE
FLAP POSITION NONE NONE 1.7 TIMES WORSE NONE NONE
SLAT POSITION NONE NONE 24 TIMES WORSE NONE NONE
SCDP AND DPU 6038 TIMES WORSE 3913 TIMES WORSE 130 TIMES WORSE 3800 TIMES WORSE 3800 TIMES WORSE
STICK SHAKER NONE NONE CRITICAL NONE NONE
RUDDER ACTUATION NONE 3043 TIMES WORSE NONE NONE NONE
ELEVATOR ACTUATION 120 TIMES WORSE NONE NONE NONE NONE
ELEVATOR LOAD FEEL ACTUATION NONE NONE NONE 3000 TIMES WORSE NONE
FLAP LIMITER ACTUATION NONE NONE NONE NONE 3000 TIMES WORSE
EHV, MOD, LVDT AND SOV INSIG NONE NONE NONE NONE
HYDRAULIC SYSTEM 362 TIMES WORSE 3043 TIMES WORSE NONE NONE NONE
THIS TABLE ILLUSTRATES THE FAILURE PROBABILITY SENSITIVITY OF FUNCTIONS WITH SELECTED COMPONENTS INOPERATIVE
FOR THE TOTAL FLIGHT. IT REFLECTS THE RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF THESE COMPONENTS TO THE FUNCTIONAL CONFIGURATIONS
ANALYZED. IT SHOULD NOT BE CONSTRUED TO ENDORSE ANY SPECIFIC DISPATCH-INOPERATIVE CRITERIA.
nents that are replaced by new items were deleted and replaced by the appro-
priate items from Table 4-2. The net difference was then calculated by com-
paring item by item the cause for each delay in the baseline sample of 660
occurrences discussed in Paragraph 4.1.3.1, and adjusting the overall probabil-
ities by the relative reliability of the old and new elements. Two 'computers
were assumed required for dispatch in all four cases analyzed.
A similar approach was used to estimate the net effect on economic relia-
bilityin terms of MTBUR. The components replaced from the list in Appendix 3
by new elements had their contribution to the MTBUR subtracted out. The fail-
ure rates of the selected new items from Table 4-2 were increased by 20 percent
to allow for less than perfect troubleshooting at the line level and factored
into the remaining list to calculate the new total MTBUR for each configura-
tion. The results of the delay analysis and the MTBUR analysis are given on
Table 4-7.
TABLE 4-7
RESULTS OF DISPATCH DELAY AND
ECONOMIC RELIABI L1TY ANALYSES
*RSSAS AND NEW FGS
*RSSAS ADDED *RSSAS ADDED FUNCTION ADDED
EVENT BASE DC-10 3-COMPCONF 2-COMPCONF 3·COMPCONF 2·COMPCONF
DELAYS
0-15 MIN 0.73 x 10-3 0.66 x 10-3 0.89 x 10-3 0.57 x 10-3 0.76 x 10-3
> 15 MIN 2.11 x 10-3 1.99 x 10-3 2.38 x 10-3 1.73 x 10-3 2.18 x 10-3
CANCELLATIONS 0.12 x 10-3 0.11 x 10-3 0.14 x 10-3 0.11 x 10-3 0.13 x 10-3
ABORTS 0.05 x 10-3**
-- -- -- --
OUT OF SERVICE 0.02 x 10-3 0.02 x 10-3 0.02 x 10-3 0.02 x 10-3 0.03 x 10-3
TOTAL 3.03 x 10-3 2.79 x 10-3 3.43 x 10-3 2.43 x 10-3 3.10 x 10-3
*VALUES BASED ON 1 -HOUR FLIGHT; NO CREDIT FOR GROUND REPAI R TIME; TWO COMPUTERS REQUI RED
FOR DISPATCH.
**PILOT ELECTIVE ABORTS, NO CRITICAL FUNCTIONS LOST.
I(ST~DY GOAL) I 76 HOURS I 78 HOURS I 116 HOURS I 122 HOURSMTBUR 70 HOURS
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SECTION 5
CONTROL LAW DEVELOPMENT
The aerodynamic performance of the EET aircraft requires two unique
control functions: relaxed longitudinal static stability augmentation, and
compensation for pitch coupling to variations in engine thrust. The primary
objective of this study is the development of a longitudinal control system
to restore the classic commercial transport flying qualities to an aircraft
with approximately zero static margin. The system referred to as the Relaxed
Static Stability Augmentation System (RSSAS) must perform this task by sensing
the primary control inputs and aircraft response and providing supplementary
aircraft control commands. Since the EET is a derivative of the DC-10 with
anticipated common airline operators, commonality of hardware, function, and
flying qualities are goals of the aircraft system desi~n. Specifically, the
RSSAS control law development has been based upon (1) use of the sensor types
presently available on the DC-10, and (2) duplication of the DC-10 flying
qualities with regard to aircraft response to pilot control inputs. RSSAS
aircraft control is accomplished primarily through the elevator surfaces.
Control laws have also been developed for joint elevator and throttle control,
but the added complexity of an automatic throttle augmentor will not be
permitted, since elevator-only control has been successfully demonstrated.
The basic EET exhibits significant pitching moments due to thrust changes
on the wing-mounted engines. While this characteristic is not a result of
relaxed stability, it has a degrading effect on both the aircraft static
stability and the pilots ability to stabilize the aircraft velocity. The
augmentor has been developed also to provide the necessary elevator control
to compensate for this pitch-thrust coupling. Two methods were identified
as solutions. The first was to develop relaxed stability augmentation control
laws with integral. thrust-sensing and automatic throttle control. This would
have a significant impact on the required system components, interfaces, and
total functional availability. The second approach (which was followed)
assumed that a simple thrust-to-elevator compensation could be determined
for all control laws and flight conditions. This control is functionally
independent of the relaxed static stability augmentation.
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It is, very important that large displacement or long-term elevator
deflections be transferred to the horizontal stabilizer to restore the
elevator authority and trim. The existing DC-10 type horizontal stabilizer
trim system has been modified to provide this feature and the autotrim mechani-
zation is discussed in detail in Section 6 of this report.
5.1 Modern Control Theory Technique
·5.1.1 General Discussion. - The modern control analysis and simulation
program J8QN, previously developed at Douglas, has been used to generate
full-state feedback RSS~S control laws based upon EET equations of motion for
six flight conditions. These control laws were developed using an implicit-
model-following technique (Reference 8) in which selected feedforward and
feedback gains cause the aircraft to follow a specified model as closely as
possible. Figure 5-1 is an example of this model-following technique. In
this example, the aircraft equations are for the cruise aft center of gravity
with the EET (40 percent mean aerodynamic chord (MAC)), and the model equa-
tions are the aft center of gravity DC-10 (30.3 percent MAC). The gain
•
matrix, M, is the resultant required gains for U,a,e, and e for the elevator
and throttle controls. The F matrix is the required gains for elevator,and
throttle commands.
5.1.2 Optimization Constraints. - Results obtained from this implicit~
model-following synthesis method depend heavily upon the designer-selected
weighting factor matrices, Q and R. Past experience with the method has
shown that the best model-following is obtained when R is taken as a null
matrix. Selecting R to be null could, in principle, lead to excessive)y high
gain matrices. This possible problem can always be avoided in practice by
realistic model selection. No problems of this sort have been encountered
in the EET studies. Past experience has also shown that choosing Q to be
simply a diagonal matrix, as is usually done in application of theory, leads
to a matching of the high-frequency response of the model. This choice can
result in totally unacceptable low-frequency-matching in some cases. A
method was previously developed at Douglas which automatically selects the
weighting matrix Q so that all frequencies are reasonably matched. This is
done when equating the aircraft and model by multiplying by the inverse
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COST FUNCTION MINIMIZED
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FIGURE 5-1. IMPLICIT-MODEL-FOLLOWING CONTROL
of L [(L,-l]. In practice, this is done by setting Q= (L LT,-l (/L/LT).1/2
Modern control analysis program J8QN has incorporated these weighting factor
selection features. Thus, in the present synthesis studies, the full-state
feedback solutions were determined uniquely in terms of the aircraft equations
of motion and the desired model equations. This method has proved to be
highly successful in producing high-quality solutions for all frequencies.
5.1.3 Real-Model Following. - Although most of the EET control law
synthesis studies performed have involved the implicit-madel-following
approach, some preliminary work has been done using a new real-madel-following
synthesis procedure. This real-madel-following approach, shown in Figure 5-2,
first generates a full-state feedback gain matrix, M, by means of a Linear-
Quadratic-Gaussian (LQG) regulation synthesis. The weighting factors, Q and
R, are selected by the designer so that reasonable feedback gains and c1osed-
loop natural frequencies are obtained. These gains will usually be higher
than the gains generated by the implicit-madel-following approach. The new
features in this approach involve the subsequent determination of a compen-
sator model and a feedforward gain matrix which cause the command response of
the system to track the desired model response. The command response
tracking of this system is similar to that of the system based on imp1icit-
model-following. Real-madel-following is suggested when a reduction is
required in sensitivity of the response to changes or uncertainties in air-
craft parameters. In the analysis performed to date, a need for this approach
has not been demonstrated; therefore, work in this area has been discontinued.
Subsequent studies based on flight da~a may result in a renewed interest in
real-madel-following.
5.2 Control Law Formulation
5.2.1 Full-State Control Law Development. - The imp1icit-model-
following synthesis technique has been employed in the current EET studies to
develop full-state feedback control laws for approach and cruise flight
conditions. The aircraft equations of motion employed were EET linearized
three-degrees-of-freedom longitudinal equations for center-of-gravity
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FIGURE 5-2. REAl-MODEl-FOllOWING CONTROL
locations at 40- and 50-percent aft mean aerodynamic chord described with data
established November 1977. The model equations employed were the DC-10
equations for comparable flight conditions, except that a center-of-gravity
location of 30-percent MAC was used in all cases. Various configurations
were investigated for elevator and throttle commands. Satisfactory model-
tracking for elevator commands was obtained, using only elevator surface
control. It was necessary to introduce a crosstie between thrust and elevator
to obtain acceptable throttle command model-tracking. Thus, implicit-model-
following synthesis cases were run for elevator-only control, and elevator and
throttle command and control. The latter cases produced full-state feedbacks
to both elevator and throttle as well as a complete command crosscoupling
feedforward matrix.
5.2.2 Reduced States Control Law Development. - State-transformation
and transfer-function-generating techniques previously developed at Douglas
were employed to generate alternative control laws with many different sensor
arrays for several approach and cruise flight conditions. These control laws
were based upon the corresponding full-state implicit-model-following
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synthesis. It will be shown later in this report that these control laws
produce approximately the same aircraft command response. A total of 32
sensor combinations have been considered (see Table 5-1). Most of these
have yielded acceptable control laws.
In the initial control law development phase, a transfer-function-
generating technique was used which expressed the elevator and throttle
commands in terms of transfer functions that shape the state feedbacks and
pilot commands. Fewer feedbacks were required than for full-state feedback;
thus, sensor configuration simplification occurred at the expense of filter
complexity. Quite often the filters generated by the theory were reduced by
pole-zero cancellation, and the resulting configurations were somewhat
simpler than the original full-state feedbacks. A block diagram of an
initial angle-of-attack control law (Law No.5) is shown in Figure 5-3 for
the approach and cruise cases. An acceptable thrust crossfeed was not
obtained for the cruise cases. Block diagrams for all of these initial
control laws, excluding those containing longitudinal acceleration, are
presented in Appendix 6.
TABLE 5-1
CONTROL LAWS INVESTIGATED
1. OOUOl 12. 00 AN ti 23. Ax AN 01
2. 08 13. 08 AN 01 24. AxAN
3. 0001 14. 00 AN U 25. Ax
4. 00 U 15. OOhu 26. AN
5. 01 16. OOh 27. uO
6 UOI 17. AxAN Ii u 28. 018
7. u 18. AxAN ti 29. 08 AN
8. 00 Ax AN 19. ti u 30. AN U
9. 08 Ax 01 20. ti 31. ANti
10. 08 Ax u 21. Ax AN u 32. AN 01
11. 08 Ax Ii 22. Ax AN U 01
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8ec 2K1
S + K4S + K5(RAD) 2S + K6S + K7
2
a K2
S+ K8 S + K lOS + K11 8e(RAD) S+ Kg 2 (RAD)S + K12S + K 13 +
K 14
THRUST K3(DIMENSIONLESS)
APPROACH
K 1 = 0.6457
K2 = 0.3816
K3 = 0.20
K4 = 0.0356
K5 = 0.000318
K6 = 0.07758K7 ;: 0.0227
K8 = 1.385
Kg ;: 1.80 ..
K10 ;: 0.0478
K 11 = -0.0008052
K 12 = 0.07758
K13 = 0.0227
K14 = 0.0024
K15 = 50.0
CRUISE
K 1 = 0.51035
J<2 = 0.1195
K3 = 0.0
K4 = 0.05
K5 = 0.03338
K6 = 0.02
K7 = 0.004709
K8 = 1.138
K9 =.1.64
K1'O= -:0.2198
K11 = -0.02793
K 12 = 0.02
K13 = 0.004709
K14 = 0.0
K15 = 50.0
FIGURE 5-3. CONTROL LAW NO.5 (a)
Two problems that occurred with the transfer-function method are:
(1) the generation of control laws that lead to unstable closed-loop poles
which are cancelled by unstable zeros in the feedforward transfer function,
and (2) the generation of control-transfer functions with unstable poles.
The command responses still match that of the full-state configuration from
which these transfer-function forms were derived, but these unstable configur-
ations cannot be employed in a practical control system.
5.2.3 .Eljmination of Several Initial Control Laws. - Prior to solving
the unstable pole problem, the number of control laws being investigated was
reduced. Based o~ simulation studies, all control laws involving longitUdinal
acceleration (Ax) were eliminated. The Ax control laws provided acceptable
response to elevator inputs but quite unacceptable response for throttle
inputs. The throttle response could be made acceptable but required high-
gain crossfeeds with destabilizing signs' (i.e., positive feedback). With the
number of acceptable control laws not requiring this high-gain crossfeed, no
system degradation was obtained by the elimination of the Ax sensor. Control
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laws containing altitude rate (h) were eliminated, based on the statistical
evaluation of the control law performance in turbulence which will be dis-
cussed later in Paragraph 5.5.1. Two control laws, 27 and 28, utilizing
pitch rate but not pitch, were eliminated due to similarity of sensor source
with control laws 3 and 4. Finally, control laws 13 and 32 were eliminated
by the configuration studies reported in Section 6 of this report, since the
selected sensor sets did not provide these combinations of sensors in the
fail~re-reversion paths.
5.2.4 Pole Placement Synthesis. - With the number of control laws
reduced from 32 to 11, an attempt was made to eliminate the unstable ele-
ments of the control laws. The transfer-function forms required placement
of the shaping network closed-loop poles and also placement of open-loop
transfer-function poles. All control laws were stabilized by performing
a multiple-pole placement synthesis in which both sets· of poles were
simultaneously moved to new locations. While this method was able to
eliminate the unstable elements, it did not have enough independent physical
parameters which could be varied so that all poles could be place at will.
Two sets of perturbation equations (cruise and approach) were used to develop
the control laws with this new technique and when the same control law forms
were compared for the two flight conditions, it was noted that the filters
were radically different. The combined filters were the same order, but the
individual components were different. A third-order filter for approach
might consist of a second-order and a first-order while the same law for cruise
would be three first-order filters. Simplification and approximations for
the filters was attempted, to determine if the control law would perform
satisfactorily over the flight envelope. Of the eleven control laws, three
were acceptable over the flight regime. Two of these were full state control
laws (e, e, u, ex, and e, e, u, an) requiring no filters and the other
(e 6 u), by coincidence, had the same filter for the two flight conditions.
Unfortunately, the pole-placement synthesis could not place the poles in
the same location for the two flight conditions.
5.2.5 State Space Form. - It was ~ssumed at the beginning of the control
law development that when transfer functions are used, it is undesirable .to
have the surface control fed back to the observer, as Luenberg's form requires
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(Reference 8). This is due to noise generally present on the position feed-
back, as well as the consideration that a single computation may drive more
than one surface and thus require some type of signal-averaging before use
in the observer. The disadvantage of this form, however, is that the
observer poles are distinct from the extra closed-loop poles, due to the
observer. A re-examination of the control laws showed that the transfer
function method expressed in state space form was closely related to
Luenberger's reduced-order observer. A control form was then adopted which
essentially replaced the requirement for surface-position feedback, with the
control command fed back to the observer. This is a simple mechanization,
since the control command is singular and totally contained within the RSSAS
computer. Having adopted this form, the closed-loop poles added by the
observer are the same as the observer poles. This new form requires only a
single pole placement, and there are enough free parameters to permit pole
location of all observer poles to desired values.
Since the control laws were now being developed in state space form
rather than transfer functions, a reduction was also possible in the amount
of computation required to implement the control laws. There was no reason
that the observer had to generate physical states; therefore, much computation
was eliminated by employing normal states instead of physical states. A
computer program was then written which takes the basic Luenberger observer
matrices, and a matrix which contains the observer pole placement synthesis
transformation matrix, and generates all the elements needed for a difference-
equation control law formulation. This program was used to generate control
laws for nine configurations at both cruise and approach. The full-state
feedback control laws are unaffected by the change of form. A block diagram
of the control laws is shown in Figure 5-4, with the gains used for the angle-
of-attack law given in Figure 5-5. Figure 5-4 applies for all control laws.
Numbers for the remaining 10 control laws are given in Appendix 7.
An advantage of the present control law formulation is that the feed-
forward and throttle cross-tie blocks are the same for all nominally equiva-
lent control laws. Also, in the state space form, the filters are not only
the same throughout the flight envelope, but they are also the same from
control law to control law.
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FIGURE 5-4. RSSAS CONTROL LAW BLOCK DIAGRAM
PX1 = EXP (-10.0 " DT)
PX2 = EXP (-0.8 " DT)
PX3 = EXP (-0.25 " DT)
PX4 = EXP (-0.2 " DT)
CRUISE
U1 = 0.5 " PILOT COMMAND + U
Zl = Zl " PX1 + U1 " (1 - PX1)
Z2 = Z2 " PX2 + (-10.8726 " U1 + 2.05745 " THRUST - 1.83644 " ~) " (1 - PX2)
Z3 = Z3 " PX3 + (-79.918 " U1 + 4.31615 " THRUST - 18.297 " ~) " (1 - PX3)
Z4 = Z4 " PX4 + (79.777 " U1 - 1.38494 " THRUST + 22.18.449 ,,~) " (1 - PX4)
U = 0.01501 " Z1 + 0.15802 " Z2 - 0.1778 " Z3 - 0.14585 " Z4 + 0.21952 " ~ + 0.29 " THRUST
FEED FORWARD = 0.5
APPROACH
U1 = 0.674 " PILOT COMMAND + U
Z1 = Z1 " PX1 + U1 " (1 - PX1)
Z2 = Z2 " PX2 + (-7.4035 " U1 + 2.0827 " THRUST - 0.71526 " ~) " (1 - PX2)
Z3 = Z3 " PX3 + (-147.064 " U1 + 46.4056 " THRUST - 7.395 " ~) " (1 - PX3)
Z4 = Z4 " PX4 + (157.61 " U1 - 50.7887 " THRUST + 9.20378 " ~) " (1 - PX4)
U = 0.01519 " Z1 + 0.12673 " Z2 - 0.07174 " Z3 - 0.06469 " Z4 + 0.5598 " ~ + 0.31 " THRUST
FEED FORWARD = 0.674
FIGURE 5-5. EET CONTROL EQUATIONS - LAW NO.5
100
5.2.6 Gain Programming. - With the control laws expressed in state space
form, it becomes quite simple to write programs for the numbers as a function
of velocity. However, each number in the matrix has to have its own program.
Some of the gains increase with velocity, while others will decrease with
increasing velocity. Also, the number of gain programs per control law
varies. The full-state feedback requires only six gain programs, while the
angle-of-attack control law requires seventeen. The gain programming
schedules for control laws 1-7 are provided in Appendix 7.
5.3 Simulation Configuration
The RSSAS control law validation and performance analysis was conducted
in the Douglas DETAC (Digital Equipment Technology Analysis Center). In this
facility a simulation was developed to represent the aircraft, augmenter,
and necessary interfacing systems. Both perturbation "and LFE (large flight
envelope) aircraft aerodynamics were used, depending upon the intent of the
various RSSAS evaluations.
5.3.1 Facility. - A digital computer simulation of the EET aircraft
and augmentor was used to evaluate the dynamic performance of the system.
The simulation was developed in FORTRAN IV, for the DETAC facility (Fig-
ure 5-6). The facility consists of:
• Central digital computer with a real-time operating system FORTRAN IV
software package, 96K words of memory-mapping, cache, and floating-
point hardware, plus three satellite computers, each with 32K words
of memory, all connected by a high-speed communication link.
• Three interactive graphics units, one with color displays.
• Cockpit mockup.
The relationships among the major elements of DETAC are shown in the
block diagram of Figure 5-7. The Sperry Univac V76 minicomputer is general-
purpose and microprogrammable. A cache enhances memory access for faster
operation. Three Sperry Univac V73 minicomputers provide computations and
simulation support for the central computer. Peripheral support equipment
includes a DEC-writer III terminal, card reader, magnetic tape, cassette tape,
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FIGURE 5-6. DETAC FACILITY
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FIGURE 5··7. DETAC HARDWARE BLOCK DIAGRAM
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PROCESSING
STATION (SPS) :\]0..,
Century Data CDS-114 disc, Infotron VistarjGT Alphanumeric display terminal,
and Varian Statos-3l printer/plotter.
The Vector General display system interacts in real time with the central
computer. The graphic system has a hardware two-dimensional, rotat~ble­
coordinate transformation generator driving two display stations, each with
a 53-cm (21-inch) CRT, light pen, function-switch keyboard, and alphanumeric
keyboard. The displays can be driven independently or in parallel.
Equipment for interfacing with avionics devices includes analog-to-
digital and digital-to-analog converters, digital-to-synchro converters, and
digitalinputjoutput modules.
5.3.2 Computer Setup. - The simulation is separated into three
separate and distinct jobs: problem setup, execution. and analysis. The
setup task consists of modifying the system gains, initial conditions, type
of upsets, wind conditions, and other related items. Each of these inputs
is easily modified by means of the light pen and alphanumeric keyboard at the
graphics system. This program runs exclusively in the main machine.
The simulation task is broken down into three subtasks. Each of these tasks
is then solved in one of the three computers used and any data needed by the
other machines are transferred via a high-speed data link. The machines run
in an asynchronous mode with the data being transferred when available. The
data from the other machines are buffered so all solutions are solved with
data obtained at the same time. The main machine schedules the other two
machines, but after that no machine is master. The main machine solves the
display portion of the problem, samples autopilot and augmentor mode switch-
ing, and transfers the time history data points from the other two computers
to the disk storage device. The second computer solves the aircraft equations,
generates sensor information, develops the environment, and solves the engine
dynamics. The third computer interfaces with the pilot inputs, solves the
autopilot, autothrottle, and augmentor equations, and simulates the actuator
dynamics. The main computer completes its task 10 times per second while
the other two machines run 20 times per second. Time-history data are
stored twice per second. A flow chart of the simulation task is shown in
Figure 5-8.
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FIGURE 5-8: MULTICOMPUTER SIMULATION
While the simulation task is being solved, time-history data are written to
the disk. These data are sent to the disk as rapidly as possible in whatever
order and form available. The first section of the analysis task reads the
data into the computer to reorder and process the data for plotting purposes.
The plot program allows the analyst great flexibility. He or she has the
option of plotting any of 60 parameters with any of the remaining 59 from
any of four cases. Up to two parameters can be plotted on the same curve
with a maximum of six curves per page. If only a section of the curve is
desired, a zoom feature is supplied. Hard copy of any desirable data, of
report quality, is instantaneously available. Tabulation of the data is
also available.
5.3.3 System Descriptions
5.3.3.1 Aircraft. - Two aircraft simulations were developed - a perturbation
aircraft and a large-flight-envelope aircraft. The perturbation aircraft is
simulated as two sets of three-degree-of-freedom equations with cross-coupling
terms between the sets of equations. The longitudinal equations are based
upon the aerodynamic description of the EET aircraft. The lateral equations
are those of the DC-10 Series 10 for a corresponding flight condition at a 30
percent center-of-gravity case. The cross-coupling terms are those of the
EET. The perturbation equations are valid for large pitch changes, but allow
only small changes in airspeed and angle of attack. These equations utilize
linear fixed coefficients for the aircraft description. The large-flight-
envelope equations were the same equations used for the motion base studies.
These equations allow for large airspeed and angle-of-attack variations,
valid from takeoff to landing.
5.3.3.2 Sensors.- No system lags were simulated for the aircraft sensors.
The sensors were located at the proper station number for the DC-10 aircraft.
Gains other than unity could be introduced for the sensors used by the aug-
mentor, but these gain-varied signals were not utilized by the autopilot or
speed command system. Multiple sensors of the same signal were not simu-
lated.
5.3.3.3 Engines. - Two engine simulations were developed - one for the,
perturbed aircraft equations and one for the large-flight-envelope equations.
The engine for the perturbed aircraft was simulated as a first-order lag
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(time constant of 0.5 seconds) and a fixed gradient (183.5 kilonewtons per
radian of throttle). The maximum thrust is limited to 169 kilonewtons per
engine. while the minimum thrust is 6.2 kilonewtons per engine. The large-
flight-envelope engine simulation is basically the sam~ engine with the
gradient, and limits a function of the aerodynamics.
5.3.3.4 Environment. - The wind model used for the turbulence is the
standard Dryden wind model. In addition to turbulence, steady-state winds
or winds as a function of altitude can be added in all axes. Even though
the ILS beam signals are not used for the data runs discussed in this report,
nonlinear centerline representations are available for several CAT I and
CAT II airports.
5.3.3.5 Actuators. - The elevator actuators (four independent actuators)
were simulated as a first-order lag (time constant of '0.1 seconds) with rate
(1 radian per second) and position (0.44 radians) limits. At this stage of
control law verification, the hysteresis and dead-zone characteristics have
been eliminated. Also eliminated were the mechanical cross-ties between
surfaces. The aileron aotuators (two only) were simulated the same except
with different rate (0.44 radians per second) and position (0.35 radians)
limits. Only one rudder actuator was simulated with the same time-constant
as the other actuator, but once a.gain different rate (0.44 radians per
second) and position (0.17 radians) limits.
5.3.3.6 Pilot Interface. - The pilot interface with the simulation is by
one of two methods. Either the pi lot can use the soft· cockpi tin the DETAC
facility or he may use a small joystick. The graphics provides ADI-type
information plus a plan view of aircraft path for pilot interface and the
augmentor monitor. Both the joystick box and the cockpit provide for elevator
and aileron inputs, flap movement, pilot trim switches, gear extension, and
speed brake deployment. The pilot also has control of augmentor control law
select, autopilot mode, speed control engage,. and failure insertion by means
of the control keys connected to the graphics system. Vertical speed knob
of the autopilot vertical speed mode is simulated on the joystick box.
5.3~3.7 Speed Control. - Automatic speed control is provided by means of a
simulation of the standard DC-10 speed command system (see Figure 5-9).
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FIGURE 5-9. EET SPEED COMMAND SYSTEM
No changes have been made to the system to make it compatible with the EET
aircraft. An autothrott1e servo is simulated for the system and no parallel
input to the joystick or soft cockpit is provided (i.e., throttle levers do
not move when automatic system is engaged). The automatic system can be
engaged or disengaged at any time during the simulation run.
5.3.3.8 Autopilot. - The autopilot used for this study was an experimental
system developed by Douglas IRAD for the DC-10. This autopilot is valid
throughout the flight regime and includes such modes as pitch hold, vertical
speed, altitude preselect, altitude hold, glides10pe capture, glideslope
track, flare, heading hold, heading select, localizer capture, localizer
track, and align.
5.3.3.9 Augmentor. - During the development of the augmentor design, each
version of the augmentor was simulated. The augmentor simulated now is the
final version of the design described in Section 6 of this report.
5.4 Control Law Verification
All control laws formulated were initially verified in the DETAC where
time histories of the aircraft response to elevator and thrust upsets were
obtained, using the perturbation aerodynamic equations. The two upsets were
an elevator pulse of 0.0175 radians (1 0 ) for one second and a step thrust
change of 6~3 kilonewtons (1430 1b). The time histories were obtained at both
approach and cruise flight conditions. Each of the time histories was then
compared with the responses of the DC-lO which was used as a model in the
control law synthesis. Each control law response was also compared with
every other control law. Although all 32 original and 11 final control laws
were evaluated, only the seven control laws of eeua family (eeua,ee,eea,eeu,
a,ua,u) will be discussed in this section.
Figures 5-10 through 5-13 provide an insight to the basic DC-10 and
unaugmented EET airframe responses to the pitch and thrust upsets. The 25
percent center-of-gravity EET is a mid center-of-gravity position and is
statically stable while the 40 percent center-of-gravity EET is approximately
at zero static margin. As shown, these ~onfigurations display significantly
different characteristics for Short-period damping, phugoid, and stability.
Figure 5-14 provides a comparison of the DC-10 and augmented (eeUa control
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law) 40 percent center-of-gravity EET responses to the elevator upset for the
cruise flight condition. These time histories for pitch and velocity are
almost identical. It is these two parameters that the RSSAS attempts to
match at the expense of a, since they are the physical characteristics that
the flight crew observes. Comparisons of all seven control laws with the
DC-10 for cruise and approach flight conditions are presented in Appendix 8.
Figure 5-15 shows control law (eeua) to control law (esu) tracking for this
same upset. All control laws demonstrate this close comparison.
The RSSAS without thrust-to-pitch compensation cannot provide the DC-10
characteristics for the thrust upset. Figure 5-16 shows the two responses
to be quite different. Adding the thrust/pitch compensation to the augmentor
provides the satisfactory response shown in Figure 5-17. Comparisons of all
seven control laws with the DC-10 for cruise and approach flight conditions
have demonstrated this correlation.
5.5 Performance Analyses
Several analyses have been conducted to evaluate the RSSAS performance
for various aircraft, environment, and system conditions. The intent of the
individual analyses is discussed below.
Statistical Performance - A statistical evaluation of the performance of
each control law was conducted in a turbulent air environment. For the
initial control laws, this analysis was used to eliminate configurations which
did not add to the RSSAS capability. The final selected control laws were
analyzed to provide an insight into the flying qualities to be exhibited
during the motion base simulator tests.
Aircraft Configuration Changes - The augmented aircraft response to flap
and landing gear extensions was evaluated to compare the capabilities of
various control laws when no special aircraft configuration intelligence is
provided.
Control Law Sensor Sensitivities - Each control law was evaluated to
determine its sensitivity to sensor signal variations. This analysis was
performed to establish the allowable sensor tolerances and/or sensor com~
parison monitor thresholds.
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Control Law Tracking - For a given flight patch tracking maneuver, each
control law was monitored to evaluate the relative differences in control
cOJl111ands. This establishes the level of synchronization necessary for control
laws in standby. Control-1aw-to-control-law comparison capability is also
determined.
FGS/RSSAS Interaction/Operation -'- This analysis establishes the inherent
static stabi1 ity augmentation capabi1 ity of various combinations of the
flight guidance system autopilot a'nd autothrott1e. Flight guidance system
performance with and without the RssAs is also evaluated. Although automatic
flight control is demonstrated, several performance characteristics may be
valid for manual pilot control.
5.5.1 Statistical Performance Analysis. - An existing general-purpose linear
control system analysis computer program was adapted for use in statistically
evaluating the response of the propo~ed control laws in a turbulent air
environment. As shown in Figure 5-18, the analysis was affected by subjecting
the closed loop linearly modeled system to simultaneous longitudinal and
vertical wind gusts, input through aerodynamic coupling as well as through
the appropriate sensors. The Dryden wind ~ust models for angle-of-attackand
forward-velocity gusts, as defined in MIL 8785-B, were used. The standard
deviations of the aircraft variables were computed by solving for the steady-
state matrix variance equation for the linear system driven by white noise.
The aircraft variables observed include: pitch attitude (e), pitch rate (~),
angle of attack (ex), velocity (u), altitude rate (h), normal acceleration
..(AN)' and elevator deflection (ce).
Of the initial 32 control law configurations, 11 were eliminated by ex-
cluding longitudinal acceleration, Ax' as a feedback parameter prior to this
analysis. Statistical gust responses for the remaining 21 control laws have
been computed and bar diagrams drawn. Figures 5-19 and 5-23 shows the relative
e, ex, AN and ce performance between each of the control law configuration~
for a cruise flight condition. Based on this evaluation, altitude rate (h)
was eliminated as a feedback parameter. This was due to its degrading effect
on some sensor combinations and its consistently lower level of performance
compared with airspeed (u), the other air data computer parameter.
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As. a result of this and concurrent studies, the original 32 control laws
.
have been reduced to the eeUa family of seven (esua,ee,eea,esu,ua,u,a)
configurations. The remaining seven have be,~n revised (gains and filter
changes), new statistical gust responses were computed, and bar charts drawn.
Figures 5-20 and 5-21 show the new gust responses for the cruise and approach
flight conditions. An evaluation of these responses can provide an insight
into comparative system/aircraft performance. 00 and 0; are indications of
, e \J
control law sensitivity to gusts, and 0e,oAN and 0h relat~ to passenger ride
comfort. Tight augmentor control is reflected in 0e and 0a' while 0u indi-
cates possible coupling to the aircraft thrust control. Three control laws,
No.1 (eeua), No.3 (eea), and No.5 (a) were demonstrated on the motion base
simulator (MBS). During the MBS tests, the higher values of e and AN for the
No.5, a, control law manifested themselves with pilot opinions of a more
.
active aircraft. The No.1, 66Ua, control law has the tightest 6 control
which also agrees with several pilot comments during the tests.
5.5.2 Aircraft Configuration Changes. - No special intelligence has been
added to the RSSAS to sense and compensate for aircraft configuration
changes. The RSSAS control laws do, of course, respond to the perturbed
aircraft parameters in such a manner as to maintain the previous trimmed air-
craft flight path. Figures 5-22 and 5-23, provide comparisons of the
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unaugmented 25 percent center-of-gravity EET, unaugmented 40 percent center-
of-gravity EET and augmented (control law No.5, a,) 40 percent center of-
gravity EET responses to landing gear and flap extensions. In all cases
shown, no correcting pilot control has been applied, but during actual flight
conditions, the pilot or autopilot would immediately compensate for the normal
aircraft responses.
The landing gear responses in Figure ~22 shows that the neutrally stable
40 percent center-of-gravity EET responds to this maneuver with an undamped
pitch-down. Both the unaugmented 25 percent center-of-gravity and augmented
40 percent center-of-gravity EET respond to the gear extension with a con-
ventional pitch-down, decreasing the angle of attack, and increasing airspeed.
All of the augmentation configurations will attempt to maintain the trimmed
condition. As shown in Figure 5-22, the augmentor provides nose-up elevator
(negative sign) and the aircraft demonstrates the least landing gear effect.
Figure 5-23 shows the aircraft responses to the flap extension. (The
low-drag flap design of the EET does not need a significant increase in
thrust to maintain the approach airspeed for this configuration change.) The
unaugmented 25 percent center-of-gravity EET response is similar to that of a
conventional aircraft with an immediate angle-of-attack reduction and pitch-
up, followed by an increased angle-of-attack and a reduced steady-state pitch
altitude ,as the aircraft slows down and descends. The unaugmented 40 percent
center-of-gravity EET responds to the configuration change with a continuous
pitch-up maneuver. The augmented 40 percent center-of-gravity EET responds
immediately to the change in angle of attack and pitch, and applies nose-down
elevator (positive), which improves the 40 percent center-of-gravity response.
The 0.027 radians (1.5 degrees) of elevator is not sufficient, however, and
the resulting 0.25 radians (15 degrees) is considerably greater than the mid
25 percent center-of-gravity response.
5.5.3 Control Law Sensor Sensitivity. - An evaluation of the control law
;z.~.~
sensitivity to variations in sensor signals was performed by establishing
representative sensor errors, inserting these tolerances in the RSSAS DETAC
simulation, and then comparing the resultant responses to the elevator and
thrust upsets with those of the nominal system. The sensor tolerances were
obtained from a composite of the specification values, results from accept-
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ance testing, and from the DC-10 in-service experience. They are presented
in Table 5-2. The greatest deviation from nOl'linal, whether empirically
evidenced in the specifications or $tatistically obtained, was set as the
maximum allowable tolerance.
Testing was conducted using the e6Ua control law family (No. 1 through
No.7) with the 40 percentcenter-of-gravity EET for both the cruise and
approach flight conditions without turbulence effects. Upsets were introduced
in the form of a 0.01745-radian (one-degree), one-second elevator step and a
steady-state thrust increase of approximately 6300 newtons (1430 lb). Runs
were made using nominal sensor values and then repeated with sensor gains set
to the maximum positive tolerance and again with gains set to maximum negative
tolerance as shown. in Table 5-3. Comparison of the data presented in Appen-
dix 9 shows good correlation between the nominal value runs and the maximum
.
tolerance runs, except for control law No.3 (eea) in the cruise case.
As will be noted in the data package for these runs, several combinations
of off-nominal values for the pitch and angle-of-attack sensor signal inputs
to control law No. 3 were demonstrated. The data show that large excursions
of the pitch sensor gain result in unstable - possibly divergent - response,
whereas similar excursions of the angle-of-attack sensor gain result in
heavily over-damped response characteristics.
With the exception of some necessary refinements to control law No.3
gain terms, the data demonstrate that the control laws are adequately
insensitive to anticipated levels of sensor-tolerance variations. This allows
setting the sensor comparator levels at a value sufficiently high to eliminate
nuisance warning, yet assure adequate performance capability.
5.5.4 Control Law Tracking. - Control-law-to-control-law tracking for the
•ee~a control law family (No. 1 through No.7) has been evaluated with the 40
percent center-of-gravity EET in a moderate turbulence with RMS level of 2.3
meters/sec. The test runs were made for the approach and cruise flight con-
ditions, and initiated with an upset of 0.0175 radian (1°) of elevator for
one second. Each of the seven control laws was allowed to augment the air-
craft and the instantaneous commands of the other six control .laws were com-
pared to the active control. Excellent correlation was observed between
the active and standby control laws. Figure 5-24 shows the precise
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TABLE 5-2
SENSOR TOLERANCES
COMPONENT SPECIFICATION INFLIGHT MANUFACTURE OR
. PERFORMANCE MAINTENANCE
SENSOR ACCURACY BIAS NOISE DEVIATIONS ACCEPTANCE
ANGLE OF ATTACK (0<1 ±0.0044 RAD (±0.25 DEG) NO DATA ±0.0044 RAD (±O 25 DEGI
DUAL OUTPUT ±0.0018 RAD AVAILABLE
(±0.1 DEG)
MOUNTING ±0.0044 RAD
(±0.25 DEGI
NORMAL ACCELERATION (AnI ±0.019n ±0.0029n ±0.0029n 1a = ±0.OG9n ±0.00759n
MOUNTING ±0.0044
(±0.251
AIR DATA COMPUTER 1a = ±0.22 MIS
(±0.54 KNI
1. MRSPEED (u) ±2.57 MIS (±5 KNI AT 30.87 MIS (60 KNI AS IN ACCURACY SPECIFICATION
±1.03 MIS (±2 KNI AT 51.44 MIS (100 KNI AS IN ACCURACY SPECIFICATION
±1.03 MIS (±2 KN) AT 102.89 MIS (200 KNI AS IN ACCURACY SPECIFICATION
±2.06 MIS (±4 KNI AT 231.5 MIS (450 KNI AS IN ACCURACY SPECIFICATION
2. ALTITUDE RATE (hI ±5 PERCENT OR 0.15 MIS (30 FPMI. 1a = ±0.22 MIS
WHICHEVER IS GREATER (±O 707
FT/SECI
VERTICAL GYRO
PITCH ATTITUDE (6) TAKEOFF ±O.021 RAD (±1.18 DEGI 1a = ±O.OO134 ±O.OOS7 RAD (±0.5 DEG -
CRUISE ±O.OOG RAD (±0.35 DEG) RAD STATIC CHECK)(±o.on
DESCENT AND LANDING DEG)
±0.020 RAD (±1.15 DEGI
MOUNTING ±0.0018 RAD
(±0.10 DEGI
TABLE 5-3
MAXIMUM TOLERANCE RUNS
SENSOR SIGNAL
Velocity
Pitch
Alpha
Pitch Rate
Cruise
!. 1%
+10%
+10%
+ 1%
TOLERANCE
Approach
+ 2%
++15%
+ 5%
+ 1%
correlation of the comparisons with control law No. 1 (eeua) as the active
control. The results of this analysis assure that minimal command synchron-
ization is necessary for the control law in standby. Also demonstrated is a
possible application of contro1-1aw-to-control-1aw comparison for system
monitoring.
5.5.5 Flight Guidance System/RSSAS Interaction-Operation. - The Flight.
Guidance System (FGS) performance with the 40 percent center-of-gravity EET
was evaluated for a flightpath tracking task consisting of control to a
selected positive rate of climb and then a transition to a fixed altitude.
In Figure 5-25, the FGS autopilot performs the specified maneuver with a
fixed throttle setting which allows an increasing velocity as the aircraft
levels to hold altitude. Approximately 0.007 radianS (0.5 degrees) of elevator
is required for a satisfactory altitude capture. With the autothrottles
engaged, Figure 5-26 shows that the reduction in thrust to maintain airspeed
results in a significant nose-down pitching moment which causes the aircraft
to deviate from the selected altitude. (Elecom is the autopilot elevator
command and Augcom is the sum of the autopilot and RSSAS commands.) The
autopilot responds to the pitch-down but is limited at approximately 0.044
radians (2.5 degrees) of elevator authority for this flight condition. In
Figure 5-27 the autopilot, autoth~ottle, and RSSAS are all engaged, and
once again a satisfactory altitude capture is performed. During the capture
maneuver, the autopilot applies 0.012 radians (0.69 degrees) of nose-dowri
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(positive) elevator and the RSSAS provides 0.008 radians (0.46 degree) of
nose-up (negative) elevator fora total command (Augcom) of 0.004 radians
(0.23 degree) of nose-down (positive) elevator. Then, as the autothrottles
reduce the thrust and the aircraft pitches nose-down, the autopilot applies
0.028 radian (1.6 degrees) of nose-up elevator and the RSSAS provides 0.017
radian (0.97 degree) of nose-up elevator, for a total of 0.045 radian (2.58
degrees) of nose-up elevator.
The resu1 ts of these tests indicate. that the conventional autopi lot can
easily handle the aircraft's relaxed static stability, but when coupled to
a significant pitch/thrust coupling, it does not provide the necessary
elevator response. Also observed in the fixed-throttle maneuver of Figure
5-25 were several large command reversals during the capture. When the
RSSAS was engaged, these reversals were significantly reduced, as was the
frequency of the autopilot command input.
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SECTION 6
SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE DEVELOPMENT
The RSSAS is a multichannel avionics system consisting of the appropriate
sensors to describe the aircraft response, Flight Augmentation Computers (FAC)
to perform the control calculations to achieve the desired flight response,
an actuation system which transforms the computations into longitudinal air-
craft control, and hydraulic and electrical systems to provide the necessary
power for the other elements. Figure 6-1 is a diagram of the major RSSAS
elements. Operationally, the RSSAS is independent of other normal aircraft
flight controls and-will function continuously in conjunction with either
pilot or automatic pilot control. RSSAS aircraft control is accomplished
through the elevator surfaces wherein augmentation commands are summed with
the primary f1ightpath commands to provide a total surface deflection.
Unlike the primary control commands which are reflected back to the control
column, the RSSAS control is performed by a series actuator, the displacement
of which will not be reflected back into the primary flight control system.
The elements in developing the system include· (1) the system design
requirements, (2) the formulation of proposed configurations, and (3) the
evaluation of several selected candidates. Figure 6~2 shows the relationship
of these elements. The system design requirements are obtained from the
initial study constraints and the results of other study tasks. They define
the fixed hardware requirements or hardware flexibility, the existing and
desired flying qualities, the necessary functional reliability and safety,
and the augmentation control requirements. The architectural formulation
tasks then define: (1) the individual system components, (2) their level
of redundancy, (3) their functional capability, (4) the interconnection of
the devices, and (5) the characteristics of the architecture which could
impact the design of the system/aircraft. Finally, the evaluation task
determines the merit of the proposed systems with regard to the established
requirements and also compares the satisfactory systems in order to select
the most promising candidates for further consideration.
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6.1 System Design
6.1.1 Sensors. - The sensors considered for the relaxed static stability
computation consist of all devices whose combination of parameters provides
sufficient dynamic aircraft data to be used in the calculation of the aug-
mentation control laws. The candidate parameter list includes: pitch '
attitude (8), pitch attitude rate (0), angle of attack (a), airspeed (u),
altitude rate (h), longitudinal acceleration (Ax) and normal acceleration
(AN)' The baseline equivalent DC-lO sensor arrays which provide these data
are:
• Three vertical gyros for e and 0
• Two ang1e~of-attack vanes for a
• Two air data computers for u and h
• Two accelerometer units for Ax and AN"
The vertical gyros provide e as an qna10g two-wire output and the FAC
.
must derive e from this signal. a as used for the RSSAS is actually the
average value of the two wing-mounted (one on each wing) dual transduce~
vanes, which have been calibrated for induced-flow effects. Each digital air
data computer provides both u and n on a common serial digital data bus. The
accelerometer units provide both Ax and AN as two-wire analog signals with
an additional 28 VDC discrete validity for AN which is determined by
comparing dual AN accelerometers. The pitch/thrust compensation calculations
are based upon the Nl thrust parameter of each engine. The Nl signal is
provided as a two-wire analog signal from the engine indicator system.
A strapdown Attitude and Heading Reference System (AHRS) was considered as
a variation to the baseline DC-10 sensors. Three AHRS units replaced the
vertical gyros and accelerometer units supplying 6 t 6t Ax and AN on a common
serial digital data bus. Resulting reliability calculations were essentially
identical to the OC-10 sensors, so the tabulations are not repeated.
6.1.2 Flight Augmentation Computers (FAC). - A specification of the FAC
includes both the definition of the internal hardware mechanization and a
de,tailed description of its functional operation. The system analysis and
simulation of this study require a rather extensive development of the
145
functional operation but a detailed hardware architecture is not necessary
nor will it be established. It is assumed, however, that the hardware mech-
anization will be digital and that the individual computers will be capable
of full internal failure detection. This and several other hardware char-
acteristics will be discussed in general.
6.1.2.1 Hardware Architecture. - The main hardware elements within a
digital com~uter are the input/output (I/O) circuits~ memory, and central
processing unit (CPU). The I/O is required to provide the interface with all
external components of the system which include the sensors, actuators,
control and annunciation units, and the other RSSAS computers. The computer
memory stores th~ data required for the system calculations performed by
arithmetic operations and logic decisions of the CPU. Using these elements,
several different architectures may be constructed to satisfy the system
requirements. The following configuration summaries are the primary near-
term concepts which are intended to provide full internal fault-detection
capability.
The single-path, dual-processor architecture shown in Figure 6-3
includes two central processors while most of the other elements are single-
string. It is argued that if the processors themselves can be guaranteed to
be functioning properly by comparing their outputs, the rest of the machine
can be shown to function by various error-detection schemes. It is felt by
the advocates of this architecture that one may be able to avoid a detailed
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) of the processor since the second
processor (which may be dissimilar) is always watching the first processor.
The dual-path, single-processor architecture shown in Figure 6-4 consists
of dual paths (i.e., dual memory, I/O) within the machine but uses a single
processor to operate on the data. After the A and B sensor sources are con-
verted to data words in separate memory locations, the data values are
compared. The data are then averaged and control laws are computed twice
and compared. If the control law computations are valid, the data are sent
out to the servo-amplifiers through the digital to analog converters. The
outputs of the D to A converters are sent back through the input analog to
digital converters and compared with what their value should be. If the
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FIGURE 6-3. SINGLE-PATH, DUAL-PROCESSOR ARCHITECTURE
FIGURE 6-4. DUAL-PATH, SINGLE-PROCESSOR COMPUTER
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output is valid, servo respO,nse mus't be checked. The servo position is sent
back through the input and compared with what its response should be. In
this way the entire system is monitored.
The key to the whole process is the integrity of the processor itself.
It must be fully monitored. Several techniques for ensuring proper function-
i ng of the processor wi llbe discussed later in this report •
. The dual-path, dual-procesSQr architecture is essentially the packaging
of two completely independent co~puters in one line-replaceable unit (LRU).
This is the direct equivalent o.f tOday's analog dual-channel fully monitored
computers, and many of the cross-comparison techniques described above are
applicable. Manufacturers differ in the details with regard to frame
synchronization, I/O handling, etc. In general, the internal comparators
are set a little wider since each channel is either not operating on the
same data or receives the same data through different I/O devices. Time
skewing and data freshness affect channel-tracking tolerances also.
6.1.2.2 Functional Architecture. -The functional requirements of a
FAG are shown in Figure 6-5 and consist of: (l) processing data between the
computer and the external system components; (2) performing the control
computations; (3) maintaining executive control of the internal functions,
and external actuation control and communications, and (4) monitoring the
system functions. Each comput.er within the RSSAS performs these functions
identically and independently except that such operations may be pre-
programmed decisions based upon the other c;omputer data transfer.
(a) Data Processing. The computer must interface with three different
types of signals: Analog, 28-VDG discrete, and serial digital data.
The largest anticipated interface list for the RSSAS function is
itemized below:
Inputs
Analog (2-wire)
*3 - Pitch Attitude
*2 - Vertj.<;:a.l; Ac~~l\~r;a ttqn
4 - Angle of Attack
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SERVO OUTPUT (TO END-AROUND TEST)
CONTROL SELECT
GAIN
SERVO COMMAND
TRIM COMMAND
STATUS
ENGAGE
I/O
COMPUTER
SERVO
TRIM
SERVO COMMAND (TO SERVO MODEL)
SERVOS
PERFORMANCE MODEL
SERVO COMMAN D TRIM
TRIM COMMAND ...
SENSORS
....
SENSOR DATA ~ CONTROL TRIM DIRECTOR COMMAND TRIM DIRECTOR ~
DATA TRANSFER" GOMPUTATION
SERVO(S): OUTPUT CAUTION/WARNI~G
... PROCESSING
COMPUTERS INPUT STATUS ..
PROCESSING ...
TRIM ... r ,, ,
"
ENGAGE DATA TRANSFER ..
... STATUS ...
ENGAGE ~ MONITOR: .1 EXECUTIVE I CAUTION/WARNING ENGAGE~ DATA TRANSFER .... VALIDITIES "I ...
- SENSORS - DATA SELECT
FIGURE 6-5. FLIGHT AUGMENTATION COMPUTER FUNCTIONAL DIAGRAM
2 - Nl (Engin& Thrust)
2 - Series Elevator Actuator Position
2 - Horizontal Stabilizer Position
2 - Prima,ry Elevator Control Position
1 - Manua·l Airspeed Slew,
28-VDC Discrete (l-wi're)
*2 - Vertical Acceleration Va,l i dity
1 - System Engag~,~Logic
1 - Test Ini tiate Logi,c
Serial Digital Data BuS (2-wire)
2 - Airspeed
2 - Computer Intercommunication
1 - Maintenance System
*May be replaced by 3 - Attitude Heading Reference System,
2-wire serial digital data buses.
Outputs
Analog (2-wire)
2 - Series Elevator Actuator Command
28-VDC Discrete (l-wire)
4 - Trim Command
2 - Trim Director Command
2 - Series Elevator Actuator Eng~ge
1 - System Warning
1 - Pitch/Thrust Warning
Serial Digital Data Bus
- Intersys tern Communi cati ons
Figure 6-6 is a typical. hardware mechanization which shows the
required data-processing, interfaces. At the input, the analog
signa1s are' cond,j til on.~:j a;nd,mul ti pJ e~-ed .'l then co.nv,ellted, to di gi ta1
and impressed onto the input data bus. The 28-VDC discretes are
packed into digital words. with each input typically representing a
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FIGURE 6-6. COMPUTER BLOCK DIAGRAM. MONITORED PLUS INTERCOM
single bit of the word and sequenced onto the input bus. The serial
digital data buses require a serial-to~parallel conversion prior to
interface with the data input bus. The output data are provided by
picking the appropriate d.ata of the CPU output data bus and reversing
the operations performed at the input.
(b) Control Computation. The control computation function performs the
necessary operations, as shown in the flow diagram of Figure 6-7, to
select or synchronize the appropriate control laws, compute the
selected control law, am;! provide the corresponding series elevator
actuator and horizontal stabilizer commands. The control logic is
provided by the executive function and the command outputs are fed
back to the monitor as part of the validation process. Figure 6~8
shows the computer mechanization of the control law forms shown in
Section 5, Figure 5~3.
A single control law is represented in the figure showing the system
pre-engage synchronization (power~up value), and control law in
standby synchronization (sample and hold, S/H), The pre-engage
synchronization essentially establishes the existing aircraft inputs
as the trim condition at engagement. The standby synchronization is
active whenever the associated actuator is engaged but that control
law is not active. This will assure that at the moment of transfer
between control laws, identical servo commands are present; there~
fore, a surface transient will not result. Also, since the pilot can
maneuver the aircraft with the primary horizontal stabilizer trim,
the pilot command input to each control law is a combination of
these two commands. The stabilizer position has, however, been con-
verted to equivalent elevator by the gain factor K2 which is approxi~
matelya constant 1.613 over the flight envelope of interest.
Each control law mechanization has a unique sensor input array,
observer, and gain matrix. Selection of the appropriate control law
is performed in accordance with the logic from the executive func-
tion. The sele€tedc~lflibrol la"'! commafld is then Ol:lt~t>l:It to the series
elevator actuator. The automatic series elevator trim function
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FIGURE 6-7. CONTROL COMPUTATION FLOW DIAGRAM
interfaces at this point and this feature will be discussed in detail
in Paragraph 6.1.4.
Gain programming of the control laws is accomplished using the air-
speed input from the air data computer. Should both air data com-
puters fail, the gain programming reverts to the input from the
manual airspeed slew switch on the overhead instrument panel, which
is activated by the flight crew.
(c) Executive Control. The executive function determines and controls
the actuator engagement, control. law selection, and status/warning
data transfer. The flow diagram in Figure 6-9 shows that the execu-
tive decision process is initiated with an input from the monitor
function. Based on the validity of the computer and actuator, and
provided an engage logic from the RSSAS controller is present, the
associated actuator will be supplied an engage command. The validity
of the sensor array is used to determine the available control laws
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ACTUATOR
COMMAND
.COMPUTER/ACTUATOR
VALIDITY
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COMPUTE R/ACTUATO R
CONFIGURATION
MONITOR
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CONTROL LAW
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ENGAGE CONTROLLER OTHER SYSTEM STATUS
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NONE
YES
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WARNING
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FIGURE 6-9. EXECUTIVE FUNCTION FLOW DIAGRAM
and then, in conjunction with the status of the other computers and
the actuator engagement, the best control law is selected for control
and the others are synchronized. Appropriate logic functions are
picked off for status/warning annunciation and for data transfer to
the other RSSAS computers.
A more detailed flow diagram of the actuator engage and system warn-
ing is shown in Figure 6-10. The computer first determines if the
associated engage switch has been selected. If not, the warning
light output is reset and the actuator is not engaged. With the
switch on, the computer validity must be present and a control law
available (unit control law not in standby) to continue the logic
process for actuator engagement. If not, the system warning is set.
Next, with the computer configured for the control of two actuators,
the validity of the first is checked and if present, the actuator is
armed. Now, if a satisfactory total system control law is available
(one which agrees with the other computers or gives best performance
available), the actuator is engaged. This sequence is then performed
on the second actuator (note that a warning will be provided if
either actuator is armed and a control law is not available).
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FIGURE 6-10. ACTUATOR ENG'AGE AND SYSTEMWARNING
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The most complex task of the executive function is to select the
system control law. Figure 6-11 is the flow diagram for determining
the highest-level control law available to a given computer - unit
control law (UCL). This process determines from the monitor output
which sensors are available. The UCL is then selected as the control
law which uses the greatest number of sensors. This control law,
however, may not be in agreement with the control law of the other
computers due to tolerances or failure conditions. Common control
laws, while not yet proven to be essential, do seem to be desirable
for surface-to-surface tracking and total system performance. For
this reason, each computer independently determines the system
control law (SCL).
Figure 6-12 (a, b, c and d) shows the flow diagrams for the selection
of the SCL (note that this diagram is for the No.1 computer). In
Figure 6-12a, the actuator arm/engage status of each computer is
examined and, if OFF, all control law flags of that unit are set to
IIfailed ll for the purpose of selecting the SCL. In Figure 6-12b, the
flags determined in 6-12a are counted and if all computers have
common valid sensor arrays, the highest level (most sensors) control
law is selected.
Figures 6-l2c and 6-l2d show the process followed to determine the
SCL when all of the computers do not have a common control lawavail-
able. The objective of this logic sequence is to determine if two
computers have a valid, common control law and, if so, that SCL is
selected and the computer that is not in agreement has its SCL put
in standby (STBY). If no two computers agree, all computers revert
to their UCL, which is considered the best decision available.
The thrust/pitch compensation function is also controlled by the
executive as shown in Figure 6-13. Dual Nl outputs for each engine
are provided from the thrust-indicating system to each FAC. These
Nl signals are compared by the system monitor to determine the
validity of the data and, if a failure is not detected, the thrust
term used in the compensation calculation is Nl = No. 1 Nl + No.2
N,. If either engine datum is determined to be failed~ Nl is set
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TO FLAG COUNT AND NO FLAG CONTROL LAW SELECT
(SEE FIGURE CONTINUATION)
FIGURE 6·12a. SYSTEM CONTROL lAW (SCl) SELECTION FLOW DIAGRAM
equal to that of the valid datum. With both engines still operative,
this will result in essentially half the required thrust-control gain
with an accompanying caution annunciation. If both data sources fail,
the thrust/compensation is put into hold and the appropriate warning
light comes on.
(d) Monitoring System Functions. A variety of methods is used to detect
failures within the computer and its associated components (sensors
and actuators). Some of these techniques are aimed at specifically
validating a hardware function. Others determine the system's
health by evaluating its performance or potential performance ability.
Such concepts are highly dependent upon the function, architecture,
and intended performance of the system. The following discussion
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FIGURE &12b. S'CL FLOW DIAGRAM (CONTINUED)
will highlight those monitor concepts intended for the RSSAS. Most
of these are contHiuous.l,y flHTctioning duri·ng fl ight or on the ground
and are an integral part of both the' monitoring and maintenance
functions of the system.
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FIGURE 6·12c. SCL FLOW DIAGRAM (CONTINUED)
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computer Tests:
cPU Instruction Test - The CPU instructions can be exercised by per-
forming arithmetic and logic operations by inserting known values,
performing the functions, and comparing the answer with a known final
result.
CPU Fixed Memory Tests - The permanent memory can be tested by a
check routine which determines the number of 1's in data storage, and
compares this number with a known result.
Scratch Pad Memory Test - The scratch pad memory can be tested by
driving all locations in the memory to 1IS, then to O·s, for read-in/
out comparison, and verifying each bit is in the proper state. At
the completion of the test, the original contents of the memory
location are restored.
Analog/Digital (A/D) Test - A/G converter testing is accomplished by
inserting a known reference voltage to the A/D converter, sampling
the converted digital word, and then comparing it with the known value.
163
Computer Power Supply Test- The regulated power supplies can be
tested by digitizing each voltage one at a time, through the AID
converter, and comparing them with known tolerances in the cpu.
Input Circuits Test - Analog input circuits can be tested by measur-
ing two redundant channels for each input signal. The demodulator
references are also converted to a known nominal value. The discrete
input circuits are tested by applying logic stimuli to verify that
the circuits are operational, by performing a decoder check, and by
performing a stimulus removal check.
Output Circuit Test - All analog outputs can be tested by gating each
back through the input analog multiplexer and the AID converter, and
then comparing this digital value with the known digital word which
originally initiated the analog output. The computer discrete out-
puts are also reconverted into an input digital test word. This
word is then compared with the known digital word which commanded
the original discrete outputs.
Hardware Monitor - The preceding tests all require that the computer
be running to be able to detect faults. It is also necessary to
detect the fact that the computer stops functioning completely, such
as in the absence of power or failure of the internal clock. This
is accomplished by a square wave or "heartbeat" monitor. As the
computer cycles through its program, it turns a signal on and off
each cycle. The resulting square wave is monitored with hardware
such that if the signal stops oscillating at the proper frequency
(for example, 20 Hz), the engage solenoid of the actuator will dis-
engage. Such a device is shown in Figure 6-14.
The above list does not presume to include all possible tests which
are, or could be, included in the self-check routines of a specific
digital computer mechanization; however, it does represent a general
set which could apply to any machine. These kinds of tests, taken
as a whole, are comprehensive in that they address all of the func-
tional elements within the computer.
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Sensor Tests:
Comparison and Voting - The RSSAS sensors will vary in degree of
internal monitoring capability. Monitoring of these devices is
accomplished by installing them in the vehicle in a way that makes
each one completely independent of the other, and comparing (for two
sensors) or voting (for more than two) the sensor outputs. Thresh-
olds for the comparators are established by statistical models of the
sensor and computer tolerances, and when the threshold is exceeded,
both sensors are no longer used and the system shuts down or reverts
to other modes of operation.
Sensors with digital outputs have validity incorporated in the word
itself. The sign-status matrix, as it is called, dedicates 2 or 3
out of 32,bits to the validity of the signal. Some manufacturers
feel, however, that there are failure modes in the sensor for which
they cannot guarantee to set the digital word to a fail status. The
alternative for the system designer then is to continue to look at the
28-VDC validity which does not properly reflect status, or ask the
sensor supplier to remove the digital word altogether from the wire,
which they agree they can do.
Parity Checks - For data transmitted on a digital bus, one bit of
the 32-bit word is dedicated to parity. The bit indicates whether
the total bit sum is even or o~d, thus giving the user/flight control
computer a way of establishing confidence in the transmitted signal.
Parity is nota self-sufficient means of establishing validity,
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since it will catch Word errors only about half of the time. But
since data rates are very high, parity errors will occur fast enough
in a failed device to make the technique useful.
Reasonableness Check - The computer can assess a particular sensor's
validity by cOlilparing its data with data derived from an independent
dissimilar sensor. Thus, if vertical speed, as measured by an air
data sensor, makes a sudden change without a change in lagged normal
acceleration, one wou~d suspect either or both sources. Considerable
effort is now being expended along these lines in an attempt to
minimize the number of redundant sensors required aboard a vehicle.
Actuation Tests - Surface actuators are probably the most common
devices to be modeled since they include several non1inearities, or
authority limits. Models are simply inserted into the comparator
path before the comparison is made, and can detect such phenomena
as hardovers, loss of hydraulic pressure, and servo-amplifier
failures.
System Tests - Comparison and voting within the computer. The output
commands of the several redundant, but uniquely different, control
1aw computations have been demonstrated to track each other with a
relatively high degree of accuracy. In the cases evaluated, a single
contro1 1aw was selected for augmenta ti on control, wh i1 e the others
were being calculated but were in standby. In such a configuration,
it appears that contro1-1aw-to-control-law comparisons can be used
to validate the system performance. Failure of individual sensor
elements could affect more than one control law type, which although
detectable in the performance comparisons, would require several
control law comparisons of dissimilar sensor arrays to provide fault
isolation.
Mechanical or Aerodynamic Voting - Multiple channels of control and
actuation are often tolerant of failures which result in errors of
single-command 'elements. These failures are voted out in the mechan-
ica1system or if the erroneouscornmand is transmitted to a single
segment of a multiple segment surface, aerodynamic voting takes
place. (The DC-10 auto1and configuration with quad elevator and
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aileron surface segments is an example of aerodynamic voting.)
These failures must, of course, be quickly isolated and removed in
anticipation of any subsequent fault.
Several of the RSSAS configurations which control a quad series
elevator actuator arrangement can take advantage of similar voting
characteristics. The quad-actuator, quad-surface configurations
will vote aerodynamically. The quad-actuator configurations, with
two actuators on each of two segments, can result in mechanical
voting at the surface and then aerodynamic averaging of the two
surfaces. This type of voting or averaging will be integral with
RSSAS configurations regardless of whether the individual computers
are operating with the same control laws (as was analyzed in this
study) or whether each computer operates with a different control
law which may be a desirable dissimilar computation configuration.
Performance Modeling - Modeling can be used to either measure or
predict the system performance. For the RSSAS, the anticipated
command of each control law in respo~se to aircraft upsets and
environment conditions can be predetermined and then compared ·with
measured control-law performance. Another method might be to estab-
lish performance relationships between the various control laws as
a function of the aircraft disturbance. These models could then be
continuously evaluated in flight against the actual system perform-
ance. The statistical evaluation studies of Section 5 could provide
the basis for this type of monitor function.
Figure 6-15 is a flow diagram of the RSSAS monitor function. The
first step in this operation is to determine if the computer is cor-
rectly functioning. If the computer is failed, all further opera-
tions are in doubt; therefore, the executive is sent a message that
flags all control functions. In addition, the computer flag is
stored by the system maintenance function which accumulates all fail-
ure information. With the computer valid, the other control func-
tions are sequentially checked. First, the actuator response is
compared with the expected result determined with a model of the
actuator. If two actuators are controlled, each is individually
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monitored. Next, each set of sensors is compared. When a failure
is detected, a second check of the same sensors is made using the
data transferred from one of the other computers. If that compari-
son is also invalid, the sensor is determined to be failed; if not,
the computer input port is probably failed. Finally, the trim
system is monitored by putting all trim commands (pilot/autopilot
and RSSAS) into a trim ~ode1 and comparing this expected result with
the actual horizontal stabilizer motion. All monitor data are then
sent to the executive and maintenance functions for proper warning/
status annunciation, control selection, engagement decision and data
transfer.
Based upon the performance analyses reported in Section 5, two addi-
tional concepts not shown in Figure 6-15 may be employed in RSSAS
monitoring. In one concept, contro1-1aw-command-to-contro1-1aw-
command comparison monitoring appears useful for several but not all
control laws. The other concept"is to establish statistical per-
formance models of the contro11aws which could be used in either of
two ways. First, the control law performance model could be deter-
mined as a function of the environment. The monitoring task would
then be to establish the environmental condition, callout the appro-
priate model, and compare it to the actual control law performance.
The second method would be to determine a model which correlates the
performance characteristics of two or more control laws. This model
could then be used to continuously compare the real-time system"per-
formance. None of these techniques has yet been developed but now
that the RSSAS control laws and performance have been established,
future studies will be aimed specifically at improved monitoring
concepts.
6.1.3 Actuation System. - Conventional commercial transport primary
mechanical flight control systems operate in such a manner that as the pilot
inputs move the control surfaces, this movement is fed back to reposition the
pilot controls. When the automatic pilot operates in place of the pilot, it
positions the surface by moving the primary control system with an auxiliary
actuator. This mechanization is referred to as a parallel actuation system,
since the autopilot input is essentially tied to the pilot controls and their
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positions parallel each other! Augmentation systems which operate simultane-
ouslY with the primary f1 ight contrql$ and share the same controlsufaces
,'.. . .., .;..
require an additional series actuator interface which causes the same control
surface to respond to the sum qf the cQntro1 conmands, but ~ithout the series
input being ref1ec.ted back into the pilot controls.
For the EET RSSAS, the elevatQr actuation system must be designed to pro-
vide this series and parallel operation. The b.ase1 ine primary e1 evator control
system,is that of the DC-l0 ShOWD in, Fi~ur~ 6~16. Several a1ternativ~ configu-
rations which provide the required function have been qualitatively evaluated,
along With the necessary hydraulic power interface using the baseline system
shown in Figure 6-17.
6.1.3.1 Actuation Config,ura,tions and Operation. - Six basic elevator
actuation systems have been considered. These are shown in Figures 6-18
through 6-23. The surface actuator$c incorporate tandem, cylinders powered by
two separate hydraulic systems, such that no single hydraulic failure can cause
loss of any surface output. The auxniary actuators for series and parallel
commands, whether they are separate or incorporated within the surface actua-
tors, are single cylinder units, each powered by one of the two' hydrauli.c
systems driving the associate~ surface actuator. The rationale behind elimina-
tion of the complexity of tandem cylinders fo,r paralle.1 and s,eries actuators
is that one parallel unit can drive the cruise autopilot and one pair of un'its
is good for auto1and, and loss of one or two series surface outputs is accept-
able after a single hydraulic failure,.
Configuration A, shown in Figure 6-18, is the basic configuration. In it,
a series and a parallel actuator are added in the linkage path to each surface.
The parallel.mode. actuator output rod is disengaged within the unit when
hydraulic power is not applied, so that minimum friction is added to the
system. The series mode actuator output rod is spring pre10aded to the neutral
position when hydraulic power is not applied, thus providing a reaction point
for the summing link driving the surface actu.ator input. In this configuration,
10s~ of hydraulic power to a series actuator causes loss of series outputs on
its associated surface.
Fi gure 6-19 shows Confi gurati,on B" which combi nes a series and a parallel
actuator into a single unit which also transmits mechanical cOl1llJands. One of
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these units is incorporated in the linkage path to each surface. Since the
actuators incorporate single hydraulic cylinders, the outputs must be bussed
together to prevent loss of mechanical control of one or two surfaces after a
single hydraulic failure. As a result, loss of hydraulic power to one, two,
or even three of the series/parallel actuators causes no loss of series
command to the surfaces. This is not as advantageous as it appears, however,,
since loss of two hydraulic systems also causes loss of output of at least one
and possibly two surface actuators.
Configuration C, shown in Figure 6-20, combines three series and four
parallel actuators into a single package located upstream of the control
surface linkage bus. The individual actuators are identical to those of Con-
figuration A. As in Configuration B, bussing of the series actuator outputs
prevents loss of series commands after one or two hydraulic failures, although
with two hydraulic failures one or two surfaces will also be inoperative.
Figure 6-21 shows Configuration D, an integrated series/parallel actuator
located upstream of the control surface linkage bus. This unit accepts mechan-
ical, series electrical, and parallel electrical inputs and provides dual
mechanical outputs to the control surface bus. For reasons given subsequently,
this configuration was quickly eliminated, so no further description is given.
Configuration E, shown in Figure 6-22, integrates the series actuators
with the mechanical surface actuators. Units of this type are in common usage
today, primarily in rudder actuators which incorporate yaw dampers. A parallel
actuator, identical to those of Configuration A, is added in the linkage path
to each actuator. As in Configuration A, loss of hydraulic power to the series
portion of an actuator will cause loss of series output of that actuator.
Figure 6-23 shows Configuration F, which integrates both the series and
parallel mode actuators into the surface actuators. As in the previous con-
figuration, loss of hydraulic power to the series portion of the actuator
causes loss of the series mode output of that actuator.
6.1.3.2 Actuation Configuration Evaluation. - The primary considerations
in evaluating each of the proposed actuation configurations are discussed
below:
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Configuration A
• Maximum number of actuators.
• Does not take advantage of existing unit capability.
Configuration B
• Primary pilot input linkage not direct to actuator - adds lag between
pi lot i npu t and s'urface r'espohse.
• Added weight of additional bus system at output of series/parallel
actuator.
• Does not take advantage of existing unit capability.
Configuration C
• Most flexible actuation arrangement - redundancy of autopilot and
augmentation actuators easily changed to match reliability
requirements.
• Large number of actuators.
• Does not take advantage of existing unit capability.
Configuration D
• Brings entire control system to a single, conmon point. Failure
effects could be severe.
• Very complex pilot, autopilot, and augmentation interface.
(Internals not shown in diagram.)
Configuration E
• Requires add-on of autopilot actuators to existing configuration.
• Existing actua'tors mUSS'f be· reworked (.sfmpTe cha'nge) to provide series
augmentation tnput rattler than parallel autopilot input.
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Configuration F
• Most adaptable to the existing mechanical configuration.
• Requires a one-for-one replacement of actuators.
To keep the RSSAS incorporation to a minimum risk and minimum change,
Configurations E and F are the candidate selections. For the further RSSAS
studies, these configurations are identical since both include the integration
of the series augmentor actuator into the primary power actuator. In the total
system architecture evaluations, two other variations to the selected configu-
rations were considered. These were: (a) dual series command inputs into a
single series actuator, and (b) actuation configurations which do not include
a series input at each surface segment.
6.1.3.3 Hydraulic Arrangement.
(a) Control Surface Actuators. The surface actuators are tandem cylinder
units, each utilizing two different hydraulic power supplies. For
maximum reliability, all power supplies should be represented and
they should be represented as equally as possible. With three sup-
plies, the optimum combinations would be 1-2, 1-3, 2-3. Since there
are four actuators to supply, the fourth must duplicate one of the
other three. For purposes of the hydraulic arrangement study, the
three supplies are considered identical, thus it is immaterial which
actuator is duplicated. The actuator supplies have therefore been
allocated as follows: 1-2, 1-2, 1-3, 2-3.
(b) Series Mode Actuators. Allocation of three hydraulic systems and/or
three computer channels to three actuators is straightforward. How
to optimize the allocation of three systems to four actuators is not
immediately apparent. Several ground rules may be set up, however,
for maximum reliability. First, a basic power source (i.e., engine,
APU, etc.) will be used to generate both hydraulic power for the
actuators and electrical power for the computer channels. These
sources are designated as 1, 2; and 3, and hydraulic and electrical
systems 1,2, and 3 are each associated with the correspondingly
numbered basic source. Thus, failure of a basic source will result
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in loss of both the correspondingly numbered hydraulic system and
electrical system. To prevent failure of a basic source from causing
loss of more than one series mode channel, each channel (including
the surface actuators) should utilize electrical and hydraulic power
from a common basic source. A secondary source of hydraulic or
electrical power may be used (as in the surface actuators) where its
failure alone will not cause loss of that channel. If it is assumed
that computation Channell is supplied by electrical System 1, Chan-
nel 2 by electrical System 2, etc., the above ground rules may be
stated more simply as follows:
• For a channel having one series mode actuator and one surface
actuator, each actuator must utilize at least one hydraulic
system numbered the same as the computation channel number.
• For a channel having two series mode actuators and two surface
actuators, each series mode actuator must utilize one of the
systems used by its associated surface actuator. At least one
of the series mode actuators must utilize a hydraulic system
numbered the same as the computation channel number.
Applying the above ground rules reduces the number of permutations of
hydraulic systems and computer channels to a more manageable number.
These cases were examined for the effects of all combinations of •
hydraulic and electrical failures up to the double-hydraulic,
double-electrical level. Comparing the results on the basis of the
number of surface actuators suffering a total loss of series com-
mands, it is found that all cases fall into one of two groups. Con-
figurations in which the two series mode actuators controlled by one
computer are powered by the same hydraulic system, suffer complete
loss of series mode capability for 12 failure cases. All other con-
figurations suffer this same loss in only nine cases. Tables 6-1
and 6-2 sho~ the analysis for two typical configurations, one for
each of the two groups.
The configuration of the series mode actuators is such that they are
readily adaptable to two inputs, one each from two different computer
channels. In the event of a failure in one channel, the remaining
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channel would be capable of controlling the actuator within its
normal authority, but at half-rate. This suggests the possibility
of increasing reliability by applying commands from two different
computer channels to each series mode actuator. An analysis,
similar to that described above, was performed using this approach.
Again, it was found that there is no real lI optimum ll arrangement
Tables 6-3 and 6-4 show two cases typical of the IIworsell and IIbetter ll
groups of configurations. A comparison of Table 6-2 with Table 6-4
(both representative of the IIbetter ll groups) shows that the dual
inputs to the series mode actuators does result in fewer series
command losses for the combined computer/hydraulic system failures.
Although complete command losses are reduced, in most cases several
or all of surfaces remaining active are operating at half-rate, thus
reducing the servo-loop response and in some·cases resulting in
servo loops operating together but with different response
characteristics.
The configuration of Table 6-4 is that currently being simulated.
To avoid problems due to the rate limitation discussed above,the
gain of the good input to an actuator is doubled when the other input
fails.
(c) Parallel Mode Actuators. A study of hydraulic system allocation to
the parallel mode actuators has not yet been accomplished. If a
three-channel parallel mode were to be used, the series mode analysis
would apply directly. If a four-channel mode should be selected,
the DC-10 Automatic Flight Control System configuration would be
directly applicable.
6.1.4 RSSAS Autotrim. - As the aircraft fl ight path or engine thrust
changes, the RSSAS will command a steady-state elevator for these new condi-
tions. To allow a retrim of the series elevator position and reestablish the
range of authority for the RSSAS series actuator, an automatic trim feature is
necessary to reposition the horizontal stabilizer an amount equivalent to that
being maintained by the elevator. The autotrim system designed for the RSSAS
performs this function with the use of the existing DC-10-type rate actuator
horizontal stabilizer trim system shown in Figure 6-24, replacing the alternate
trim with the RSSAS input.
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FIGURE 6-24. SYSTEM BLOCK DIAGRAM - HORIZONTAL STABILIZER TRIM
The block diagram shown in Figure 6-25 is a combination of RSSAS and auto-
trim concept. As the augmentor develops an elevator command, the threshold
detectors sense this signal at Point A. The threshold detectors, in combina-
tion with the time delays, are set to minimize stabilizer motion resulting
from transitory augmentation commands. A typical threshold detector charac-
teristic is shown in Figure 6-26. The ON threshold is set at the minimum level
above the average expected elevator displacement. This average may be estab-
lished by evaluation of the augmentation commands in various levels of turbu-
lence and/or during selected aircraft maneuvers. The OFF threshold is set at
a position about which the augmentor may function without immediately requiring
stabilizer motion. The OFF level must, however, be established so that it can
be achieved during all flight conditions. If not, the autotrim will continu-
ously drive the~abilizer. Both levels of the threshold detector must also be
variable to correspond to the effectivity of the elevator. The time delays.
are set to complement the threshold detector such that transient elevator
commands above the ON trim level do not result in stabilizer motion. The out-
puts of the threshold detector/time delays are fixed discrete commands to the
stabilizer1s actuation system.
The autotrim actuation consists of two dual electrohydraulic valves and
motors which operate at fixed equivalent rates summing to drive the stabilizer.
One of the valves combines the primary pilot input with the augmentation trim
and the other valve combines the primary pilot input with the autopilot trim.
A single motor operates the stabilizer at half the rate of the two combined.
Therefore, under normal operation the primary pilot trim operates at twice the
rate of either of the other two trim functions. Table 6-5 summarizes these
rates. If the two inputs to a valve are opposing commands, the associated
motor will not drive. If the two motors are driving in opposite directions,
the stabilizer will not move.
To maintain consistent rates for the primary pilot trim function, the
output of the threshold detector/time delays is inhibited as a function of
pilot trim. Specifically, trim in the same direction is inhibited. In this
way, the series elevator will not be retrimmed in a direction opposite to a
pilot input which would effectively cut the pilot trim rate in half. Under
all other conditions, the fixed RSSAS trim will be transmitted to the electro-
hydraulic valve. As the stabilizer moves in respo~se to this command, the
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TABLE 6-5
TRIM RATE SUMMARY
TRIM RATE
ABOVE 129 MiS BELOW 129 MiS MOTOR
TRIM (250 KN) (250 KN) USED
PRIMARY 0.0035 RAD/S (0.2°ISEC) 0.00873 RAD/s (0.5° /SEC) -1 AND-2
RSSAS 0.00175 RAD/S (0.1 ° /SEC) 0.00436 RAD/S (0.25° /SEC) -1
AUTOPILOT 0.00175 RAD/S (0.1 ° /SEC) 0.00436 RAD/S (0.25°/SEC) -2
series elevator is repositioned an equivalent amount. Since the stabilizer
position is a combination of all stabilizer commands, it is not used for this
function. Instead, a model of the stabilizer motor provides the compensating
signal which is summed with the series elevator command.
The output of this model is also used in subtraction from total stabi-
lizer position to determine all motion used for f1ightpath guidance. This,
in turn, is summed with primary elevator control and provided as an input to
the RSSAS control.
Fault detection and isolation is an important consideration of the RSSAS
trim function. Generally, two failure conditions can occur: (1) no trim
action when required by the series elevator deflection, and (2) stabilizer
motion does not agree with the elevator being off-loaded (i.e., the actuator
model). Figure 6-27 expands the RSSAS autotrim diagram to include several
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FIGURE 6-27. RSSAS BLOCK DIAGRAM WITH AUTOTRIM MONITORING
monitoring functions for these conditions. For the no-trim case, the C2
comparator is set to recognize an abnormally high series elevator deflection.
The Cl comparator in turn sums all the trim inputs to determine agreement
with the total stabilizer position. A failed condition sensed by either
comparator set activates a manual trim director and allows primary pilot
inputs.to the actuator model to off-load the series elevator. A single
electrohydraulic valve failure is also detectable by comparing the pilot
trim input with the actual stabilizer rate at the actuator monitor null
detector. Detection of mismatch at the null detector sets the model inputs
to half value (half rate with only one valve operative).
A production installation of such a system would require further study
into the criteria for failure warning and latching/resetting of internal
monitoring functions. Faults must be promptly recognized, reacted to, and
indicated, but the intelligence of the system may require a self-healing
process. The design shown is a combination of self-healing monitors and a
single-latching comparator intended to shut down the autotrim function for
gross disagreements of trim actuation and elevator off-load.
6.1.4.1 Alternate RSSAS Autotrim Mechanization. - Another RSSAS auto-
trim mechanization considered was the use of a position (rather than rate)
control system on the horizontal stabilizer with a fixed total travel capa-
bility. This concept, developed for the initial DC-10, was to be used with
a mach/airspeed trim compensator. Early in the DC-10 development program,
it was determined that this augmentation was not required so the position
stabilizer control valve was not installed on the production aircraft.
This concept was not selected for the RSSAS, primarily for two reasons.
First,·a position system requires that the individual trim command of each
FAC be synchronized or voted to establish a single stabilizer command. The
resultant stabilizer position would then have to be fed back to the FACs
in the correct proportion to the ratio of their desired displacement com-
mands. An additional unit may be required to perform this trim drive.
Second, and most significant, is tIle requirement that the RSSAS continuously
control and position this actuation syst~m properly for the flight regime.
If the RSSAS is completely disengaged in flight and then subsequently
engaged, the stabilizer actuation system may not be in the proper position
to provide the range of stabilizer deflections necessary to off-load the
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series elevator. This problem would not exist if the RSSAS was flight-
crucial and it could be assured that full-time, continuous stabilizer control
would be provided.
6.1.4.2 Autotrim Operation. - The RSSAS autotrim function has been
analyzed for various primary pilot and autopilot trim demands. Several of
these operations are presented here using the simplified trim schematic
shown in Figure 6-28. Figures 6-29 through 6-32 show the altitude, elevator
commands, and trim response corresponding to selected maneuvers. The actual
values used are arbitrary and have been selected for convenience and proper
direction of response but not assigned an absolute signal level. In Case 1,
Figure 6-29, the pilot inputs a pitch-up command with nose-up elevator. The
pilot input (Oep)is in one direction and the augmentation input (oes) may
move in the opposite direction to stabilize the aircraft response (8). After
the appropriate time delay (TO) the augmentation trim command (oTC) turns on.
The washout command (oWO) is summed with the augmentation command (oe) until
the total (oes) is zero and the trim command (oTC) turns off. While 0TC was
on, the stabilizer (oST) was moving at a fixed rate and has now established
the required new setting. When the pilot returns the aircraft attitude to
the original condition, the trim process is reversed.
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Figure 6-30 demonstrates a similar operation, but in this case the pilot
has exercised his primary trim (oPT) to off-load his elevator displacement
(oep) prior to the operation of the augmentation trim. This leads to the
next operational sequence with the pilot and RSSAS trim overlapping in time
as shown in Figure 6-31. Note that the trim demands are in opposite
directions, so the RSSAS trim-detector/time-delay output is not inhibited.
If the trim demands were in the same direction, the RSSAS trim would be
inhibited until the pilot trim is satisfied. The trim signals combine to
turn off the upper control valve (CV) and the stabilizer runs at half rate.
At the same time, the series elevator (oes) is reduced by the washout
command (oWO) and this combines with the stabilizer motion (oST) to provide
an aircraft response identical to that resulting from full stabilizer rate.
The last example, shown in Figure 6-32, is the combined operation of
autopilot and RSSAS trim responding to ~pposing commands. At time T1' the
autopilot trim (oAPT) is initiated to off-load the autopilot elevator input
(~eA/P)' At time TO, the RSSAS trim (oTC) turns on and, since the two trim
commands are in opposition, the stabilizer motion' (oST) stops. The two
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FIGURE 6-30. AUGMENTATION TRIM - CASE 2
elevator displacement commands (oeA/p and 0es) continue to wash out at
opposite equivalent rates .. When either command error is nulled, the cor-
responding trim is turned off. In the example shown, the autopilot is
satisfied first, and at this time the stabilizer begins to move in response
to the existing RSSAS trim command.
6.1.5 Integration of Other Augmentation Functions. - Several other
functions were considered for integration, together with the RSSAS function,
into the FAC. These additional functions include:
• Yaw damping/turn coordination
• Elevator-load-feel programming (ELF)
• Flap-position limiting (FL)
• Stall warning.
Diagrams of the equivalent DC-10 systems are present~d in Appendix 10.
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There are two reasons for this integration. First, all of these
functions are required for dispatch of the aircraft. Second, most of the
required data to perform these calculations will normally be ava'ilable to
the RSSAS function. These signals include:
• Yaw rate - attitude heading reference system
• Roll attitude - attitude heading reference system
• Airspeed - air data computer
• Mach - air data computer
• Angle of attack - angle-of-attack vanes.
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Additional sensor signals necessary to be provided to the FAC include:
• Flap position - FL and stall warning
• VCK position - stall warning
• Function-engage control - all functions
• Servo/actuator commands and feedback - all functions.
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The effect on the computer architecture and system reliability of
incorporating these functions is discussed in Paragraphs 6.1 and 4.2,
respectively.
6.1.6 Electrical Power. - The EET basic aircraft flying qualities are
such that an augmentor is not required for safety of flight. Thus, the
augmentation system does not require a noninterruptable electrical power
source, such as a battery. For this reason, a conventional electrical AC
power system for the EET is acceptable. A description of the aircraft
system is presented in Appendix 11.
6.1.7 Maintenance Concept. - Maintenance is the function performed by
the user of a system to place that system in proper operating condition. To
assist in that function, most avionics systems incorporate a certain amount
of maintainability. The thoroughness and accuracy with which a system
performs this function depends on the capabilities of the individual com-
ponents and the complexity of its interfaces. The motivation for improving
this capability is the cost of maintenance or possible lost revenues, as in
the case of dispatch critical functions. All the functions (RSSAS, Yaw
Damping, E1evator-Load-Feel/F1ap-Limiting, and Stall Warning) proposed for
integration into the FAC are in fact required for dispatch. Therefore, a
complete and comprehensive built-in maintenance capability is desired. The
three major tasks that this FAC maintenance function must perform are:
(1) Fault Detection, (2) Fault Isolation, and (3) Functional Verification.
6.1.7.1 Fault Detection. - Fault detection is mostly performed con-
tinuously in flight by the system's monitors. Each FAC, of course, uses the
data to make on-line control and/or configuration decisions. The data must
also be transmitted to a central system maintenance unit and stored in a
nonvolatile memory for subsequent recall. For the ground condition, a
manually initiated, automatic test is required, which stimulates the system
so that the monitors can perform their functions.
6.1.7.2 Fault Isolation. - The on-line system monitoring is primarily
designed to isolate a fault to a function. In most cases, the fault is also
isolated to a component failure or interface. Some faults, however, are not
195
easily isolated, such as different faults which produce the same effects.
For these cases, the ground maintenance function must have the capability to
sequentially stimulate the individual system elements. In other cases, an
unusual combination of environmental conditions or control requirements may
be the stimulus for the fault. Here the recorded data must be maintained
and, upon recognition of the conditions or by recurrence of the event, the
fault diagnosed.
6.1.7.3 Functional Verific9tion. - There are two levels of functional
verification of the system. The most complete is that verification necessary
after installation of a system component - primarily a FAG. Using the central
maintenance unit, all functions influenced by the newly installed component
must be tested by the maintenance personnel for proper operation, including
some level of performance capability. Besides being a function test, this
procedure verifies the system to the component level. The other functional
verification occurs during a normal preflight cockpit check and is performed
by the flight crew. In this case, the maintenance unit is not used, but
rather the test is initiated at the location of the normal cockpit controls
for the function. Each function can be individually tested or performed as
part of an integral test, depending on the cockpit layout and/or operation
philosophy. The preflight test is intended to be solely a functional check,
and verification to the flight crew is at a functional level.
To isolate a fault or verify a function while on the ground requires
the capability to stimulate the sensors to known conditions. The FAGs will
in turn verify the sensor data, perform the necessary calculations for each
of its functions, and provide an appropriate actuator command output. The
actuation systems are checked by verifying the correct feedbacks. (Stall
warning requires observation of the stick shaker.) All units of the FAG
functions will have this capability.
6.1.7.4 The Maintenance Unit. - The maintenance unit is an integral
part of the flight augmentation system design. It must interface with all
FAGs to issue maintenance test instructions and to interrogate the computer
function. A single maintenance unit may perform the same function for other
avionics systems such as the flight guidance systems (autopilot and flight
196
director), flight management systems (navigation and flight performance),
and/or thrust management systems (autothrott1e and thrust-rating). To assure
that the maintenance unit does not become the limiting factor in the maintain-
ability of these systems, a simple reliable device is required. The proposed
unit would include a test-initiate pushbutton, a go/no-go annunciator, and
select switch to allow individual system test or varying levels of functional
test, depending upon the maintenance action required or a·ircraft configuration
(hydraulic power available or surfaces locked). It is suggested that a
microprocessor be included in the unit, with nonvolatile memory, to perform
the necessary test data management and to record the inf1ight and test data.
A mu1ticharacter display also would be provided to convey the detailed
performance information to the maintenance operator. The display also would
be used by the system to request the maintenance operator to make aircraft
configuration changes, verify display presentation, or to perform other
functions not available to the maintenance unit. Verification or nonverifi-
cation of the requested task would be signified through separate pushbutton
inputs.
Due to the interaction of the maintenance unit and operator, it is
suggested that the unit be located in the cockpit, convenient to the
necessary aircraft controls and displays. A remote parallel unit may be
considered for the avionics equipment compartment.
The maintenance unit required to perform these functions is similar to
the DC-9 Series 80 Digital Flight Guidance System Maintenance Panel shown
in Figure 6-33.
6.1.7.5 Preflight Tests. - The preflight tests of the augmentation
system functions are initiated by the flight crew at the normal control
location on the forward overhead control panel. The test-initiate signal is
provided directly to the FAC which in turn sequences the proper system stimuli
to verify the selected function. Initiation of the test will cause the
appropriate function warning light to illuminate. Besides indicating the
test in progress, this serves as a test of the warning light circuits. At
the conclusion of the test, the warning light will extinguish if the
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FIGURE 6-33. DC-9 SERIES 80 MAINTENANCE PANEL
function is satisfactory, but will remain illuminated if a fault is detected.
The test results will also be monitored by the maintenance unit which may
receive detailed component failure characteristics. Figure 6-34 shows the
overhead instrument panel layout with appropriate augmentation function
controls.
6.1.8 Fly-by-Wire Considerations. - The fly-by-wire (FBW) concept can
be implemented as either hybrid nonflight crucial or as the total primary
flight controls. The hybrid mechanization would require some level of
mechanical capability as a backup to the electronic control, but the total
system would not require such backing.
At first, FBW seems like an ideal candidate for integration with the
RSSAS due to its high reliability and architecture (primarily actuator inter-
face). After some consideration, however, many differences become apparent
and these require significantly different design approaches. Some of these
items are discussed below.
6.1.8.1 Reliability and Safety. ~-The loss of the RSSAS function must
meet a lxlO-5 regulatory failure probability criterion, as interpreted in
Figure 4-7, for a basic aircraft with Level 2 flying qualities which can
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complete its mission or flight plan. The electronics of a hybrid FBW would
probably have to satisfy the lxlO-7 probability requirement since the flight
plan would be aborted with an immediate landing. This is a result of having
only a single-string mechanical control system available s which may be a
single failure away from loss of aircraft control. The full electronic FBW
would s of courses require a maximum system failure probability of less than
lX10-9. Dispatch inoperative considerations would require an even greater
level of redundancy than that required to meet the safety criteria.
6.1.8.2 Flying Qualities. - While the RSSAS is provided to maintain
flying qualities, the FBW mechanizations are primarily a replacement for
complex and heavy mechanical components.
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6.1.8.3 Sensors. - The RSSAS requires several different types of
aircraft sensors to describe the aircraft control and response. The FBW
systems require only some type of pilot control sensors (control wheel or
side-stick force or position), to determine the desired pilot input.
6.1.8.4 Computation. -The RSSAS function requires the processing of
many inputs, a complex computation and logic operation, and a large degree
of monitoring of different devices. The FBW function is a rather simple
calculation with the minimum sensor input. Monitoring must be complete,
but the task is relatively simple. The FBW systems will require control of
many actuators (more than RSSAS) and, to keep the computation system simple,
a fully monitored closed servo loop at each of these actuators may be
required.
6.1.8.5 Actuation. - Static stability augmentation is accomplished
through series elevator actuators which do not reflect back into the pilot
control. The traditional commercial transport has used control systems
which reflect the position of the control surfaces. For the hybrid FBW,
this can be accomplished by using a parallel actuator at the surface and
allowing this actuator to back-drive the control wheel/column through the
backup cable system. The full electronic FBW would have no way of driving
the control wheel/column through a mechanical system so that the surface
actuator could be shared with other functions such as RSSAS. Either the
control wheel/column would not be required to display the control surface
position, or a separate actuator package would have to be installed at the
pilot1s position to move the control input in parallel with the surface.
6.1.8.6 Electrical Power. - Unlike the RSSAS, the FBW mechanization
cannot be allowed to disconnect (even a temporary disconnect of the hybrid
system would be a nuisance); therefore, a noninterruptible power source is
required. The full electronic FBW requirement of the electrical system is
more severe than any present electrical system requirement.
6.2 Architecture Formulation
Architecture formulation consists of defining the individual elements
of the system, their level of redundancy, and the interconnection of the
200
devices. Based on individual design constraints and functional independence,
it has been decided that the configurations for the relaxed static stability
augmentation, pitch/thrust compensation, and automatic trim for the series
elevator augmentation would be developed independently. Formulation of the
relaxed static stability augmentation architecture has been initiated by first
establishing the most demanding functional reliability requirements of the
system. As shown in Figure 6-35, this can be based on the interpretation of
the regulatory requirements, desired functional availability, or other criteria
based on knowledge of, or experience with, such systems. In the reliability
and safety section of this report, the regulatory requirement for the loss of
augmentation for an aircraft with Level 2 flying qualities has been interpreted
to specify a total RSSAS function failure probability of approximately 1x10-5
for one flight hour. The desired functional availability of the RSSAS is
based on traditional capabilities of similar augmentation devices such as yaw
damping. This allows one complete system loss per year for a fleet of 200
aircraft, each operating 1000 hours per year. This equals a failure rate of
2.5x10-6 failures/hour. The path through the design contingencies anticipates
that as the aircraft aerodynamic definition progresses, it may be determined
that there are isolated aircraft/envelope combinations in which the
unaugmented aircraft flying qualities degrade to a Level 3. The regulatory
requirements would then specify a total RSSAS failure probability 1xlO-7 in
these flight regimes. This most restrictive system failure probability has
been established as the reliability requirement of the study. It is antici-
pated that this target, besides providing a margin for the specified flying
qualities, will allow flexibility in operating and maintaining this dispatch-
critical system.
The relaxed static stability augmentation has been partitioned into
functional subsets as shown in Figure 6-36. These subsets include: (1) the
sensors along with the data transmission to the computation; (2) the computa-
tion accepting the data input and providing control commands to the actuators,
and (3) an actuation system which interfaces with the primary controls to
drive the elevator surfaces and is powered by the hydraulic system. The
existing conventional electrical system ~as assumed to be used for the power
source and is described in Appendix 11.
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Using this partitioning of function, the specified reliability has been
allocated to the individual subsets proportionately to that system reliability
experienced on the DC-10. As shown in Figure 6-36, the sensor system prob-
ability goals is 3x10-8 and the combined computer/actuation subsets goal is
4xlO-8. The remaining 3x10-8 is allocated to the electrical system and any
control devices. The computation and actuation subsets have been combined
since an individual actuator system has a significantly lower failure proba-
bility than its corresponding computer drive, and the associated computer
failure nearly always results in loss of the corresponding actuator control.
This dependence of the actuation on the computation justifies combining the
reliability requirement into a single subsystem goal.
Figure 6-37 is a system redundancy graph that relates the single system
MTBF to the number of systems required to achieve a failure probability of
1xlO-7 for one hour. All failures are assumed to be detected and isolated.
This gives a first approximation of the level of redundancy needed in con-
structing a system architecture. For the partitioning assigned, this graph
-8 -8.could have been constructed more accurately for the 3xlO and 4xlO fallure
probabilities of the subsystems. Based on avionics hardware experience which
has shown typical component MTBF's in the 3000- to 5000-hour range, a redun-
dancy level of two to no greater than three appears to satisfy the reliability
requirement. In actuality, the curve differs from that shown when considera-
tion is given to effects of failure modes and fault detection, isolation, and
reconfiguration capabilities.
6.2.1 Sensor Array
6.2.1.1 Initial Component Redundancy Evaluation. - Prior to determination
of acceptable control laws, a sensor reliability analysis was performed, assum-
ing only a single control law capability would be attained. The failure prob-
abilities of the sensor array related to each of the original 28 possible
control law configurations have been calculated for various levels of component
redundancy. This provides an insight into the sensor redundancy and/or sensor
monitoring confidence required to satisfy the allotted failure probability of
3xlO-8.
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Subsequent control law development has demonstrated that several control
laws, each based on a unique sensor array, provide satisfactory augmentation.
This allowed the use of a method of control law reversion (discussed in
Paragraph 6.2.1.2) to meet the reliability criteria for sensor failures
rather than "bulk sensor redundancy". A technique for selection of the
required level of redundancy and monitoring for "bulk sensor redundancy II
is presented in this section only as an example for the reader and was
not used in the selection~ the final system architecture.
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Calculations have been made for redundancy levels of two, three, and four
sensor systems. The MTBFs used for the various sensors are based on historical
data available from DC-10 experience. These MTBFs are 3200 ~ours for the
Vertical Gyro (e), 6000 hours for the Air Data Computer (u, h), 12,000 hours
for the Accelerometer Unit (AN' Ax)' and 3000 hours for the ~ngle-of-Attack
Sensor (a). Since there is no DC-10 sensor for pitch rate (e), a MTBF of
5000 hours has been assigned; this value should be realistic whether the device
is added circuitry to derive pitch rate from pitch attitude, or a separate rate
sensor installed on the aircraft.
The study has assumed that the sensor-monitoring function would be such
that with three or more operative units, a single failure would be detected by
comparison-monitoring, isolated, and removed with 100-percent confidence. With
two operative units of the same type, a failure would be detected by compar;son-
monitoring ,with 100-percent confidence but isolated and removed (such that the
remaining unit can continue to operate) with a confidence factor, C, related
to the capability of in-line monitoring of an individual sensor's data. Of
course, when operating with "a single-type sensor unit, all failures result in
loss of function regardless of failure-detection capability. In the calcula-
tions performed, the confidence factor, C, is not assigned, but rather deter-
mined so that the reliability criteria are satisfied.
The reliability of the individual sensor units is Rs = e-
At and the
probability of failure is Qs = 1 - Rs = 1 - e-
At
. With At very small,
Q~ 1 - e- At ~ At. For a dua1-sensor-type redundancy, the probability of total
function failure due to the sensors, QFs' is approximately the probability of
failure of both devices of a type, Q~ , plus the probability of a failure in
either single unit that can only be iIo1ated at a probability of C, 2 (1 - CT)
QST' This gives the equation:
where CT = confidence of in-line fault detection and isolation of sensor
type T.
205
In the triple redundancy sensor arrays, the probability of failure, QFS'
is approximately the probability of failure of all devices of a type, Q~ , plus
the probability of two devices of a single type failing where the secondTfai1ure
can only be isolated at a probability of C, 3(1 - CT)Q§T' This gives the
equation:
With quad-sensor redundancy, the probability of failure, QFs' is approximately
the probability of failure of all devices of a type, Q~T' plus the probability
of three devices of a type failing where the third failure can only be isolated
at a probability of C, 4(1 - CT)Q~T' This gives the equation:
NQ ~ ~ Q4 + 4(1 - CT)Q3sFS T=l ST T
The value of C has been calculated by setting QFS = 3x10-
8
. For those
control laws with more than one sensor, C has been determined by allocating to
each sensor type an equal probability of sensor function shutdown due to incom~
plete in-line monitoring of individual sensors (C < 1). As an example, for a
triple-redundancy, three-sensor-type array:
Equalizing the effect of the unmonitored failure terms gives:
3( 1 - 2 2 2Cl)QS = 3(1 - C2)QS = 3(1 - C3)QS1 2 3
3 x 10-8 _ Q3. _ 03 _ Q3
=
Sl S2 S3
3
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Solving for the confidence terms gives:
Q3 + Q3 + Q3 _ 3x10-8
C1 =
Sl S2 S3
+ 129QS1
Q3 + Q3 + Q3
-
3x10-8
C2 =
Sl S2 S3
-+ 1
9Q2
S2
Q3 + Q3 + Q3
-
3x10-8
C3 =
Sl S2 S3 + 1
9Q2
S3
The required confidence level (or probability) of isolating faults with
in-line monitoring for each sensor type is thus proportional to the probability
of failure of the device. The higher the failure probability, the greater the
necessary confidence that these failures will be isolated with in-line
monitoring.
The results of the evaluation are presented in Table 6-6. For each of
the candidate control law configurations, the following data is presented:
QFS(C1S = 100%) - failure probability of function with the confidence of in-line
monitor fault detection and isolation set to 100 percent; QFS (CIS = 0) -
failure probability of function with zero confidence of in-line monitor fault
detection; and then the calculated required confidence factors of each sensor
element to achieve the desired 3x10-8 failure probability. In most cases the
dual-redundant sensor array does not give the desired value of reliability even
if the in-line monitoring detected and isolated 100 percent of all sensor
failures. The triple-redundant sensor array exceeds the requirement for a
. lOa-percent confidence factor and usually needs an in-line monitor confidence
in excess of 90 percent to achieve the 3x10-8 failure probability. The quad-
redundant sensor array would have sufficlent reliability to achieve the desired
value with zero-percent failure detection and isolation of an in-line monitor.
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TABLE 6-6
EFFECT OF SENSOR REDUNDANCY
TWO THREE FOUR TWO THREE FOUR
CONTROL LAW SENSORS SENSORS SENSORS CONTROL LAW SENSORS SENSORS SENSORS
1 (jJ,O,II,a) 9 (O,IJ ax ,,,)
QFS (C'S . 100%) 2.765 x 10--7 8.018 x 10-11 2.425 x 10-14 0FS IC'S = 100%) --7 7.613 x 10- 11 2.353 x 10-142.557 x 10
QFS IC'S = 0%) 3.208 x 10-10 0FS IC's = 0%) 3.046 x 10-10
C 91.02% Co 97.45%I'
Co 97.45% C, 93.77%0
C' 93.77% C
ax 64.09%0
C 97.76% C 97.76%a
"
10,lil
10 (0, iJ, ax' 1')2
1.724 x 10-7 4.373 x 10-11 1.196 x 10-141.377 x 10-7 3.852 x 10-11 1.114 x 10-14 QFS IC'S = 100%)QFS IC'S = 100%)
0FS (C'S = 0%) 1.749 x 10-10QFS IC'S = 0%) 1.541 x 10-10
Co 97.44%Co 94.89% C· 93.76%C· 87.52% 00 C
ax 64.05%
C 91.01%
(0, Ii, a) I'3
QFS IC'S = 100%) 2.488 x 10-7 7.555 x 10-11 2.348 x 10-14 11 (O,iJ,ax,h)
2.702 x 10-1p -7 4.373 x 10--11 1.196 x 10-140FS IC'S = 0%) 0FS (C'S = 100%) 1.724 x 10
Co 96.59% QFS (C'S = 0%) 1.75 x 10-10
Cli 91.88% Co 97.44%
C 97.08% Cb 93.76%a
C
ax
64.05%
11',0,0) Cli 91.01%4
QFS IC's . 100%) 1.654 x 10-7 4.315 x 10-11 1.191. x 10-14 12 10,6, an' h)
QFS IC'S = 0%) 4.316 x 10-11 -7 4.373 x 10-11 1.196 x 10-140FS (C'S = 100%) 1.724 x 10
C 88.02% QFS IC'S = 0%) 1.75 x 10-10I'
Co 96.59% Co 97.44%
Cb 91.68% C, 93.76%0
Can 64.05%
5 lal Cli 91.01%
QFS IC'S = 100%) 1.111 x 10--7 3.704 x 10-11 1.235 x 10-14
0FS Ie'S = 0%) 1.482 x 10-10 13 (0, Ii, an' ,,)
·-7 7.613 x 10-11 2.353 x 10-14
C" 91.01%
0FS (C'S = 100%) 2.557 x 10
0FS (C'S = 0%1 3.046 x 10-10
Co 97.45%
6 IjJ,a) C· 93.77%
QFS (C'S 100%) 1.389 x 10--7 4.167 x 10-11 1.312 x 10-14 0=
Can 64.09%QFS :C'S = 0%) 1.667 x 10-10 C 97.76%
C 82.02% "I'
C
"
95.56% 14 (O,O'"n,jJ)
-7 4.373 x 10.-11 1.196 x 10-14QFS (C'S = 100%) 1.724 x 10
7 11') QFS IC'S = 0%) 1.75 x 10-
10
QFS (C'S 100%) 2.778 x 10-8 4.63 x 10-12 7.716 x 10-16 Co 97.44%=
1.852 x 10-11 C· 93.76%QFS IC'S = 0%) 0
C 64.05%C 99.999% 64.01% an
I' CjJ 91.01%
8 (o,e,ax,a
n
) 15 (0, b, 1', til ..
1.515 x 10-7 3.967 x 10-11 1.123 x 10.-14 ·-7 4.778 x 10.-11 1.268 x 10-140FS (C'S = 100%) QFS IC'S = 100%) 1.932 x 10
QFS (C'S = 0%) 1.587 x 10- 10 QFS IC's 0%1 1_911 x 10-10
Co 97.44% Co 97.44'}b
Cli 93.76% Cil 93.76%
Cax 64.05% CjJ 91.01%
C 64.05% Cli 91.01%an
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TABLE 6-6
EFFECT OF SENSOR REDUNDANCY (CONTINUED)
TWO THREE FOUR TWO THREE FOUR
CONTROL lAW SENSORS SENSORS SENSORS CONTROL lAW SENSORS SENSORS SENSORS
16 (0, Ii, hi 22 (ax' an' Il, 0<)
-7 4.315 x 10-11 1.191 x 10-14 -7 4.282 x 10-11 1.321 x 10-14QFS IC'S = 100%1 1.654 x 10 QFS (C'S = 100%) 1.528 x 10
QFS IC'S = 0%) 4.316 x 10-11 QFS (C'S = 0%1 1.713 x 10-10
Co 96.59% Cax 64.05%
CiJ 91.68% Can 64.05%
Ch 88.02% C 91.01%Il
C 97.75%
0<
17 lax' an' 1', Ii) 23 (ax' an' 0<)--8 1.042 x 10-11 1.64 x 10-15QFS IC'S = 100%) 6.944 x 10 -7 3.819 x 10-11 1.244 x 10-14
1.042 x 10-11
QFS (C'S = 100%) 1.25 x 10
QFS (C'S = 0%1
QFS (C'S = 0%) 1.528 x 10-10
Cax 64.01% C 52.06%
Can 64.01% axC 52.06%
CIJ 91% anC 97%
Cli 91% 0<
24 (ax' an)
-8 1.157 x 10-12 -1718 lax' an' til QFS (C'S = 100%1 1.389 x 10 9.645 x 10 .
-8 5.787 xl0-12 8.681 x 10-16 QFS (C'S = 0%) 4.63 x 10-12QFS IC'S = 100%) 4.167xl0
QFS IC'S = 0%) 2.315 x 10-11 C 99.99% 71.99%ax
C 52.01% C 99.99% 71.99%ax an
C 52.01% (a)an 25
Cli 88% QFS (Cax = 100%1 6.944 x 10-
9 5.787 x 10-13 4.823 X 10-17
QFS (Cax = 0%1 2.083 x 10-
8 2.315 x 10-12
19 IIl,ti) Cax 99.986%
-8 9.26 x 10-12 1.543 x 10.-15QFS IC'S = 100%) 5.556 x 10
QFS IC'S = 0%) 3.704 x 10-11 26 (an)
-9 5.787 x 10-13 4.823 x 10-17C 82% QFS (Can = 100%) 6.944 x 10
Il 2.083 x 10-8 2.315 x 10-12Cil 82% QFS ICan = 0%)
C 99.986%an
20 Ihl 27 (1l,0)
-8 4.63 x 10-12 7.716 x 10-16QFS ICIi = 100%1 2.778 x 10 QFS (C'S = 100%) 6.778 x 10-8 1.263 x 10-11 2.372 x 10-15
QFS ICIi = 0%1 1.852 x 10-
11
QFS (C'S = 0%) 5.052 x 10-11
Cli 99.999% 64.01% C 82.01%
Il
Co 87.51%
21 (ax' an' Il)
-8 5.787 x 10-12 8.681 x 10-16 (0<,0)QFS IC'S = 100%) 4.167 x 10 28
2.315 x 10-11 -7 4.504 x 10-11 1.395 x 10-14QFS (C'S = 0%) QFS (C'S = 100%) 1.511 x 10
Cax 52.01% QFS IC'S = 0%) 1.667 x 10-
10
Can 52.01% C 95.51%0<
C 88% Co 87.52%Il
6.2.1.2 Alternate Sensor Configuration Flexibility. - The large number of
acceptable control laws identified and verified using different sensor combi-
nations provide considerable flexibility in reconfiguring the control law as a
result of sensor failures. A reconfigured control law has a sensor combination
that is a subset of the original (maximum) sensor array. Figure 6-38 shows
the control law flexibility with sensor failures that allow reconfiguration to
other available sensor sources. This type of control law reversionary scheme
results in increased augmentation ·system availability without requiring addi-
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FIGURE 6-38. CONTROL LAW FLEXIBILITY
tiona1 sensor hardware redundancy. The strategy followed is to operate with
the control law having the highest-level sensor array (most unique parameters),
thereby keeping all signals in the active computation rather than in a standby
mode. If a sensor fails, the system is reconfigured, using the control law
with the next highest sensor array.
6.2.2 Computer Architectures. - The computer architecture analysis con-
siders a system which performs only the RSSAS function and a system which also
performs the other augmentation functions described in Paragraph 6.1.5. The
analysis evaluates and compares the re1iabi1ities of each system.
In a digital computer, a large part of the total failure rate is inde-
pendent of the functions performed. The processor, A/D converter, I/O control,
and general purpose routines in memory are required regardless of the number
of functions. Thus, memory growth as functions are added is minimal. The
computer memory distribution is estimated for this study as:
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Basic System
Static Stability Augmentation
Yaw Damper/Turn Coordination
ELF/FL
Stall Warning
60 percent
15 percent
10 percent
6 percent
9 percent
Figure 6-39 shows the computing subsystem elements. The basic system
elements and their failure rates are given below. These element failure rates
are independent of functions performed.
Basic System
Processor and Memory =
Bus Interface and Control =
Power Supply =
A/D Converter and Control and MUX =
I/O Discrete and Output Control =
Total
28.4
21.3
8.3
25.4
12.7
95.9
The failure rate (in hours) for each function has then been determined
assuming that static stability augmentation is first provided. Table 6-7 shows
assignment of memory failure rate to the required analog and discrete inputs
and outputs for each function. The total is 340.9xlO-6 failures per hour
including the basic system.
If the augmentation functions were to be provided by a separate digital
computer, the basic core elements, as well as several data interfaces, must be
added to each function as shown in Table 6-8. When these are added together,
the total system failure rate is significantly higher as shown below:
Stability Augmentation
Yaw Damper
EFL/FL
Stall Warning
Total four independent units
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238.5
198.7
192.9
130.9
761xlO-6 failures per hour
For subsequent calculations, the following FAG failure rates are used:
FAG with RSSAS only
FAG with all augmentation functions
SERVO
POWER SUPPLY
71. '= 6
250xlO-6 failures per hour
340xlO-6 failures per hour
ATOD
PROCESSOR AND MEMORY
-+
POWER SUPPLY TMs 9900 71. = 42
71. = 8.3
-
CONTROL f+-71. = 7.0
~ ATOD
r MULTIPLEX71.=6 CONVERTER71. = 12.4
..J ~ BUS CONTROLBUS INTERFACE
.....
ANALOG INPUT 71. = 10.1
71. = 11.2
71. = 1 ...
~
-+ AC DEMODS -71. = 1.91
4
DIGITAL
.....
DIGITAL -~MULTIPLEX TRANSMITTER71. = 4.4 71. = 13.5
r
POWER SERVO
AMPL
71. = 6
DIGITAL DIGITAL ANALOG SERVO
-+ RECEIVERS MULTIPLEX
-
OUTPUT ~ DC OUTPUTS ~71. = 10 -.. 71. = 4.4 CONTROL 71. = 1.2 ~.M!'I"71. = 8.5 71. = 3
DISCRETE INPUT/OUTPUT DISCRETE
-. INPUTS
DISCRETE
- OUTPUTS ~CONTROL71. = 0.11 71. = 4.2 71. = 1.0
ALL i\'S ARE IN FAILURES PER MILLION HOURS
FIGURE 6-39. COMPUTER SUBSYSTEM ELEMENTS AND FAILURE RATES
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TABLE 6-7
INTEGRATED FUNCTION RELIABILITY SUMMARY
COMPONENT STABILITY
VALU~ AUGMENTATION YAW DAMPER ELF/FL STALL WARNING
AX 10-
AX 10-6 A X 10-6 A x 10-6 A X 10-6(EACH) (NO.) (NO.) (NO) (NO.)
MEMORY (0.15) 5.1 (0.10) 3.4 (0.06) 2 (0.09) 3.1
SERVO AMPLIFIER 3.0 (2) 6 (2) 6
ACINPUT 2.91 (13) 37.8 (6) 17.5 (6) 17.5 (1 ) 2.9
-
DC INPUT 1.0 (5) 5 (2) 2
DISCRETE INPUT 0.11 (4) 0.5 (8) 0.9 (5) 0.6
DISCRETE OUTPUT 1.0 (10) 10 (17) 17 (4) 4 (8) 8
DC OUTPUT 1.2 (2) 2.4
TRANSMITTER AND
MULTIPLEXER 16.5 (1 ) 20.9*
RECEIVER AND
MULTIPLEXER 10.0 (5) 54.4*
POWER SERVO AMPLIFIER
PLUS POWER SUPPLY 6.0 (2) 18**
TOTAL 142.1 46.8 41.5 14.6
"CONSTANT AX 1O-~ OF 4.4 ADDED TO THESE SUBSYSTEMS.
**CONSTANT A x 10- OF 6.0 ADDED TO THIS SUBSYSTEM.
TABLE 6-8
INDIVIDUAL FUNCTION RELIABILITY SUMMARY
COMPONENT STABILITYVALU~ AUGMENTATION YAW DAMPER ELF/FL STALL WARNINGAX 10-
(EACH) (NO.) AX 10-6 (NO.) A X 10-6 (NO.) AX 10-6 (NO.) AX 10 6
BASIC CORE 95.9 95.9 95.9 95.9
MEMORY 5.6 3.7 2.2 3.3
SERVO AMPLIFIER 3.0 (2) 6 (2) 6
ACINPUT 2.91 (13) 37.8 (6) 17.5 (6) 17.5 (3) 8.7
DC INPUT 1.0 (5) 5 (2) 2
. ,
DISCRETE INPUT 0.11 (4) 0.5 . (12) 1.3 (5) 0.6
DISCRETE OUTPUT 1.0 (10) 10 (17) 17 (4) 4 (8) 8
DC OUTPUT 1.2 (2) 2.4
TRANSMITTER AND
MULTIPLEXER 16.5 (1 ) 20.9:* (1 ) 20.9* (1 ) 20.9*
RECEIVER AND
MULTIPLEXER 10.0 (5) 54.4* (3) 34.4* (3) 34.4* (1 ) 14.4*
POWER SERVO AMPLIFIER
PLUS POWER SUPPLY 6.0 (2) 18 * *
TOTAL 238.5 198.7 192.9 130.9
*CONSTANT A x 10-6 OF 4.4 ADDED TO THESE SUBSYSTEMS.
**CONSTANT A x 10-6 OF 6.0 ADDED TO THIS SUBSYSTEM~
6.2.3 Sensor Computation Architectures. - Several alternative methods of
transmitting data from the fixed DC-10-type sensor set to the computational
elements have been considered. Shown in Figure 6-40, they include: (1) direct
single sensor to corresponding computer signal conditioning data processor
(SCDP); (2) data crossfed from each sensor to all computer SCDPs and between
I
all computers; (3) data crossfed from each sensor to all computer SCDPs; and,
(4) data crossfed between all computers.
Each of these methods was in turn coupled with trip1e- and dual-redundant
computer configurations to form the architectures shown in Figures 6-41 to
6-43. All computers are assumed to be internally fully monitored either by
in-line self-testing (triple computer configurations in Figure 6-41 and dual
computer configuration in Figure 6-42), or by comparison of dual hardware
channels (dual computer configuration in Figure 6-43). For the triple
computer configurations in Figure 6-41, a direct dedicated sensor connectiQ~
to each SCDP (Figure 6-40, configuration 1) is not possible since several of
the sensor types (a, An' u, h) are of a dual level of redundancy while the
computers are triple-redundant. The sensors must therefore interface with
more than single SCDP as in configurations 2 and 3 or the data must be cross-
fed between CPU's, as in configurations 2 and 4.
A reliability evaluation has been made of these candidate architectures
using the DC-10 sensor failure rates previously listed in Paragraph 6.2.1.1
and the following representative computer reliability values, based on the
previous computer discussion:
. Computer MTBF
•
•
Single-Channel
Full In-Line Monitor
Dual-Channel
Comparison-Monitor
4000 hours
3200 hours
The corresponding internal function failure rates used are:
•
•
SCDP
(both type computers)
Remaining Electronics
Single-Channel Type
- Dual-Channel Type
62.5xlO-6 failures/hour
l87.5xlO-6
125xlO-6/channel
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CONFIGURATION NO.3
*
. COMPUTATION
Ir------lltl l SCDP H CPU
'------..I
SENSORS.
CONFIGURATION ~O. 1
SENSORS COMPUTATION·
I 1----+l·II~ I~l
*DUAL AND TRIPLE REDUNDANT COMPUTATION EVALUATED
SENSORS COMPUTATION SENSORS. COMPUTATION
CONFIGURATION NO.2 CONFIGURATION NO.4
8-GEN·25944
FIGURE 6-40. SENSOR/COMPUTATION INTERFACE - ARCHITECTURE FORMULATION
------ _._- _...-._-----_.
The results of the reliability calculations for each combination of com-
puter, data transmission, and control law are summarized in Table 6-9. The
probability of function loss calculated for each sensor combination assumes
that all sensor subset combinations are also available and can provide satis-
.
factory performance. As an example, the eeaU control law failure probability
. ..
includes the ee, a, U, eea, eeu, and aU control laws and requires that all of
these fail for loss of function. The allocated probability of failure for this
portion of the system is 3xlO-8; therefore, all sensor combinations which do
not exceed this probability limit describe a successful family of control
laws. The combinations which do not satisfy the criteria are shown shaded in
Table 6-9. (Note that the No. 1 method of data transmission was determined to
exceed the probability limit and was not calculated for all combinations.)
This table also shows the predominant contributor(s) to the failure probability,
which can be the sensors (S), the computer SCDP (SC), the remaining computer
function (CP), or the total computer (C). Probabilities are for one hour.
These data indicate that either trip1e- or dual-redundant computers, and
several sensor families, can satisfy the reliability criteria. The sensor data
must, however, be crossfed between the sensors and the computer. Use of the
computer crosstalk data bus to crossfeed sensor cannot in itself satisfy the
sensor data transmission requirements, but can be used to improve the data
availabil ity.
216
,
I
1
1
I
I
I
1
1
J
---- -- -- --- ---- -- ----1
I
1
I
I
1
1
1
I
-I
I
I
I
I
1
1
I:':'O~P~T~R_3 J
CONFIGURATION 3
~~~)1 II
"
SIGNAL
~ CONDITIONERI CENTRALDATA PROCESSOR[3]- PROCESSOR UNIT(SCOP)
~
t:O~~~~____
- - -------
-'
""'CD-
I-------- - - -----_ .....
~ I(U.~)2 ~ SIGNALCONDITIONERI CENTRAL
~ DATA PROCESSOR[5J- PROCESSOR UNIT(SCOP)I
I COMPUT£R 2
IT}- ._--- ----- - - - ---- ----
I-------- - - --------i I
em SIGNALCONDITIONERI CENTRAL
"6
3
DATA PROCESSOR
I PROCESSOR UNIT(SCOP)
I
"I
I
I
I
1
I
1
1
I
J
---------------------1
I
I
I
I
I
1
1
.
_.
1
I
1
I
I
I
I
I I1~~~T..:~3 J
CONFIGURATION 2
(u, tlj 1 1I SIGNAL ~" CONDITIONERI CENTRAL~ DATA '"-;:::::: PROCESSOR[3]- PROCESSOR ~ UNIT(SCOP) r;:::: f= f--v
1
~
I_C~M~U~E!!.1____
- - -------
.~
@
I-------- - - - --- - --
~ 1~ SIGNAL ~CONDITIONER! r='- ~ ~ CENTRAL~ DATA PROCESSOR[5]- PROCESSOR rs UNIT(SCOPI t= ~I
I COMPUTER 2
GJ- ._------- - - - - - -- - - - --
. ...-
1- ------- - - --------
I
~ SIGNAL ~CONDITIONERI L-....,.., CENTRAL63 DATA PROCESSOR1 PROCESSOR f-- UNIT(SCOPI
I
...,
~ 1------------- -------
1
o:EJ- II SIGNAL ~I, CONDITIONER!
-
CENTRAL
DATA PROCESSOR
[3J-- I PROCESSOR ~ UNITI ISeDP) r--;=:I
~
l~o~p~T!.R2. ___
- - ------ -
-...-
....,
CD- 1--- ------ - - --------
I
~ 1I SIGNAL ~I CONDITIONER! ~r2 := ~ CENTRALDATA PROCESSOR1 PROCESSOR UNIT[S}- I (SCOP) 1= F:>~1
I
~
I~O~~:.e~2____
- - --------
-J
1-------- - --------
I
I L...r...I SIGNAL ~ CENTRAL83 1 CONDITIONER!DATA PROCESSORr PROCESSOR UNIT(SCOP) f--
I
I
1
I
I
1
I
I
I
_I
I
I
1
I
I
1
I
I
I
-I
I
1
I':'O~P~T~R~ I
CONFIGURATION 4
FIGURE 6-41. TRIPLE COMPUTER CONFIGURATION
217
~,
"
Ii
"
,
I
I
I
iICOMPUTE R 1 I
- --- J
,--- -- - - - - ------ -----
I I
, I
--t--~ ~~~6'I~,ONERI CENTRAL I
~~Jc'\SSOR b~~E$SOR I
~~ I
I
I I
I':"O~~T~~ .I
,------- -
I-
I:
>: ._--;-:JlI SIGNAL
I ,CONQITIONERI "===::::;:==>1' CENTRALI' DATA r PR'ill:ESSOR
, rS"c'l:i.~SSOR UNIX
~l
CONFIGURATION 1
I
CO~F!GURATION 2
,-- ----- ----------
I
I
CENTRAL
PRQCJ:SSOA
UNIT
CENTRAL
PROCESSOR
UNIT
-- ----1
,
I
I
I
I
I
I
SIGNAL
g~~~'mJNEfll
P.r,'OCESSOfl
ISC~~'
CONFIGURATION 4
I
I
I
I
I
,~O~~~!- _
,--------
I
I
---I--"':,:';lI SIGNAL
, CONOITIONERI
DATA
I rS"c~~~SSOR
I
,
I~~U~E~ _
-I
I
I1[5]-
J '
I
J ,ITJ-
1-----
I
->
I....
SIGNAL
W- ~
CONOITIONERI GENTAALDATA PAO(;ESSO~PROCESSORr+ ISCQPI UNIT
CD- II-='O~~~ ~ ______ ---------oJ
~
CD-
1---- -- - - -- - - ---- - ---
~ I,lu.M2 ,..b: SIGNAL( CONDITIONER/ CENTRAL
~ DATA PROCESSOR[5J- PROCESSOR UNIT(SCOP)
I
I....:.~~T.:.R..:. ________ ________
CD-
-
I 83
CONFIGURATION 3
FIGURE 6·42. DUAL COMPUTJ:RCON,FIGURArlpl\I.-SING'-J:PijOCI;$$,O.R
2~8
CENTRAL
PROCESSOR
UNIT
CENTRAL
PROCESSOR
UNIT
------------1
I
,
1
1
I
I
I
1
I
I
1
1
I
1,
1
_____ J
1-------
1
1
I
1
1
I
1
1
I
1
1
,
:~~~E~l _
CENTRAL
PROCESSOR
UNIT
CENTRAL
PROCESSOR
UNIT
SIGNAL
CONDITIONERI
DATA
PROCESSOR
'SCDP)
------------------- -,
1
1
I
1
I
1
1
1
I
1
1
I
,
1
1
I
COMPUTER 1 IJ ...J
°3 °3
CENTRAL
PROCESSOR
UNIT
--------,
I
I
CENTRAL I
PROCESSOR
UNIT
CONFIGURATION 2
,--------
I
1
1
1
1
1
I
1
I
1,
I
I COMPUTER 21 ..J
SIGNAL
CONDITIONER!>--.....+--:3>1 DATA
PROCESSOR
(SCDP)
,---------- --- ---- ----
I I
1 I
1 CENTRAL 1
I PROCESSOR I
1 UNIT I
1 1
SIGNAL I
: g~~~'TONERI I
1 rs~'i,~~SSOR 1
1 I
I CENTRAL I
I PROCESSOR 1
1 UNIT 1
: 1
I COMPUTE R 2 I1 ...J
CONFIGURATION 1
~
CENTRAL
PROCESSOR
UNIT
CENTRAL
PROCESSOR
UNIT
----------l
I
I
I
1
I
I
1
I
I
I
I
I
I
1
I
________I
SIGNAL
CONDITIONERI f-:=~=~DATA ~
PROCESSOR
(SCDP)
1
I
I
1
1
l:~~~R~ _
1---
I
1
1
1
I
I~.-SIGNAL
CONDITIONERI
DATA
PROCESSOR
(SCDP)
CENTRAL
PROCESSOR
UNIT
COMPUTER 1
CENTRAL
PROCESSOR
UNIT
1------------ -----,
I
I
IAOC:I.~I
°3 °3
CENTRAL.
PROCESSOR
UNIT
CENTRA~
PROCESSOR
UNIT
-----·---l
I
1,
I
1
1
1
1
1
I
I
1
I,
1
1
I
1______-.J
SIGNAL
CONDITONERI
DATA
PROCESSOR
(seop)
I
I
1
1
1
I
I~~P~~:'-- __ - - __
,---- -- --
1,
I
I
I
CENTRAL
PROCESSOR
UNIT
CENTRAL
PRoceSSOR
UNIT
I
,
I
I
,
__________J
I
1
I
1
I
1.:?~~E~ __
SIGNAL
CONDITIONERI ~===~
-++---:ill DATA
PROCESSOR
(SCDPI
CONFIGURATION 3 CONFIGURATION 4
FIGURE 6-43. DUAL COMPUTER CONFIGURATION
219
RELIABILITY GOAL: 3 x 10-8 FAILURE PROBABILITY FOR ONE HOUR
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6.2.4 Computer/Actuation and Total System Architecture. - The computer-
actuator configurations shown in Figures 6-44, 6-45, and 6-46 have been sug-
gested as the architectures to interface with the sensor arrays concluded as
successful in Paragraph 6.2.3. These configurations are based on dual- and
triple-redundant computers interfacing with the DC-10-type split surface
arrangement, using either two or four of the elevator segments (at least one
surface on each side of the vertical tail). In addition, several of the con-
figurations use dual series input actuators, allowing multiple computer control
of a single elevator surface. The appropriate hydraulic system inputs to the
series actuators have also been considered. The failure rates used for the
actuation system are actuator = O.02xlO-3 and hydraulics = O.09xlO-3 failures
per hour.
CONFIGURATION 1
CONFIGURATION 3
CONFIGURATION 2
--~--(3)
----
__C_3__---GJ-........6)
CONFIGURATION 4
C - RSSAS FAC
A - SERIES ELEVATOR ACTUATOR
H - HYDRAULIC SYSTEM
FIGURE 6-44. TRIPLE-REDUNDANT COMPUTER/ACTUATOR CONFIGURATIONS
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CONFIGURATION 1 CONFIGURATION 2
G ( )C1 H1 C1 A1
( )[JC2 H2 A2C2
CONFIGURATION 3 CONFIGURATION 4
A1 A1
CONFIGURATION 5
C - RSSAS FAC
A - SERIES ELEVATOR ACTUATOR
H - HYDRAULIC SYSTEM
FIGURE 6-45. DUAL-REDUNDANT COMPUTER/ACTUATOR CONFIGURATIONS
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CONFIGURATION 1 CONFIGURATION 2
I k-I ~I )CI Al HI CI
I ~I I kC 2 A2 H2 ) C2
CONFIGURATION 3
CONFIGURATION 5
CONFIGURATION 4
CI
C - RSSAS FAC
A - SERIES ELEVATOR ACTUATOR
H - HYDRAULIC SYSTEM
C2
FIGURE 6-46. DUAL-DUAL COMPUTER/ACTUATOR CONFIGURATIONS
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Table 6-10 is a summary of reli.ability calculati:ons for the combi.ned
sens,or, computer, and' actuation arcbitectures. For each combination of
computer/sensor and computerlactuato:r configuration, a p.ro:b.ab:il:i:ty of loss-of-
function ;'s prov;,deo' for each su,ccessfuT sensor array. Also p,rovided is an
i1r:l:dica·t ion of the pre.d!omhilant contri:butor to, the fan ure wh';!ch can be ttie
S611liSOrS (S), the comp,uters SCIDI?' qs£), the total; compu,ter (€:)" the actuator (A),
(1)r the hyd,raulics (H).
From the data p,resented: i:n Table 6-10,. it is concluded that all configura-
tions except Dual No. 1. compti.\;'ter/actliJiator satisfy the allotted probabi 1ity of
function loss of approximately 7xlO-8 for one hour.
6.2.5 Candidate System Selection. - Several considerations enter into the
final selection of the system architecture. It has preyiously been established
that all sensor data must be crossfed to all computers. In addition, it is
recognized that all computers must talk with each other with regard to control
law selection, failure reversion, and probably even trim and normal augmenta-
tion control. Since an intersystem cOlTllTlunication link is required, it should
be used additionally to crossfeed sensor data. Also, while the system must
satisfy the reliability design requirements, too much redundancy or complexity
of interfaces is usually costly in terms of higher system purchase price and/or
lower total system maintenance MTBF, which is reflected in higher maintenance
costs. With these two considerations in mind, Figure 6-47 shows several sensor
arrays combined with triple-and dua1-red4ndant architectures as a function of
their reliability potential. The legend in Figure 6-47 defines the level of
computer redundancy, computer/actuation configuration, and sensor/computation
interface. As an example, Triple 1.2 indicates triple-redundant computer/
actuation configuration 1 (Figure 6-44) combined with sensor/computation
configuration 2 (Figure 6-41).
As previously discussed, several other augmentation functions are candi-
dates for integration into the FAC. Ihis would result in lower computer MTBF
and would effectively move all of the configurations shown in Figure 6-47
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TABLE 6-10
SENSOR/COMPUTER/ACTUATOR RELIABILITY SUMMARY-
TRIPLE-REDUNDANT COMPUTERS
COMPUTER/SENSOR INTERFACE CONFIGURATIONS
COMPUTER/ TRIPLEX CONFIGURATION 2
ACTUATOR
NO.1 NO. 12 NO. 13 NO. 14 NO. 15 NO.3 NO.4 NO. 16 NO. 29 NO. 27 NO. 30 NO. 31 NO. 32 NO. 26INTERFACE
CONFIGURATIONS 1',c<,8,8 J, 8, AN
,_ 9,8.AN ,Q J,8,Aw l' 8, f), h, Il 01,8.8 1',8,8 8,8, h 8;8,AN 1',8 AN,I' AN''; AN,a AN
TRIPLE 1 1.200 1.2@® 1.2@(8) 1.200 1.2@(8) 1.2@(8) 1.2@(8) 1.2@(8) 1.200 1.2@(8) 1.2@(8) 1.2@(8) 1.2@<!} 1.9~
x 10-S x 10-S x 10-S x 10-S xl0-S xl0-S x 10-S x 10-S x 10-S xI0-S xl0-S x 10-S x 10'-8 x 10
TRIPLE 2 1.9©@(8) 1.9~ 1.~ 1.~ 2.7@ 5.1@ 2.7@ 2.7@ 1.9~ 2.7@ 2.1~ 2.1®©®(8) 2.~ 7.o@
x 10-11 x 10-1 x 10-1 x 10-1 x 10-10 x 10-10 x 10-10 x 10-10 X 10-1 X 10-10 X 10-11 X 10-11 x 10-11 X 10---S
TRIPLE 3 8.1@@c8> 8.0@)oo 8.o@oo 8.0€)@® 2.5@ 5.1@ 2.5@ 2.5@ 7.9@ 2.~ 1.~ 1.~ 1.~ 7.o@
X 10-12 x'10-12 X 10-12 X 10-12 X 10-10 X 10-10 X 10-10 X 10-10 X 10-12 X 10-10 X 10-11 X 10-11 X 10-11 X 10-9
TRIPLE 4 8.1@@® 8.0@)oo 8.C@®® 8.o@)@@ 2.5@ 5.1@ 2.5@ 2.5@ 7.9@ 2.5@ 1~ 1.~ 1.2~ 7.o@
X 10-12 X 10-12 X 10-12 X 10-12 X 10-10 X 10-10 X 10-10 X 10-10 X 10-12 X 10-10 X 10-11 x 10-11 x 10-11 X 20-9
TRIPLEX CONFIGURATION 3
TRIPLE 1 1.200 1.200 1.200 1.200 1.200 1.2@43) 1.~ 1.2~ 1.200 1.2@(8) 1.2@(8) 1.2@(8) 1.200 1.~
xI0-S xI0-S xl0-S X 10-S xl0-S X 10-8 X 10-S X 10-S xl0-S X 10-8 xl0-S X 10-S X 10'-8 X 10
TRIPLE 2 2.8©@@ 2.8©@® 2.8©@(!j) 2.8~ 2.7@ 5.2(§) 2.7@ 2.7@ 2.8~ 2.7@ 2.8~ 2.8@@(8) 3.2~ 7.o@
X 10-11 X 10-11 X 10-11 X 10-1 X 10-10 X 10-10 X 10-10 X 10-10 X 10 . X 10-10 X 10-1 X 10-11 X 10-1 X 10-9
TRIPLE 3 1.7@ 1.7@ 1.7@ 1.7@ 2.6@ 5.1@ 2.6@ 2.6@ 1.7@ 2.6@ 1.7@ 1.7@ 2.1@ 7.o@
X 10-11 X 10-11 X 10-11 x 10-11 x 10-10 x 10-10 x 10-10 x 10-10 x 10-11 ;'10-10 X 10-11 x 10-11 x 10-11 X 10-9
TRIPLE 4 1.7@ 1.7@ 1.7@ 1.7@ 2.6@ 5.1@ 2.6(§) 2.6@ 1.7@ 2.6@ 1.7@ 1.7@ 2.1@ 7.o@
x 10-11 x 10-11 x 10-11 X 10-11 x 10-10 X 10-10 x 10-10 x 10-10 x 10-11 x 10-10 X 10-11 X 10-11 x 10-11 X 10-9
PRI~ARYCONTRIBUTORS TO FAILURE PROBABILITY @ -SENSOR, @> - CPU, €"-TOTAL COMPUTER, e -ACTUATOR. (8) - HYDRAULICS
TABLE6~10
SENSOR/COMPUTER/ACTUATOR RELIABI L1TY SUMMARY -
DUAL~REDUNDANTCOMPUTERS
COMPUTER/SENSOR INTERFACE CONFfGURATIONS
OUAL CONFIGURATION 2
N
N
0'
COMPUTERI
ACTUATOR
INt.ERFACE
CONFIGURATIONS
DUAL 1
DUAL2
DUAL3
DUAL 4
DUALS
NO. 12
8,8. AN. h
• NO. 14
8,8.AN ·1l
NO. 15
. ,
8.8,h, Il
NO.3
<>.6.8
3.9@
x 10~8
3.9@
X 10-8
NO.4
1l,8.8
3,90
X 10-8
3.9(§)
x 10-8
NO. 16
9.8.~
3.9(§)
x 10-8
3.9(§)
X10-8
NO. 29
.
8,8,3_
n
NO. 26
AN
,
OlJ'AL"CONFIGI1R'ATJON3
6.9(0
X 10-8
·.L1@
X 10-'7
6,~
-8
-X 10
6.3(§)
-8
.Xl0
7.5@
X 10-8
6.3@
-x 10-8
6~:tCD
.)(10~8
, 1.2@
X 10-'7
7.5@
X 10-8
6,S(§)
X 10-8
1.2@
X 10-7
~.~(§)
X 10-8
7.S(§)
X 10-8
6.~
xlQ-8
7:s'@
x 10-8
6.3~
xl0 8
1.20
X 10-7
.6,3@
. -'8
X 1-0
7.S(§)
X 10-8
1:2@
X 10-7
6.3@
, x'1O-8
DUAL3
DUAL2
DlJ"AL4
DUALS
-DUAL 1
PRIMA'RV CONTRIBUTORS TO FAlLURE PROS-ABILITY-€) - TOTAL COMPUTER•.~ -ACTl}ATOR. @ - HYDRAULICS
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TABLE 6-10
SENSOR/COMPUTER/ACTUATOR RELIABILITY SUMMARY-
DUAL-DUAL COMPUTERS
COMPUTER/SENSOR INTERFACE CONFIGURATIONS
COMPUTER/ DUAL·DUAL CONFIGURATION 2
ACTUATOR
INTERFACE NO.1 . NO. 12 • NO. 13 , NO. 14 ,;NO.JS NQ.3 Ni· 4 ~O.16 jII0.29 NO.27 NO.30 NO.31 NO. 32 NO. 26CONFIGURATIONS 1", <>, 6, e e,e,AN'h e,e,AN'<> e,e,AN,1" e, e, h, I" <>, e, e 1", ,e e, e, h 8,8, an I",e AN';> AN,h' AN,a: AN
DUAL-DUAL 1 1.6@)(8) 1.600 1.600 1.600 1.600 1.700 1.600 1.6@(8) 1.600 1.6@® 1.6~ 1.600 1.600 2.3~
x 10-8 xl0-a xl0-a xl0-a x 10-a xl0-a xl0-a x10-a xl0-a x 10-a x 10-a x 10~a x10-a x 10-a
DUAL·DUAL2 1.4@)(8) 1.46)(8) 1.4®@ 1.400 1.400 1.S@(8) 1.4@(8) 1.400 1.400 1.4@® 1.4@(8) 1.400 1.4@(8) Z.l~
x 10-8 x 10- a xl0-a xl0-a x 10-a xl0-a xl0-a x 10-a xl0-a x 10-a x 10-a x 10-a x10-a x10-a
DUAL·DUAL3 3.9@ 3.9@ 3.9~ 3.9@ 4.Z@ 4.4@ 4.Z@ 4.2@ 3.9@ 4.Z@ 3.9@ 3.9@ 3.9@ 1.1~
x 10-9 x 10-9 xl0 x 10--9 x 10"'9 x 10"-9 x 10--9 x 10-"-9 x 10--9 x 10"'9 x 10--9 x 10-"-9 x 1O-~ x 10-a
DUAL·DUAL4 3.9@ 3.9@ 3.9@ 3.9@ 4.Z@ 4.4€) 4.Z@ 4.2@ 3.9@ 4.2@ 3.9@ 3.9@ 3.9@ 1.1~
x 10-9 x.1.O-9 x 10-9 x 10--9 x 10--9 x 10-9 x 10--9 x 10-'-9 x 10-"-9 x 10-'-9 x 10--9 x 10--9 x 10--9 xl0-a
DUAL·DUALS 3.9@ 3.9@ 3.9@ 3.9€) 4.Z@ 4.4@ 4.Z@ 4.Z@ 3.9@ 4.Z@ 3.9@ 3.9@ 3.9@ 1.1~
x 10-9 x 10-9 x 10-9 x 10-9 x 10-9 x 10-9 x 10"'9 x 10-9 x 10--9 x 10-'-9 x 10"'9 x 10-"-9 x 10--9 xl0-a
DUAL·DUAL CONFIGURATION 3
DUAL·DUAL 1 1.600® 1.6©@(8) 1.6@@(8) 1.~ 1.6©@(8) 1.7~ 1.6@@(8) 1.6©@(8) 1.6@€)(8) 1.6@€)(8) 1.6~ 1.6©@(8) 1.608)(8) 1.7~
x 10-7 x 10-7 x 10-7 xl0 x 10-7 x 10-7 x 10-7 x 10-7 x 10-7 x 10-7 x 10-7 x 10-7 x 10-7 x 10-7
DUAL·DUALZ 1.1(§) 1.1(§) 1.1(§) 1.1(§) 1.1(§) 1.1(§) 1.1(§) 1.1(§) 1.1(§) 1.1(§) 1.1(§) 1.1(§) 1.1(§) 1.1(§)
x 10- 7 x 10- 7 x 10-7 x 10-7 x 10-7 x 10-7 x 10-7 x 10-7 x 10-7 x 10-7 x 10-7 x 10-7 x 10-7 x 10-7
DUAL-DUAL 3 9.S(§) 9.S(§) 9.S(§) 9.S(§) 9.S@ 9.S(§) 9.S@ 9.S(§) 9.S(§) 9.S(§) 9.S@ 9.S(§) 9.S(§) 1.0@
x 10- 8 xl0-a xl0-a xl0-a xl0-a xl0-a xl0-a x 10-a xl0-a xl0-a xl0-a x 10-8 x 10-a x 10-7
DUAL-DUAL4 9.S@ 9.S(§) 9.S(§) 9.S(§) 9.S@ 9.S(§) 9.S@ 9.S(§) 9.S(§) 9.S(§) 9.S(§) 1 9.S(§) 9.S(§) 1.0(§)
x 10-8 xl0-a xl0-a xl0-a x 10-8 xl0-a xl0-a x 10-a xl0-a xl0-a -a' xl0-a xl0-a x 10-7xl0
DUAL·DUAL S 9.S(§) 9.S(§) 9.S(§) 9.S(§) 9.S@ 9.S@ 9.S@ 9.8@ 9.S@ 9.S@ 9.S@ 9.S(§) 9.S@ 1.0@
x 10- a xl0-a xl0-a xl0-a xl0-a x10-a x 10-a xl0-a xl0-a xl0-a x 10-a . x 10-a xl0-a x 10-7
PRIMARY CONTRIBUTORS TO FAILURE PROBABILITY @ - SENSOR, €9 - SENSOR COMPUTER DATA PROCESSOR, @ - TOTAL COMPUTER, @ - ACTUATOR, <B> - HYDRAULICS
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FIGURE 6-47. SYSTE~ R~L'Aalt..ITY ASSI;S'IIIlENT (RELIABILITY GOAL:
7 x 10-· FAILURE PROBABILITY)
toward the right with increased probability of system failure. Dual No. 1
would then be the first eliminated on the basis of not satisfying the
reliability goal.
The lower MTBF of the DUAL-DUAL (dual CPU, dual computer) configurations
tends to discourage its use. Assumming a 3200-hour dual CPU computer MTBF,
the availability of two such computers with comparison monitoring is slightly
higher than three 4000-hour MTBF in-line monitored computers. However,
three computers provide a potential spare for possible in-service dispatch-
ability requirements. With one computer inoperative, the system would revert
to a dual configuration.
The RSSAS sensor array has more than the necessary redundancy and most of
the components are required for dispatch as part of other systems so their
.
availability is not chargeable to RSSAS alone. Two sources of 0 (and 0) are
required for dispatch by the attitude display system. Two sources of air data
are also currently required and provide the u signal for RSSAS. The angle-of-
attack transducers are required for dispatch by the stall warning system.
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An aircraft is seldom dispatched without a fully operative actuation
system (all hydraulics are mandatory). Thus, the minimum number of actuators
required for safety is also adequate for RSSAS. For symmetry of control, how-
ever, it is important that a single computer control an elevator surface on
each side of the vertical tail. Thus, a dual-actuator arrangement with dual
inputs to each actuator is desired.
Based upon the considerations discussed above, the selected systems are
those shown in Figure 6-48. These are Triple 1.2 with a reversion capability
to Dual 2.2.
6.2.6 Thrust/Pitch Compensation Sensor Interface. - The need for auto-
matic compensation of the pitching effects resulting from thrust changes is
peculiar to aircraft with wing-mounted engines and not a requirement of the
relaxed static stability concept. Pitch/thrust compensation will, however, be
provided on the EET with nearly the same reliability of the static stability
augmentation, since these two functions share computation and actuation devices.
The only differences exist in the sensor interface. The pitch/thrust compensa-
tion interface with the engines is shown in Figure 6-49.
SENSORS COM TERS ELEVATOR CONTROL
FIGURE 6-48. SElECTED SYSTEM ARCHITECTURES
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FIGURE ~·49. PITCtvTHR~ST COlYlpEN8.ArlPI\! SEI\lSPR !I\ITJ:RfACE
Loss of the trr~st d~t~ fr9m ~ither ~ngine r~s4lts in the compensat~r
providing only h~lf the r~qHireA ~hrust/pit~h ga1n· ~l~hQ~9.h Hegraqed, s;Qni-
fi~ant compensatipn is still pr9yip~q. Lqss pf pqth ~naine thrust d~t~ elimi-
nates the thr~st/pit~h ~ompens~tipn. The p.rppabilit~ of th~se tWQ eVents ar~:
Loss of ~in~le en~ine thrust data
Q = 2'AET + ~~Q)t
Q = 2{lOPxlO-6 t 50QxlO-6)(1)
Q = 1.2~lo-3
where
ET = Engipe tr~nsducer
ED = Engine d9t~ sy~tem
t = One rour
~ = Failures per hour
Loss of both engine tnrust data
. 2 2Q = (~ET + ~ED) (t)
Q = (lOOxlO-6 +. 500xlO-Q)2(l)2
Q = 3.QxlO-7
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FAC DOWN TRIM3
FIGURE 6-50. RSSAS AUTOTRIM INTERFACE
Failure rates are based on current DC-10 operational data.
6.2.7 RSSAS Auto Trim Interface. - The RSSAS autotrim function has been ".
previously described in Paragraph 6.1.4. The interface of the discrete FAC
trim outputs and the horizontal stabilizer trim system is relatively simple.
As shown in Figure 6-50, each of the FACs, regardless of redundancy level,
provides its discrete trim outputs, up-trim or down-trim, on separate signal
paths. Then all of the up-trim wires are connected together and all of the
down-trim wires are connected together. These separate trim commands are
provided to the stabilizer trim control valve, which in turn commands the
trim motor to drive the horizontal stabilizer at a fixed rate.
Although a simple mechanization, it is expected that the probability of'
loss of the autotrim will exceed that of the basic RSSAS function. Autotrim
loss probability is calculated as:
Q = (ACONTROL + ATRIM)t = (28xlO-6 + 38xlO-6)(1)
VALVE MOTOR
Q = 6.6xlO-5
When this occurs, the manual RSSAS trim director is activated and the RSSAS
series elevator displacements are off-loaded using the primary trim system as
described in Paragraph 6.1.4. Again, the failure rates used in this calculation
are based on DC-10 operational data.
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SECTION 7
IMPACT OF RSSAS ON THE AIRCRAFT DESIGN AND CERTIFICATION
Tn~ incorporation of ~nY or all SY$tems on a commercial aircraft requires
;' • . ,.' - ':.' J _.' .' ',.' .' .' . '.'.'. - .'.' '..' •
significant qes;Qn, dey~lQPm~nt, qnalY~is, ve.rification, and qemonstration
efforts. AltnQ~ah mo~t syst~m$ m4st comply with specific regulatory require-
ments, satisfaction of th~~e r~Q~l~tiQn~ is achieve.q thr04gh the normal design
practices 4sed by tne airfrqW~ m~nYfact4r~rS ~nq system/component s4Ppliers tq
aSS4re themselves of the q~glit¥ anq sqfe.ty of their prod4ct. This section, of
the report provipe$ ~n estimat~ of the effort in manpqwer ang dollars required.
to incorporate relaxed static stability in an E~T aircraft, with consideration
of the FAA regulations for the aircraft ce.rtificatiqn which relate to this
system.
An aircraft with relaxeq static stability rnHst ~OWR1Y with c~rtain FA~
requirements which specify perform~nce for both the aircraft and augmentatiqn
system. The specific reQula,tion,s Which re.late to the yniqye. stapilit¥ char~c­
teristics of the qir~raft have Pe.en analY~ed. and are. re.ferenced and brieflY
diScussed as follqws;
Part 25
2q.2l{c)
25.23(a)
25.] 03
25.105
25.107
25.111
25.115
Airworthiness Standard.~: Transport CategorY Airplanes
The controllability, ~t~pility, trim, and stqlling characte.rist1cs
must be demonstrated for tne. unaugmented aircraft and every expected
. , .'.'. , .'.'.'.' \ ' .' '.' .'. .' '.' " ,.'. .',' ,~ , . "" . ,
augmented aircraft cQnfig~ration.
Ranges of acceptable ce.nter~ of grQvity mgy vary d~pendjng upon tn~
configuration of theq4,gm~ntation system. In practice, thjs d~peI')9­
ency woul.d have tq .be. estqbl ished }'lith regard to the Qugmentati 0[1
.. . , .. " , "','
configurQtion at disp~tch.
Most unfavorable center of gravity for stall ~ay vary as a functipn
of augmentation configuration.
Takeoff performance fflQ¥ be .~ fM,.nctjpn ,of a,ugment~tjonco,nfj·g.4rati9,n.
Ground-tp-air cycle mU$t be d~monstrated.
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25.143
25.161
25.171
25.173
25.175
25.201
25.203
25.205
25.671
25.672
25.1309
25.1503
25.1505
Controllability and maneuverability must be considered for unaug-
mented and all augmented aircraft configurations.
The unaugmented aircraft may not be able to maintain a trim condition
in a turbulent atmosphere.
The unaugmented aircraft would not be able to satisfy the stability
requirements of these paragraphs. The unaugmented aircraft must,
however, be considered the failed condition and an associated accept-
able probability of occurrence established and demonstrated by
analysis.
Stall characteristics may differ with augmentation configurations.
Demonstration of all expected configurations is required.
Unaugmented and augmented aircraft configurations must be able to
withstand primary flight control system failures and demonstrate
satisfactory controllability. Failures critical to unaugmented and
augmented aircraft may not be the same.
Failures of the augmentation system must be demonstrated to provide
acceptable flying qualities, or shown to be sufficiently improbable.
Critical failure conditions must be verified to be sufficiently
improbable.
A speed limitation may be established if satisfactory performance
cannot be achieved at high speeds.
7.2 System Validation
The validation of an avionics system is an integral part of the normal
design process required to verify each element of the design, and it provides
the data necessary to progress to the next step in the program. Figure 7-1
is a summary of a 42-month program for the validation of an RSSAS system on a
new aircraft design. The subtasks of this program are classified as perform-
ance compliance, fault-related, or system description and design control. As
noted in Figure 7-1, several data submittals to the FAA are anticipated and
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-
PERFORMANCE
COMPLIANCE
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FIGURE 7-1. -RSSAS VALIDATION SCHEDULE
}
SYSTEM
DESCRIPTIONI
DESIGN CONTROL
although the form of th~ FAA reports may be unique, in most cases the require-
ment to collect these data is simply consistent with the design process.
Exceptions exist only in the area' of qualitative evaluations of the aircraft
or RSSAS, which usually require additional testing to the motion base simulator
and flight test program.
The performance compliance process begins with the aircraft simulation
used to develop and analyze the RSSAS. This total simulation is then used to
conduct motion base testing to evaluate the aircraft/system flying qualities.
Iron bird* testing is used to validate the system hardware which is then demon-
strated on the flight test vehicle. It should be noted that all performance
verification includes both fault-free operation and failure configurations
based upon the FMEA and fault analyses.
The fault analyses include determining the effects of system failures
and formulation of the monitoring concepts. This usually includes detailed
hardware FMEAs and system fault and fault tree analyses. These analyses con-
tribute to aircraft and RSSAS maintenance plans and certification documentation.
System description and design control are essentials of the design,
analysis, and verification tasks to assure a proper continuing understanding
for both the designer and monitor (including the FAA) of the intended function
of all elements of the hardware and system•.The design control feature must
be defined and maintained throughout the life of the aircraft/system.
7.3 RSSAS Implementation Cost
For the purpose of this study, the cost of incorporating the relaxed
static stability concept in the EET is determined as the differential of
the identical aircraft with and without RSSAS. This is somewhat different from
the accumulated RSSAS implementation costs, since many of the required tasks
are common to a conventional aircraft design. The primary contributors to the
RSSAS cost are the airframe manufacturer and the suppliers of the primary
components, the augmentation computers, and the new elevator actuators.
*A full-scale aircraft development fixture consisting of (1) the mechanical
primary control and hydraulic supply systems duplicating the aircraft hard-
ware and routing, (2) a cockpit simulation with pilot controls and displays,
(3) test stations for installation and control of avionics systems, and
(4) a computer simulation of the aircraft dynamics.
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The following engirieering disciplines and corresponding primary additional
areas of effort would be required:
Aerodynamics
• Flying qualities criteria formulation and evaluation
• Sta~ility ahd cdntrol analysis
(Aerodynamic definitions, wind tunnel testing, etc., require
the equivalent level of effort)
Avionics
• RSSAS hardware and system specificatidn t system performance
analysis, hardware verificatlon, and vendor coordination
Electrical
• RssAs electrical component and wiring installation
Flight Test
• Maintenance of the test aircraft and the conduct of RssAS flight
testing and certification demonstrations.
Laboratory
• Management of laboratory facilities and support engineering tests
Mechanical
• Elevator actuator specification, hardware verification, vendor
coordination, and installation design
Reliability and Safety
• System rel iab;l ity and safety analysis
• Monitoring of vendor reliability analyses
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Structures
• Structure analysis with system operation (although wing and
empennage position and sizing, landing gear, and door location
may be different from conventional aircraft, the engineering
tasks are assumed equivalent)
Other Departments
• Engineering System Compliance, Environmental, Human Factors,
Operational Engineering and Flight Performance, Weights
Involved with assuring RSSAS/aircraft design but of
significantly lower manpower level
• Product Support
- Involved with maintaining the system in service
• Material
- Performs purchasing, scheduling, and on-site inspection
The estimated manpower and flight test requirements for the most intensive
Douglas design engineering effort are:
DEPARTMENT
Aerodynamics
Avionics
Electrical
Flight Test
Laboratory
Mechanical
Reliability and Safety
Structures
Totals:
plus
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MAN-HOURS
10,000
92,000
3,000
275,000
10,000
17,000
18,000
2,000
437,000
275 aircraft flight /lours
,Anaddttional ~factor of 25;percent of the desi~in'en9ineerin~ (all'6f ~the
;,aboveengineering,except "flight 'test and :laboratory) iimust be included to cover
drawing check, G:00rdi nati on, ,and ,o:ther :pa per-proces,si n9 (requ i remerlts ,bringing
,the tot-an ·number,ofl,man"h0urs ;reqt1i~etl 'to '475~OOO.
'As$uminga !l'i'~presen'taltiNe 'a;iraraft ,industry 'cost ;OT \$40 per engineering
,'man-thourand$'lO.;OOO ,per r8',i'Y'craf.t ;fn:;ght;hour,theitota,l 'honrecurringairframe
manufac'turer',scoSittn ;1979 ',dOinJ,:fn~s :.;s!$Zl .·16 imiililitoh'.
Thesupp:ltier ,eosits "ayte iesitrltna;ted T1'rom:equ:;'vil'1'Emt tprograms :previ'ous'lycom-
pileted or currentiliY in ,progress ,and assumes lait lea's~t ;a '200"Mrcraftbase 'over
whic:h to spread ,the InonnecuJn"img 'charge's.
ETevatorActuators
RSSASComputers
'$60 ;00'0 ipershi,pselt
'$~.20"S(!)()pershi:ps'eit
Airframe costs
Sup,pl ie'r costs
Total
*in 1:979 dollars
$Q iOB,V'50
$~'80,OOO
$'2~8,75'O* peralrcrart
23'8
REFERENCES
1. Cooper, G.E. and Harper, R.P., "The Use of Pilot Rating in the Evaluation
of Aircraft Handling Qualities," NASA TN D-5153, April 1969.
2. Anonymous, "Military Specification, Flying Qualities of Piloted Air-
planes," MIL-F-8785B(ASG), 7 August, 1969.
3. Neal, T.P. and Smith, R.E., "An In-flight Investigation to Develop
Control System Design Criteria for Fighter Airplanes," AFFDL-TR-70-74,
Volume 1, December 1970.
4. Rickard, W.W., "Longitudinal Flying Qualities in the Landing Approach,"
Douglas Paper 6469, May 1976.
5. Wasserman, R. and Mitchell, J.F., "Inf1ight Simulation of Minimum
Longitudinal Stability for Large Delta-Wing Transports in Landing
Approach and Touchdown," AFFDL-TR-72-143, Volume 1, February 1973.
6. Barr, N.M., Gangsaas, D.,and Schaffer, D.R., IIWind Models for Flight
Simulator Certification of Landing and Approach Guidance and Control
Systems ,II FAA-RD-74-206, December 1974.
7. Anonymous, IIProposa1s for Revising MIL-F-8785B, 'Flying Qualities of
Piloted Aircraft,' Volume 1, Proposed Revisions,1I AFFDL-FGC Working
Paper, August, 1977; Corrected February, 1978.
8. Markland, C.A., 1I0ptima1 Model-Following Control System Synthesis
Techniques,1I Proceedings I.E.E., Volume 117, No.3, March 1970
239

APPENDIX 1
BANDWIDTH MODEL
The Bandwidth Model is a pilot-in-the-loop analytical method which
permits the estimation of the flying qualities rating a human pilot would
give the pitch maneuvering characteristics of an arbitrary aircraft config-
uration. The airplane need not be built or flown; only a mathematical model
of. the pitch response (i.e., pitch transfer function) is needed. The rating
is based on the closed-loop performance of a pilot model plus airplane system
in a pitch-tracking task.
The method involves calculation of the optimal pilot model compensation
for closed-loop pitch attitude tracking, as determined by using the adjust-
ment rules of the Bandwidth Model. The method was originated by R. E. Smith
and T. P. Neal of Cornell Aeronautical Laboratories in AFFDL-TR-70-74
(Reference 3).
The primary required information is the airplane-plus-control-system
transfer function e/Fs or e/oe. Other inputs include desired bandwidth and
droop, maximum allowable resonance, pilot transport delay, and maximum allow-
able pilot-lag-compensation angle. Primary outputs of the method are the
computed pilot model parameters. Other outputs are the pilot model phase
angle at the bandwidth frequency, the maximum closed-loop amplitude (resonant
peak), and the low~frequency asymptotes of the transfer function. The method
also yields the amplitude and phase angle versus frequency of the following
transfer functions:
1. Open loop (e/Fs )
2. Open loop plus delay (e/e~ = e~s e/Fs )
4. Closed loop compensated (e/ec = )
3. Open loop compensated (e/ec
= K e~s (Tpl s+l) )
e/Fsp (Tp2 s+l)
elec
1 + e/ec
A chart is included in this report which permits the estimation of flying
qualities ratings by use of the ouputs of the program.
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APPENDIX 2
MOTION-BASE SIMULATOR FACILITY
Six-Axis Motion Base
Dou.g,las has des.tgned' and; 'flabric~ted' a: six....axts motton....simulati'on system
capabl e of sup,porting, a, comple,te. cockp~;t stmulator and providing real istic
motion cues (Fig'ure A....l),. The co.ckpi't si:mu,l:a,tor is a:tt~'.ched to a base sup-
ported: by six hydrauli'c Jacks. a'~r~n9,ed' il';1 th.e cont'i;g,u,ra.tiion developed by the
Fran/Hin Tnstitu:te. The most impo'lrt,an-t s'p.edfifcattons are summartzed below.
AXIS
Heave
Sw'ay
Surge
Roll
Pitch
Yaw,
EXCURSION:
1.07 m
1.71 m
1.65 m
0.54 Rad!
0.58 Rad
0•.68' Rad
VEL@CITY
0,.99, mls
1.70 mls
1.80; mls
0.62 Rad'ls
0.59 Rad'!s
0..63 Rad/s
ACCELERATION:
1.6S ~
2~43 g,
1.50 g
2Z.8) Rad/s
27.8 Rad/s
2'7.9 Radls
These figures are for a payload of 44,000 kg- The fig,ures for pitch and
yaw refer to the platform axis. With the separation between aircraft center
of gravity and the pilot's positQn, the pitch and yaw motions appear prim~rny
as heave and sway.
The motion system is controlled by a minicomputer which implements the
geometric transformations, w~shout algorithms, and fail-safe features. The
minicomputer is tied to the Sigma 5 computer via a digital data link. The
minicomputer exercises servo valves and receives feedback data, viq analog!
digital converters, from Douglas-developed Linear Velocity Differential Trans-
formers (LDVT). These transformers provide linear readout over the full travel
of the hydraulic jacks. The motion system is currently equipped witha,large-
scale transport cockpit, and visual simulation is available from the Redifon
visual flight attachment (Figure'A-2).
Cockpit Interface Hybrid Satellite
Cockpit simulators are, as a matter of necessity, located some distance
from the main Sigma 5 computer facility. The Interface Hybrid Satellites are
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I RAD-96020-63
FIGURE A-1. SIX-AXIS MOTION-BASE SIMULATOR
I RAD-96020-64
FIGURE A-2. LARGE-SCALE TRANSPORT COCKPIT
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portable systems that may be located adjacent to a cockpit simulator and are
desi'gned to provide all of the necessary interfacing functions to the main
computer systemo The satellites contain up to 64 (A to D) and (0 to A)'
channels, a small analog computer, and a PDP 11/40 digital computer. The
systems are tied to the Sigma 5 through a digital link, ensuring noise-free
communicationo Patch boards are utilized to provide the necessary flexibilityo
In addition to providing the communication and conversion functions between
the cockpit and the Sigma 5, the satellites possess substantial hybrid comput-
ing power that serves to unburden the Sigma 5 and reinforce its ability to
accommodate real-time parallel tasks 0
There is an advanced analog capability consisting of two Mi1go 4100 com-
puters. These very large solid-state systems contain in excess of 550 opera~
tiona1 amplifiers eacho They possess fully automatic programming features
and are used extensively in supporting full cockpit simulators. These may
include significant elements of the avionics systemso
Hybrid System
The largest and most sophisticated system in the laboratory is the XDS
Sigma 5, Astrodata Ci-5000 hybrid. Their separate analog and digital capa-
bilities are rendered compatible through a 32- by 32-channel system of Analog
to Digital (A to D), and Digital to Analog (0 to A) converters. These also
provide the means of interfacing the digital computer with the parallel char-
acter of the real world as exemplified by pilots, cockpits, instruments, etc.
The hybrid computer system represents the successful marriage of digital and
analog techniques, and goes far in eliminating the inadequacies of either of
the systems applied separately. Since its installation, this equipment has
provided a full simulation of Douglas' Commercial transport, the DC-10, and
the Military STOl aircraft, the YC-15.
Hybrid System Software
Simulation programs are written in prob1em- or user-oriented languages
such as FORTRAN, CSSl, and SL-1. Although not stated explicitly, every pro-
granmer writing in such languages assumes that the computer will properly under-
stand the language in which he wrote his program and will faithfully follow
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his instructions. However, the computer hardware alone cannot do this. There
is resident in the computer a program or a set of programs tbat will inter-
pret the programmer's instruction'language, convert the pr.ogrammer's instruc-
tions to machine directives, and cause the computer hardware to perform the
desired acts.
Visual Flight Attachment (VFA)
One of the pilot's primary sources of data is the scene viewed from the
forward window of the aircraft. This is particularly true during final ap-
proach where runway perspective, lighting, and landing aids provide signifi-
cant data which can be critical to system performance.
Flight simulation aims at validating the design of a system, including
the pilot, through study of the actual performance. If the pilot is to func-
tion in a normal and realistic fashion, he must be provided with data, includ-
ing a visual scene, in as realistic a manner as possible. This is the purpose
of the visual flight simulator at the Long Beach facility.
The visual simulator consists of two models, a servodriven television
camera and the associated control electronics and lighting. The larger model,
which consists of the airport, runway, and surrounding terrain, is three-
dimensional (13 meters long by 4.6 meters high), with a scale of 750 to 1.
A 3048-meter runway is located at the longitudinal center of the model. The
runway is complete with approach lights, strobes, marker and threshold bars,
touchdown zone, VASI, taxiway, edge, and centerline lights. The model is
illuminated by a bank of fluorescent lights which can be controlled to pro-
vide daylight, dusk, or night conditions. The second model is .1.2 by 1.2
meters with a scale of approximately 1.6 kilometers to the inch. This model
represents terrain and cloud cover as viewed from high altitude (Figure A-3).
A Phillips Plumbicon television camera is mounted on a gantry. The
gantry travels on tracks parallel to the model to provide longitudinal motion.
The camera carriage itself is driven in two directions to provide lateral
motion and changes in altitude. Servodriven mirrors and prisms in the optics
of the camera provide roll, pitch, and yaw.
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Primary control signals from a cockpit simulator serve as inputs to a
computer-mechanized math model of the airplane dynamics. This computer is
linked to a control ~omputer which converts aircraft center-of-gravity coor-
dinates to pilot's eye coordinates and controls camera motion. The cameras
then lIf"lies ll the approach as directed from the cockpit. The system can be
used in simulation of any aircraft for which a computer model is available.
The video signal is sent to a television monitor which is viewed by the
pilot through a collimating lens mounted approximately in the plane of the
windscreen. MDe has undertaken a substantial amount of development in the
area of these collimating lenses, and has produced the most advanced and dis-
tortion-free optical system available anywhere for simulator applications.
Specifications of the VFA system are given in the following paragraph.
Maximum approach distance is 3.6 km. The eye altitude range of the air-
port model is from 221 m (maximum) to 4.6 m (minimum). Maximum longitudinal
lateral velocities are 225 knots and maximum sink rate is 10.2 m/s. The maxi-
mum pitch is 0.43 rad; heading and roll are unlimited. Maximum angular veloc-
ities are 0.75 rad/s (heading), 0.5 rad/s (roll) and 1.5 rad/s (pitch).
Maximum angular accelerations are 0.5 rad/s squared (heading), 1.0 rad/s
squared (roll) and 3.5 rad/s squared (pitch). Angular field of view is 0.24
rad horizontal (±0.42 rad) and 0.63 rad vertical (+0.28 rad; -0.35 rad).
I RAD-96020-65
FIGURE A-3. VISUAL SIMULATOR
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APPENDIX 3
COMPONENTS EVALUATED IN
THE RELIABILITY ANALYSES
AND CRITERIA BASELINE
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ATA NO.
22"'02-01
22-11-01
22-11-02
22..11 ...03
22,..12-01
22-12..02
22..12-03
22-12-08
22..13-01
22-13-02
22-13-03
22-13-04
22-15-20
22-15";21
22..17-01
22-17-02
22-18-01
22..19-01
22-22-01
22-22-02
22-31-02
22-31 ..03
22-31 ..04
22-31 ..05
22-31-07
22-31 ..08
22-31-09
22-31-10
22-31-11
22-31-12
22"33-01
22-33-02
27-11-01
27-12-01
COMPONENTS EVALUATED
NAME
Sensing Unit, Wheel Spin-up
Computer, FIt Gdnc Pitch
Panel, Cont, Pitch Gdnc
LVDT, Average Elevator
Computer, Flt Gdnc Roll
Panel, Cont, Directional Gdnc
LVDT, Average Aileron
Sensor, Control Wheel
Computer, Flt Gdnc Yaw
Gyro, Rate, Yaw
Switch, Test, Yaw Damper
Detector, AC Current
Panel Assy, Flt Gdnc Cont
Rack, Flt Gdnc Cont Pnl
Unit, Mode Ann Logic
Annunciator, Mode, Flight
Annunciator, Warning, AlP
Accelerometer Unit, Linear
LVDT, Auto Pitch Trim
Computer, Auto Pitch Trim
Switch Assy, Throt Disc, Left
Switch Assy, Throt Disc, Rt
Panel, Cont, Auto Throttle
Switch, Limit, Min Authority
Computer, AIT Speed Cont
Servo, Duplex Throttle
Gearbox, Auto Throttle
Annunciator, Warning, ATS
Annunciator, Wrn, ATS (F.O.)
Switch, Test, Speed Control
Switch, Test, Stan Warning,
Sensor, Angle of Attack
Regulator, Aileron
Actuator Assy, Aileron Trim
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ATA NO.
27-12-02
27-12-03
27-13-02
27-13-03
27-13-05
27-13-20
27-13-21
27-13-23
27-13-24
27-13-25
27-13-26
27-13-30
27-13-31
27-13-33
27-13-34
27-13-35
27-14-03
27-21-01
27-22-02
27-23-02
27-23-20
27-23-21
27-23-23
27-23-24
27-23-25
27-23-26
27-23-30
27-23-31
27-23-33
27-23-34
27-23-35
27-23-36
27-26-01
27-26-02
27-26-04
NAME
Trim Assy, Aileron Ctr Wing
. Control Assy, Trim
Valve, Check, -8
Valve, Check, -10
Restrictor, 2-Way Vise
Actuator Assy, Inbd Ail
Valve, Flow Cont, E1ec-Hyd
Valve, SO, Sol Oper
LVDT, AlP Actuator
Filter, AlP Actuator
Valve, Main Control
Actuator Assy, Outbd Ail
Valve, Flow Cont, Elec-Hyd
Valve, SO, Sol Oper
LVDT, AlP Actuator
Filter, AlP Actuator
Indicator, Surface Pos
Regulator, Rudder
Actuator, Rudder Trim
Valve, Check, -6
Actuator Assy, Lower Rudder
Valve, Flow Cont, Elec-Hyd
Valve, SO, Sol Oper
LVDT, AlP Actuator
Filter, AlP Actuator
Valve, Main Control
Actuator Assy, Upper Rudder
2-Valve, Flow Cont, E1ec-Hyd
3-Va1ve, SO, Sol Oper
3-LVDT, AlP Actuator
1-Filter, AlP Actuator
l-Valve, Main Control
Valve, Check
Valve, Check
Va1ve, Check
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ATA ,NO.
27-26-05
27-26-06
27-26-07
27-26-20
27-26-21
27-26-30
27-26-31
27-26-31
27-31-03
27-31-04
27-32-01
27-32-02
27-32-03
27-32-05
27-32-06
27-32-07
27"'33-02
27-33-03
27-33-04
27"'33-20
27-33-21
27-33-23
27-33-24
27-33-25
27-33-26
27-33-30
27-33-31
27-33-33
27-33-34
27-33-35
27-33-36
27-35-01
27-41-07
27-41-08
27-43-02
27-43-04
NAME
Valve, Check
. Valve, Shut-off, Motor Oper
Switch, low level, Comp
Pump, Motor, Alt Non Rev
Valve S/O, Pressure Oper
Sump, Alt Rud &HS
Sump, Alt Rud
Compensator, Motor Pump
Regulator, Elevator
Regulator, Elevator
Actuator, Duplex, ELF/FL
Programmer, ElF/FL
Indicator, Load Feel, Elev
Transmitter, load Feel, Elev
Switch, Elev Feel
Switch, Manual Slew
Valve, Check, -12
Valve, Check, -10
Restrictor, 2-Way Vise, Elev
Actuator Assy, Inbd Elev
Valve, Flow Cont, Elec-Hyd
Valve, SO, Sol Oper
lVDT, AlP Actuator
Filter, AlP Actuator
Valve, Main Control
Actuator Assy, Outbd Elev
Valve, Flow Cont, Elec-Hyd
Valve, SO, Sol Oper
lVDT, AlP Actuator
Filter, AlP Actuator
Valve, Main Control
Shaker, Stick
Switch, Wheel, Horiz Stab
Switch, Alt Trim, Horiz Stab
Valve, Check, -8
Brake, Trim, Horiz Stab
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ATA NO.
27-43-05
27-43-06
27-43-07
27-43-30
27-43-31
27-43-40
27-43-41
27-43-42
27-43-43
27-44-01
27-44-04
27-44-08
27-45-01
27-45-02
27-52-01
27-52-02
27-52-03
27-52-05
27-52-07
27-52-08
27-52-09
27-52-10
27-52-11
27-52-12
27-52-13
27-52-14
27-54-01
27-54-02
27-54-03
27-54-04
27-54-05
27-54-07
27-56-01
27-56-02
27-56-03
NAME
Valve, Check
. Restrictor, 2-Way
Damper, Surge
Motor, Trim, Horiz Stab
Valve, So, Sol Oper
Valve, Control, Primary Trim
Valve, So, Sol Oper
Valve, Flow Cont, Horiz Stab
Valve, Check, -6
Gearbox, Horiz Stab Drive
Actuator Assy, Horiz Stab
Coupling, Torsional
Sensor, Horiz Stab Drum
Sensor, Horiz Stab E1ec
Cylinder, Act, Inbd Wing Flap
Cylinder, Act, Outbd Wg Flap
Valve, Control, Wing Flap
Valve, Check, Press
Restrictor, 2-Way, Out Flap
Restrictor, 2-Way, O.R. Flap
Restrictor, 2-Way, Inbd Flap
Restrictor, 2-Way, I.R. Flap
Valve, Fa1p Lock
Restrictor, 2-Way
Manifold, Flap Up
Valve, Check
Indicator, Pos, Flap/Slat
Transmitter, Pos, Outbd Flap
Transmitter, Flap Handle
Transmitter, Pos, Inbd Flap
Switch, Arming, LDG Flap
Switch, Flap Intlk, G/A
Actuator, Duplex, ELF/FL
Programmer, ELF/FL
Switch, Limiter Cvrd, Flap
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lATA NO . .
27-61-20
27-61-21
27-62-01;-, , j
27,:,,63-01
, :' '.. '~",- ' ..
·?7,:"Q3-02
27-65-01l'" :."
~7-pp-02
.! - ~." .~
27-~6-P?
27-~8-Pl
27-RB-02
27-71-Q1
• ~ !<: ; )
27-71-02
27-73-9'
27-73-02
27-73-03
.. ,',--:"
27-82-01; ~ - , ' , .
27-82-03
, ,.' t
27-8,2-03
27-82-04
I ~ , . , • ,'.
27-82-05
I ',~ .•. ,"
27-8,2-06
27-82-07
" .. __• '.j
27-82-®
27-82-09
27-82-11
27-83-01
',', "
27-83-02
27-83-03
. \ .' .,
27-84-02
27-84-03
27-85-01
32-24-01
3,4-11-01
34-11-02
~4-11-03
NAME
Actuator Assy, ~Spoil Or Svo
. Valve, Spoil Dr Svo
~:' ,-~ , - '. " . '" "; ,
Light', Speed Bra~~
.- ""'j . •
~ct~a.tqr, Elee, SBQi1~r Cont
Control Unit, ~rd Spoi1~r
, ': ~ ,." ,- . "'. . : ' , -, 'i ,,~ '. '.:', -'. ;.-'
A~tuator Assy, Spp11er CQnt
Restrictor, 2-Way Visc
.: l :, '" -,. ,~,. ~ 1'.- .- . ~, ".: "" 'Ij'"
Tra~~mi~t~r! Pp~~ Spqi1er
S~nsQr, Prox SPQil~r A
Sensor, Prox Spoiler B
" ;. ~ ,~ .., .,' , r'" " • , •
pa~p~r, Byzz, Qut~q Ail
Restrictqr, Ret~rn, Fi1t~r~d
q~mper~ PyZ?, El~y,~tpr
p~mper, Peyator
Restrietor, Return, Filtered
r ? ... -,_ .., ,'\ ~"'" ',-. ': ~', 1 ~ ~ • ',' ,.., ':';.,
~Ylin~~r~ Sla.'t
Valve, Control, Slat
" " -' ", . - . '. '. " .- ""."
Va,lye, CQntrql, Sla,t
Va.1ve, Two Speeq, Sla,t
Ya.1ve, Chec~, Pr~ss
~estrictor, 2-Wa,y, Ctr Sl~t
Restrictor, 2-WaY, Cutbd Slat
" '-:" .,,', ',"" .
Be~trictQr~ Slat R~t, Outpd
ValV~, Check, -~
Cylinq~r, Sliit
M~e~ Assy, 04tb,d Sl~t Driye
Mec~ ~ssy, Outbd Sliit Driy~
M,~~h A~sy, Inqb. Sl~t Driv~
S~nsor, Position, Sl~t
Indicator, Pos, Slat
'\ ~ :' ,,~ I - ."."'"
Actuator, E1ee, Slat Cont
Switch, GrolJnd Sensing
, . ' '.
Pitot Tube
. ;,'. ; ',;
Va.ly~, S~le~tor, Static
Plate A~s~mp1y, Static
AlA NO •.
34-11-04
34-16-01
34-16-02
34-16-03
34-18-01
34-18-03
34-21-01
34-21-02
34-21-03
34-21-06
34-21-07
34-23-01
34-23-02
34-23-03
34-23-04
55-21-01
55-21-02
55-22-01
55-22-02
55-22-03
55-22-04
55-41-01
55-41-02
55-42-01
55-42-02
55-51-01
57-51-01
57-51-02
57-51-03
57-51-04
57-52-01
57-52-02
57-52-03
57-52-04
57-53-01
57-53-02
Ports, Alternate, Static
Computer, Central Air Data
Probe, Total Air Temp
Switching Unit, Air Data
Indicator, TAT &Thrust Rtg
Computer, Thrust Rtg
Gyro, Directional
Valve, Flux
Coupler, Compass
Controller, Compass
Switching Unit, Compass
Gyro, Vertical
Indicator, Attitude Director
Unit, Attd Mon/Switching
Rack, Gyro Mounting
Elevator Assy, Outbd LH
Elevator Assy, Outbd RH
Elevator Assy, Inbd LH
E1 evator Assy, Inbd RH
Elevator Assy, Inbd Dtch LH
Elevator Assy, Inbd Dtch RH
Rudder Assy, Upper Fwd
Rudder Assy, Upper Aft
Rudder Assy, Lower Fwd
Rudder, Assy, Lower Aft
Bearing, Hinge, Horiz Stab
Aileron Assy, Outbd LH
Aileron Assy, Outbd RH
Aileron Assy, Inbd LH
Aileron Assy, Inbd RH
Flap Assy, Cutbd LH
Flap Assy, Outbd RH
Flap Assy, Inbd LH
F1 ap Assy, Inbd RH
Flap Vane Assy, Outbd LH
Flap Vane Assy, Outbd RH
253
ATA NO.
57-53-.03
57-53-04
57-54-01
57-54-02
57-54-03
57-54-04
57-Q4-Q5
57-54-06
57-54-07
57-54-08
57-54-09
57-54-10
57-55-01
57-55-02
57-55-03
57-55-04
57-55-05
57-55-06
57-55-07
57-55-08
57-55-11
57-55;"12
57-55-13
57-55-14
57-55-15
57-55-16
57-5.5-17
57-55-18
76-11-01
76-11-02
76-11-03
76-11-04
76-11-05
76-11-06
77-32-11
77-32-12
77-32-13
NAME
Flap Vane Assy~ Inbd lH
. Fl ap Vane Assy ~ Inbd RH
Spo; ler Assy, #1 LH
Spoiler Assy, #1 RH
Spoiler Assy, #2 LH
Spoiler Assy, #2 RH
Spoiler Assy, #3 LH
Spoiler Assy, #3 RH
Spoiler Assy, #4 LH
Spoiler Assy, #4 RH
Spoiler Assy, #5 LH
Spoiler Assy, #5 RH
Slat Assy, #1 LH
Slat Assy, #2 LH
Slat Assy, #3 LH
Slat Assy, #4 LH
Slat Assy, #5 LH
Slat Assy, #6 LH
Slat Assy, #7 LH
Slat Assy, #8 LH
Slat Assy, #1 RH
Slat Assy, #2 RH
Slat Assy, #3 RH
Sl at Assy, #4 RH
Slat Assy, #5 RH
Slat Assy, #6 RH
Slat Assy, #7 RH
Slat Assy, #8 RH
Switch Cam Assy, Throttle
Clutch Assy, A/T Drive
Switch Cam Assy, Throttle
Switch Cam Assy, Throttle
Switcn Assy,. Throt T/0 & G/A
Switch, RTC #3 Eng 2
Cable Assy, Engine
Cable Assy, Wing Pylon
Cable Assy, Tail Pylon
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APPENDIX 4
EXPOSURE TIME FOR PROBABILITY ANALYSIS
In the course of conducting the RSSAS study, several questions were
raised on the intended meaning and interpretation of certain phrases used by
the FAA and industry groups to describe the exposure parameter over which a
particular risk probability applies. Two phrases that have caused some
confusion when used as modifers to a probability value are "per flight or
flight hour,1I and IIfor each trial or hour of exposure. II These two phrases
are synonomous when applied to aircraft, and the former is more commonly
used for that purpose.
The following discussion attempts to accomplish three things:
1. Explain the prevailing interpretation of these phrases.
2. Point out that there is not international agreement on a standard-
exposure-time parameter.
3. Discuss the implications of the lack of a standard on probabilistic
risk analyses of complex aircraft systems.
To quantify the probability of an event occurring, one must define an
exposure parameter (time, trials, cycles, etc.) over which the probability
applies. For example, the probability that a coin will fall head-up in one
toss is quite different from the probability that it will fall head-up once
in 10 tosses. Although this appears obvious and almost trite, it can
become a disturbing issue when exposure parameters are required for calcu-
lating the probability of specific functional fault conditions occurring in
sophisticated aircraft systems.
It is necessary to first establish the exposure parameter for the
undesired end-event of interest without regard for the elements that can
contribute to causing the event. For aircraft, this parameter is usually
expressed in terms of a flight or an increment of flight time. Regulatory
agencies and industry groups worldwide have been, and still are, trying to
reach agreement on a standard for end-event exposure parameters that can be
used by all groups for validating system designs.
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For systems that are critical for only a brief period during a flight,
such as automatic landing systems, ~here is a consensus that the end-event
~xposure parameter is that brief time period during which the aircraft is
i:lt risk should certain functional fault conditions occur.
For activ~ control systems such as RSSAS or load alleviation systems,
which maY in the f4ture be critical to the airworthiness of the airplane
throughout the flight d~ration, not &11 parties agree on a standard exposure
time, or whether a standard is necessary. Acurrently active leAD study
group is attempting to develop guidance material on the certification of
automatic landing systems and automatic flight control systems. The following
is from the minutes of the group's August 1978 meeting:
lilt was proposed and agreed by the Study Group that the
probability definitions used in the United States should be
included in the draft material as an Appendix because they
differ in detail from those presently in the text. The Study
Group was, however, informed that firstly the material adopted
contains intermediate levels which are not defined in the u.S.
documents. Secondly, the numerical probability values are
expressed I per hour of flight determined for the expected mean
flight time l whereas the u.S. values are expressed 'per flight
or flight houri .. Thus there is only direct numerical equivalence
for aeroplanes with an average flight time of one hour, although
actual differences will be small for the normal range of flight
times. Therefore, the use of other probability definitions in
the u.S. does not affect the applicability of the material
because the probability levels are similar in the actual certi-
fication of automatic landing systems. 1I
A note to members subsequent to that meeting elaborated further for consider-
ation by the members:
liThe meaning of the term lexpected mean flight time l ••• was
considered to need some clarification and consequently:
(i) The term was amended to read 'expected mean flight time,
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i.e., duration of average individual flight for the type of
aeroplane concerned'.
(ii) to further clarify this point, the second sentence of
paragraph 1.4.1 of Appendix C was replaced by the follow-
ing text (based on paragraph 2.8 of Attachment B to
Study Note No. 15). 'The probabilities should be
established as the risk per hour in a flight where the
duration of the flight is equal to the expected mean
flight time for type of aeroplane concerned. For example,
in systems where the hazard results from multiple failure
in the same flight, the numerical assessment must take
account of the likelihood that this will occur in a flight
of expected average duration. Similarly, in those cases
where failures are only critical for a particular period
of fl i ght., the hazard may be averaged over the whole of
the expected mean fl i ght time. I II
For a function that is critical for the entire flight length, it is
clear that the end-event exposure time is a variable, since not all flights
of a typical airplane are the same length. One might calculate an average
risk by using the average flight time, as is suggested by the ICAO Study
Group, or a worst-case risk by using the longest flight time possible for
the particular aircraft type. The current FAA view is understood to be
that one hour is the longest end-event exposure time that must be used in
risk analyses of this type, but if the actual critical exposure time is less
than one hour, the actual value may be used. The ICAO Study Group seems to
agree on the latter point. This actual lessor value comes from the words
II per flight. 1I The upper limit of one hour results from the words II per
flight hour. II The risk probability thus arrived at is for one hour of
exposure to the end undesired event. It is important to recognize that a
probability calculated for one hour cannot be linearly extrapolated to
longer times even though the expression II per hour ll is used, unless there
is no redundancy and there are no latent undetected failure modes in the
system.
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The following simple example may serve to illustrate the implication
of the current interpretation. For an event that occurs ramdom1y in time"
at a reasonably constant rate (A), "the probability (Q) that the event will
occur in a specified time space (t = t 2-t1) may be expressed as:
Q = 1 -At- e ,
if it is known that the event has not occurred prior to t 1. For small values
of At, this expression may be closely approximated, for simplicity, by:
If a device has a known failure rate of, say, nine failures per million hours,
and two of these devices are used in parallel so that both must fail before
a critical function is lost, the probability (QF) of losing the function is:
QF = Qd x Qd = Q2 = (Adt )2 = (9 x 10-
6)2t 2 = (8.1 x 10-11)t2
If this function is required for only a short time, such as during an auto-
matic landing, and both devices have been verified operating prior to
engaging the critical flight phase, then the value of t is quite small, say
about 10 minutes~ The probability of losing this function during the
critical time period is then:
Or, if this function is critical for one hour of the flight,
For longer flight lengths, the probability will increase (in this example,
as the square of the flight time), but the current FAA view is that such
an increase for real systems will be well within the combined accuracy"
tolerances of the required probability and the data and assumptions used
in the analysis, at least for values of t up to the average flight times
of commercial aircraft.
The advantage of specifying allowable risk levels on a "per-flight-
hour" basis is that it allows comparing, analyzing, and certifying various
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system configurations toa common standard that is independent of the
mission range of the vehicles they may eventually be used on. Also, within
reasonable limits, if the risk requirement is achieved with some margin, the
effect of some increase in exposure time does not usually increase the risk
to a value greater than the required certification value. In the above
example the value of t can go to 3.5 hours before the threshold of
-91 x 10 is crossed.
1 x 10-9 = {8.1 x 10-11)t2
t = 3.5 hours
Or, to view it another way, the device failure rate could be as much as
3-1/2 times worse than was estimated for the one-hour case.
A = 32 failures per million hours
Further, when analyzing actual systems with significant redundancies at
various levels, and several states of degradation or reconfiguration, several
different exposure times are almost always required for various system
elements to account for latent failures in redundant or "intermittently used
functions. The exposure time for potential failures of such elements is
always conservatively taken as the time from when the element was last
known to be functioning, to the time its operation is again verified. Even
for automatic landing systems, with an end-event exposure time of only a
few minutes for a flight, some elements within the system may have exposure-
to-failure times of hundreds or thousands of hours. These times are
applicable, for example, to devices whose failure could remain undetected
until certain special tests are performed. Often these devices become the
final constraint on the system risk level, so that the difference in the
end-event risk between a one-hour flight and one several hours long is
relatively small.
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The potential impact of latent failures is recognized by all regulatory
groups and industry. Below;-s ano~her guotationfrom the material being
developed by the reAD study Group:
IIDormant Failures (latent)
When the failure of a device can remain undetected in normal
operation~ the frequency with which the device is checked will
directly inflUence the probAbility that such a failure is present
on any particular occasion. this should be taken into account
when assessing the probabilities of any failure conditions which
include the dormant failures of monitoring devices or unchecked
redundant items. Ii
There are, of course, many additiona1 important factors that must be
considered in conducting a comprehehsive safety assessment of any aircraft
system. The preceding discussioH is intended only to t1arify, and perhaps
justify, the prevailing interpretation of the terril IIper flight or flight
hour-II as us.ed by the FAA.
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APPENDIX 5
NETWORK RELIABILITY ANALYSIS MODEL RESULTS FOR RSSAS
The methodology associated with the computer program results contained
in this appendix is discussed in Paragraph 4.2.2.1.
Case 1
Triple-Redundant (omputers
All elements operative at start of 1-, 2-, and 5-hour flights.
Case 2
Triple-Redundant Computers
Maximum number of elements inoperative at start of 1-, 2-, and
5-hour flights.
Case 3
Du a1 Compu ters
All elements operative at start of 1-, 2-, and 5-hour flights.
Case 4
Dual Computers
Maximum number of elements inoperative at start of 1-, 2-, and
5-hour flights.
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N F T W Q R K R F L tAB I LIT Y
RSSAS RELIABILITY ANALYSIS (CONF It
FL IGHT TIME 1.00 HRS.
A N A L Y S J S PRO G RAM
MCOONNeLl~OOUGLAS CORP.
RUN DATE 01/18/79
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
COOE FUNCTION LOST PROBABILITY OF FAILURE
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
A
AA
B
C
o
E
All
AAB
~SSAS 0N1Y
RSSA S AL1F UNe T1 oNS
YAW DA"'P~R
STAllWAR'NING
ELEVA mR LOAD FEEl
FLA P LI MI tl N'G
ALL FUNCTkoNS
PSSAS AND YAW DAMPEP
0.259E-09
0.272E-09
O.858E-07
O.258E-05
O.970E-07
O.970E-07
o.isoe-lO
0.245E-09
CASE 1, oNe HOUR
NET w 0 R K R ELI A B I L , T V A N A
RSSAS RELIABILITY ANALYSIS lCONF 1)
FLIGHT TIME 2.00 HRS.
L Y S J S PRO r, RAM
McbONN~lL-DOUGlASCORP.
RUN DATE 01/18119
cnoE FUNCT ION lOST PROBABILITY nF FAILURE
A RSSA S ONLY O.107F.-08
AA RSSAS ALL i=tiNCTIONS a.USE-08
R YAw DAMPER O.343E-06
C STALL WA RN t NG O.552!:-O5
0 ElEVATOR LOAD fEEL t)..388E-06
E FLAP LI MITING 0.38SE-06
All All FUNC 1I0NS O.144E-09
AAB RSSA S AND YAW DAMPFR 0.l06E-08
CASE 1, TWO HOUtis
N F r W0 R K R E L r A 8 I l tty
RSsAS R~LI~BILITY ANAlystS (CONF I'
Fl IGHT TIME 5.00 HRS.
A N A l V sis PRO G RAM
MCOONNElL~DOUGtAs CORP.
RUN DATE 01/18/19
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
CODE FUNCTION lOST PR08ABIlITY OF FAiLU~~
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
A
AA
B
C
o
F.
ALL
AA8
RSSAS ONLY
RSSAS ALL FUNCTIONS'
YAW DAMPER
STALL WARNING
ELEVATOR LOAD FEEL
FL AP LI fool IT I NG
ALL FUNC TTO!\JS
RSSAS AND YAW DAMPER
z62
0.731E-08
·0.898E-08
0.214E-05
0.i6SE-04
O.24ZE-05
O~24ZE-b5
1').222E-08
a.alOE-08
N ~ TWO R KR ~ l I A R I lIT Y
RSQS REI.IA8Il tTy AN~lYSTS (CONF 1)
Fl IGHT Tl~15 1.00 HRS.
A N A l Y SIS PRO G RAM
~COONNElL-DOUGlAS CORP.
RUN DATE 01/18/79
------------------------------~---------------------------------------------
CODE COMPO "lENT PROBABILITy OF FAILURE
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Xl
X2
X4
le5
X6
X7
leA
l(9
XI0
X11
X12
XU
lCl4
Xlr:;
Xlt
Y14
YIr;
Yl6
l(17
X18
X19
Y11
H8
Y19
X20
X21
l(22
l( 23
X24
X25
X26
X21
X26
X~9
00
01
02
03
04
VER TleAL GVROI
VERTICAL GYP02
VERTICAL GYR03
ANGlF OF ATTACK 1
ANGLE OF ATTACK 2
AlP DATA COMPUTFP 1
AIR DATA COMPUTER 2
YAW RA TE GYRO 1
YAw RATE GYIlO 2
FLAP POSI TTON I
FUP POSITION 2
SLAT POSIT!ON 1
SLAT PO SIT TON '2
scnpl (ALL FUNCTIONS)
SCDP2 (.ALL FUNCTIONS)
SCr) P3 (ALL ~UNCT10NS)
SCDP1 (RSSAS ONLY)
SCDP2 (RSSAS ONLY)
SC~P3 (RSSAS ONLY)
CPU1 (ALL ~UNCTTONS)
CPU2 (ALL FUNCTIONS)
CPU3 (ALL FUNCTIONS)
CPU I . ( RSSA S ONL Y)
CPU2 (RSSA S ONLY)
CPU3 (RSSAS ONLY)
STIC K SHAKI;R
Run:lER ACTUATOR 1
RUODER ACTUATOP 2
ELEVATOR ACTUATOR 1
ELEVATOR ACTUATOR 2
ELEVATOR LOAD FE~L ACTUATOR 1
~LEVATOR LOAD FEEL ACTUATOR 2
FLAP LIMIT~R ACTUATOR 1
FLAP LIMITEP ACTUATOR 2
EHV,~OD.LV1TtANO S.O~V. 1
EHV.MOD.LVaT.AND s.a.v. 2
~HV.MD~,LV~T,AND S.O.V. 3
FHV,MOD.LVOT,AND S.D.V. 4
HVD. SYSTEM 1
HYI). SYSTE~ 2
COMPONENT HOl..lRLY FAILURE PROBABILITIES
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O.510E-03
O.510E-03
O.510E-03
0.330E-03
0.330E-03
0.100E-03
O.100E-03
O.860E-04
O.860E-04
O.200E-05
O.200E-05
O.610E-04
O.610E-Q4
O.800E-04
0.800E-04
O.800e-04
O.625E-04
·O.625e-04
O.625E-04
0.260E-03
O.260e-03
O.Z60e-03
0.1B8E-03
O.1BBE-03
O.1B8E-03
O.240E-05
0.500E-05
O.500E-05
0.500E705
0.500E-05
O.351E-04
O.350e-04
O.350e-04
O.350E-04
O.900E-05
0.900E-05
O.900E-05
0.900F-05
O.150E-04
O.150E-04
N ~ T W n ~ K R Ell A 6 I lIT V
RSSAl) PFl IABIL lTV A~AlVSIS (CONF 1 t
FI.. ICHT TI~F 1.00 HR S.' '"
A N A l V SIS PRO G R ~ M
MCDO~NELt-nOUGtAS CORP.
, , RUN OAT E 01/18119
C(lOE F UNC TJON \-051 PRpaA~llJTV OF FAILURE
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
A
~~
B
C
D
E
All
MB
~SSAS ONLY
~ SSA$ HI- FUNCTIONS
YAW DA~PER
STALL WARNING
EU:V~TOR LOAD FE!:t.
flAP LI..,ITING
ALL FUNCTIONS
~SSAS ~ND yAW DAMPE~
0.255E-06
0.zq4F.-06
0.366E-03
O.395E-03
0.295E-03
0.2951:-03
0.140E-01
0.859E-07
C~SE; 2, ONE ti0lJR
N F TWO R K R f- L I A 8 I ~ I T V A N A
RSSASREL IABIL ITV ANALVSIS CCOfotF 1)
FL tGHT TI"IE 2.00 HRS. ' '"
lYSIS PROGRAM
MCDONNEll-DOUGLAS CnRP.
,', ' '~{Jflf OAT E ' 01/18/19
COOE FUNCTION lOST
------------------------------~~-----------------------------------------
A
AA
A
C
o
E
ALL
M8
~ SSAS ONI- Y
~ SSAS All FUNCTIONS
. '. ,;
YAW DA"pER
STAll WARNING
flEV4 TOR LOAD fEE l
flAP LIMITING
All FUNCTIONS
~ SSAS ~ND YAW qAMPfR
C~SE; 2, TWO I1Q~R$
O.102e-o~
O.U1E-OS
O.132E-03
O.791E-03
O.590F-03
O.SCJOE-03
0.29(>1=-06
o.344~-06
NET W 0 R K R ELI A ~ { l J T V
RSSAS RELIABILITY ANALVSIS (CONF It
FL IGHT TI"lE 5.0p HRS. '..
AN A l V S IS PRO G R AM
MCOONNEll-OQUGLAS CORP.
RUN OATF 01118/79
---------------------------------~----------~~-------------- -------------
COOF FUNCTI(l~ LOST ~ROBA~I~TTY OF ~ATIURE
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
A
AA
8
C
f)
E
Al~
AAB
~ SSAS DNl V
~ SSAS All FUNCTIONS
YAW DAMPFR
STALL WARNING
ELEV~mR "OAP FEEL
Fl AP LI MI i'I~G
All FUNCTIONS
~ SSA$ AND YAW DAMPER
CAS~ 2, FIVE 'HOURS
, -.' .. ' '. . -'",.;.
o .637E-(l5
. O. 734E-0'i
Q.18~E-O?
o.lQSF.-02
O·l4$E-Q2
Q.148E-02
O.laSE-05
O.Z16E-05
NET W 0 R K R"E l I A B I lIT V
PS<;AS PEL lABILITY A~AlYSIS (CO~ 11
R.IGHTTI~F 1.00 HPS.
A ~ A l V SIS PRO G R A ~
MCI)O~NEll-DO'JGLIlS CORP.
RJN DATE 01/1811«)
------------------------------~------------------------------------------
crDE COMPJNENT PROBABILITY OF FAILURE
Xl VERT ICAl. GVP 01 0.510E-03
X7. VERTICAL GYR02 0.510F.-03
X~ VERTICAL GVP03 0.510E-03
X4 ANG.f OF ATTAC K 1 0.330E-03
XC; A~Gl E 'IF ATTAC K 2 0.330F-03
X6 AIR 011 TA COMPUTER 1 0.100E-03
X7 AIR DATA COMPUTFR 2 0.1001'-03
Xll YA W RA TF :;YRO 1 0.860E-04
X9 YAW RA TE GVPO 2 0.860"'-04
XIO FLAP PClSI lION I 0.20010-0';
Xll FLA' l)(1SI TION 2 0.200E-05
XIZ SLAT PClSHIO'" I 0.610F-04
. Xl3 SLAT PClSTTTON 2 0.6101'-04
X14 seop 1 (All FUNCTIONS) 0.800E-OIt
Xl5 SCO' 2 (All FUNCTIONSI 0.800F-04
Xl6 seoP 3 fAll FUNCTIO"'S) 0.800E-04
Yi4 SCO'I (~SSA S ONL Y) 0.625E-04
Yl5 SCO' 2 (R SSA S ONL VI 0.6251:-04
Vl6 SCO' 3 (q SSA S O~t V) 0.625E-04
Xl1 CPUI fA Ll FUN:: Tt ONSI 0.260E-03
XII' (P1l2 (All F flf'.C TI ONSI 0.2601:"-03
X19 CPU3 (All FUNC TIONS) 0.2601'-03
Y17 CPUI (R SSA S ONLY I 0.18IJE-03
Yl8 CPU2 (PSSAS ONLYI 0.1881'-03
YJCJ CPU3 (R SSA S ONLV) 0.188E-03
X20 STICK SHAKfR 0.2401'-05
X21 RUO)E~ Ae TUA TOR 1 0.5001'-05
X22 RUOOE~ AC n. TOR 2 0.5001'-05
Xl3 ElEVATO!!. AC TUA TOR 1 O.500f-(,5
X24 El EVA TOR ACTUII mR 2 0.500E-Of)
X25 ELEVATOR LOAD FEEL AC TUA TOR 1 0.3511:"-04
X26 EL EVATOR LOAD FEf L AC TUA TOR 1 0.350E-04
X21 fLAl) LIMITFR ACTUATOR 1 0.350E-04
X28 FLAl) lIMITF.R ACTUATOR 2 0.350E-04
XZ9 EHV.I4JO.L VO T.A NO "S.I). v. 1 O.900E-05
X30 EHV,MOO,LVOT,ANO s. n. V. 2 0.900E-05
X31 FHV, "lJD,L VO T,ANO s. O. Y. 3 . 0.900F-05
X32 EHV, 14)0 ,LVOT .ANO s.o. V. It 0.9001"-05
03 HYD. SYSTEM 1 o .150E-0't
X34 HYD. SYSTEM 2 0.150E-04
T~OP
INOP
I~OP
INOP
INIJP
INOP
INOP
INOP
I"lOP
INOP
I~IOP
INOP
COMPONENT HOURLY FAILURE PROBABILITIES WITH CASE 2 INOPERATIVE COMPONENTS NOTED
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~ ~ 1 ~ U k ~ k l L ~ A d 1 ~ 1 1 Y
K~A~~ ktLAALiLtTW A~ALY~!~ ttU~f ~,
~Ll~hl 1~"( i~0~ Nk~.
-----------_._-------. . '
<
'"'-II.H;;
A N A L Y ~ 1 ~ P RUG K A "
HtUuNNtLL-uuuGLA~ tUKP.
'.' "RUI~ DAn:: OUlu/1'i
--------
---------------------------,-------------------
A
ALl..
AAtl
,,~~A~ Gl~L Y
K::'::'A~ ALL. fUN('l~lJl'4::'
YAn uAM~t.K
';'lAL.l ~~RNA."''''
tLC~ArUK LU~U Fl~L
t'LA" L.un liNb
ALL fUN"" 1 H.•~~
K~~A~ ANO YA~ OAH~tK
•...... .' . i
{;~SE 3, Ol\!~ HO~R
O.4l4l;-u1
O.1Q&~-07
~.CJ~2t;-01
u•.2.59E-O!»
O.103f-uo
O.103t:-Oo
0.140l:,-OI
v.14£~-Ol
N ~ I ~ U K ~ K ~ L 1 A b 1 L 1 1 Y
K~A~~K~LlAblLllyANALy~~~ lt~Nf ~.
fU WiT Hl1t £.00 Hk::'~· ..>
~ ~ ~ L Y ::. ~::. P RUb R A H
MtPUNNLll-UUUGlA::' CORP.
, RONDAlt ~l/Aijlly
---------------....---------------
CUOl fUN~11UN Lu~l
------ ._-----.---~-----------------
A R::'~A::' UNL.
AA K~~A~ ALL r~~(.l~~~~
u '( ,:,W UAI1PL.R
C ::'T~LL WARNINb
ALL
AAt;)
~L~VAIUK LUAU fl~l
fLAt" LlI'llT .LNb,
ALL rU~4.."f.L4JN~
RS::'A~ AND YA~ OAM~t:R
0.1001:.-\10
u.~Ol~-Ob
0.,;)0'11:-00
O.'55l:-v~
~ .... l"'E-"()
O.41"tt:-oo
0.296£-00
0.l911::-06
CASE a. TWO H()URS
~ ~ 1 w~ K K R ~ ~ I A ~ 1 L ! T Y ~ ~ ~
R::'A~S R~LIAb4L1IV ANALY~~~ &CU~F ~.fLlbHl ntH; ~~vo HK~. .., , .. , ....
L Y ~ 1 ~ PRO b ~ A "
~~OON~l:,Ll-OOUbLA~ ~URP.
'RUN OAl~ U1/1&I19
FUI'4LHUN Lu::'l
-------------
-------------------------
PROb~blL11Y Of FAILURE
-----------
A
AA
ALL
AAb
~~~A~ UNL't
K~::'A~ ALL fUNCTION~
YAW OAfo\Pl:k
:)lALL MAkNINb
lL.li;;vA HJK L.UAU t-I;~L
t'LAP L1"''u .l~""
ALL "'UNCT.l.i.J~
k~~A~ AND yAW UAft~I:K
C~~E 3, FIVE HOURS
Z66
U.I03c-o~
U.192l-0~
O.230E~u5
0 • .1.o'h:-04
u.:l~6l:.:-o~
o. c': ~8t-v;>
U.1651:-0~
NET Wd R K REt I A B J LIT Y
.PSA~S RFlIABIlTTY A,.,.htY~IC; (C"~F 2)
FLIGHT TI~F 1.00 HPS.
A ~ A L Y S T S P R ~ r, RAM
MCnO~NFLL-DnJGLA~ CORP.
RLJ~ OATE Ol/1l:)/7Q
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
OOF FUNCTION lOST PR"lBABTl. TTY '"IF FATlUQE
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
A ~ 5SAS ClNt Y O.245F-O#l
AA ~ ~SAS UL FUNC nnNS O.281F.-06
B YAW DA~PER 0.3661::-03
C STAL WARNING O.3Cl5E-03
D EL EVA T:"l R UlAD FEFt O. 205'=-O~
E flAP LIMIT!NG 0.ZQ5t:-03
AL l 61.l FUNCTIONS 0.740F-07,
AIIB ~ SSAS 11""0 YAW rlA MPE P 0.71)61'=-0 7
CASE 4, ONE HOUR
PSASS Pl=lTABItTTY ANAIY:ciI<; (cnNF 2.
FL I r. HT TT ~ E 2 • 00 HRS.
NE T W (1 R K R F L T A 8 r L J T Y ANALYSIS
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
(JOE FUNCTTO~ LOST PRO~ABIl I'ry OF FAlllJRF
---------------------------------------------------------------------'---~
A
AA
B
C
D
E
ALL
MB
~ SSAS ONt Y
~ SSA S H L F fiNe TH'N5
YAW DAMPER
S TALLWAPNHIG
r-LEV~TOR lOA~ FF~L
FLAP L TMITINr.
till FUNCTIONS
~ SSAS A~n YhW DAMPFR
CASE 4, TWO HOURS
0.9811:-06
o.1l21=-0 5
0.732E-03
O.79H-03-
0.!'i90~-(l3
0.590F-03
O.2Q 6E-06
O.303F-06
N F TWO R K R ELI A ~ I l I 1 Y
RSASS P.~l IABIL lTY ANALY$IS (cnNF 2)
FL IGHT TI>11= 5.00 HR S.
A NAt V S T S PRO ~ RAM
""r.Dn~NFlL-OOlJGt.AS CORP.
RUN DA1F 01/19/79
CQDF F UNCT ION LO 5T PROBARTlJTY OF FAILURE
------------------------------------------------------------~---------------
A
M
B
C
f)
E
ALL
AAB
~ SSAS ONL y
~ SSA S HL F UNC TT f1NS
YAW ')"MPH
STALL WARNING
flEVATJR LOAD FEEL
F l. AP LIM I TI NG
All FUNr.TlO~S
~ SSAS AND YAW DAMPFR
CASE 4, FIVE HOURS
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0.613':-0'5
O.101E-05
0.1~3E-02
0.1981:-02
0.1481:-02
O.148F-02
a.185E-05
0.190F-05

APPENDIX 6
·AUGMENTATION BLOCK DIAGRAMS
This section contains block diagrams of all the initial control laws
with the exception of those containing longitudinal acceleration. Material
presented here is discussed in Section 5.
269
6 ec
(RAD)
VIAS K7(M/S)
ex
(RAD)
0
(RAD/S)
e
(RAD)
6e
(RAD)
THRUST-------l-.t
(DIMENSIONLESS)
K 1 = 0.5
K2 = 0.63 ,
K3 = 0.1147
K4 = 0.022876
K5 = 0.009264
K6 = 0.29
K7 = 1.0/VTRIM
CONTROL LAW NO.1 - CRUISE
6ec K 1(RAD)
. S+ KG S+ Ks8 K2(RAD/S) -- -S+ K7 S+ K9
be
(RAD)
() K3
+ K 10 S+ K 12
-..--
-(RAD) S+K 11 S+ K 13
K5
K 14
K 14 S + 1
+
K4
+THRUST
(DIMENSIONLESS)
K1 = 0.4098 K6 = 3.651 K 11 = 0.4963
K2 = 0.02289 K7 = 0.4963 K 12 = -2.772
K3 = 0.009267 K8 = -0.1922 K13 = 0.00559K4 = 0.29 K9 = 0.OOQ59 K 14 = 178.0K5 = 0.074 K 10 = 0.4498
CONTROL LAW NO.2 - CRUISE
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a
(RAD)I---"~~I
.
8
(RAD/S)
8
(RAD)----.I
K3 oa(RAD)
K4
S + K12
S+ K13
K 14
K15
K15S + 1
,/
THRUST(DIMENSIONLESS)-"'-~
K1 = 0.4140
K2 = 0.1147
K3 = 0.02287K4 = 0.009262
K5 = 0.29
K6 = 0.00399K7 = 0.001728
K8 = 0.03718
K9 = 0:001728K10 = -1.9899
+
+
K11 = 0.001728
K12 = -2.7979K13 = 0.001728
K14 = 0.082
K15 = 565.0
CONTROL LAW NO.3 - CRUISE
VIAS
(MIS)
.
e
(RAD/S)
Oa
(RAD)
8
(RAD)
THRUST
(DIMENSIONLESS)-------I~
K 1 = 0.6100K2 = 0.5621K3 = 0.02289K4 = 0.008814
K5 = 0.29
K6 = 1.0IVTR1M
K7 = 5.4485
Kg = 0.5002
CONTROL LAW NO.4 - CRUISE
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+
Q
(RAD) --..........~
K1 = 0.51035
K2 = 0.1195
K3 " NIL
K4 " 0.05
K5 " 0.03338
K6 =0.02
K7 = 0.004709
Kg = 1,,!3.8
K9 = 1.64
K10 " -0.2198
K11 = -0.02793
K12 = 0.02
K13 = 0.004709
CONTRoL LAW NO. !i - CRUISE
""- K 1 f-+ .. s+ KaS+ K7
-. K5 ~ K2 ~ +,1.rx t,...r'\ +/
""\.~ ;.~ \"L/
s+ Kg S + K10 + A j Il~ Kj I--.- ~.. S+ Kg S+ K11
~ K4IONLESS) ..
VIAS
(M/S)
l)e
.' . c
(RAD)
a
(RAO)
THRUST
tDIMENS
k 1 .= 0.522
K2 = 0.5943
K3 " 0.1148
K4 = 0.29
K5 = 1.0IVTR1M
Ka= 0.15
K7 = 0.2
K8 = 0.606
K = 0.6939
.r<io~-~--
K11 " 0.2
CONTROL LAw NO.6 - CRUISE
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De
(RAD)
K1 r-+
S2 + K5S + K6
..
2S + K7S + K8
+,
2
-+ K4 ~ K2 ~
S + K9S + K 10 + /T\ :. I'" "'\
2 .;\.. ,/ \..L/S + K11S + K12 l'
K3NLESS) ..
VIAS
(M/S)
THRUST
(DIMENSIO
K 1 = 0.5514
K2 = 0.08297
K3 = 0.31
K4 = 1.0/VTRIM
K5 = 1.18
K6 = 0.8086
K7 = 1.242
KS = 1.1902
K9 = 7.302
K10 = 8.2718
K 11 = 1.242
K 12 = 1.1902
CONTROL LAW NO. 7 - CRUISE
Dec K1(RAD)
•() K2(RAD/S)
() K3(RAD)
De
AN
(RAD)
(M/S2)
K4
.
h K5(M/S)
THRUST------.1
(DIMENSIONLESS)
K 1 = 0.6329
K2 '" 0.02413
K3 '" -0.929
K4 = 0.000S611
K5 = 0.000367
K6 = 0.25
CONTROL LAW NO. 12 - CRUISE
°e.C K1(RAD)
8 K2(RAD/S)
8 K3(RAD)
°e(RAD)
AN K4(M/S2)
a K!i(RAD)
THRUST---;""'--"I~
(DIMENSIONLESS)
K1 = 0.6329
K = 0.0241K; = 0.006599
K4 = 0.0008611
K5 = -0;9355K6 = 0.25
CONThoL LAW NO. 13 - CRUISE
(j
/RAD/S)
8
(RAD)
VIAS
(M/S)
THRUST-------+1
(DIMENSIONLESS)
K1 = 0.5972
K2 = 0.02301
K3 = 0.008966
K4 = 0.000094
KS =0.5.612KG = 0.29
K7 = 1.0IVTR1M
CONTROL LAW 1\10. 14..:.. CRUISE
274
Dec
(RAD)
.
8
(RAD/S)
e
(RADI
.
h
(M/S)
VIAS K7(M/S)
Tt-iRUST --1~
(DIMENSIONLESS)
K1 = 0.5926
K2 = 0.02288
K3 = 0.124
K4 = -0.00004499
K5 = 0.63
K6 = 0.29
K7 = 1.0IVTRIM
CONTROL LAW NO. 15 - CRUISE
~ K1 1---+
S + K6
I S+ K7
... K2
--+ ~SI r S+ K9
+, + r
~ K3 f--+
S + K10 +.. 1" "'\ + I" r'\ + I"~
D) S + K11 ~ ./ >,/ \..1../
K4 ~
S+ K 12
SI S + K13
K14 ~
K15
r K15S + 1
+
K5 +~ r r'\
IONLESS) r\..i../
.
h
(M/
e
(RA
.
e
(RAD/
THRUST
(OIMENS
K 1 = 0.5924
K2 = 0.02287
K3 = 0.1239
K4 = -0.0000445
K5 = 0.29
K6 = 0.00391
K7 = 0.001728
K8 = -1.9899
K9 = 0.001728K10 = -0.1747
K11 = 0.001728
K12 = 0.03718
K13 = 0.001728
K14 = 0.082
K 15 = 565.0
CONTROL LAW NO. 16 - CRUISE
275
2S + K6S + K7
... K1 ~ S2.+ K S + Ka 9
2
.. K2 ~ S + K10S + K112S + K12S + K13
.+~+~1'\ :1'""'\ :(' 1\
\. / .., / "'l./
+ t
- 2
.-. K5 f-+ K3 -+ S + K14S+ K15:2S +K16S+K17
.. K4IONLESS)
V,AS
(MIS)
h
(MIS)
THRUST
(DIMENS
K1 '" 0.5952
K2 '" -0.00004517
K3 '" 0.6327
K4 '" 0.29
K5 '" 1.01VTR1M
K6 '" 0.646
K7 = 0.6465
Ka = 0.6896
K9 = 1.132
K10 = 0.5183
K11 = -0.051718
K12 = 0.6896
K13 = '.132
K14 = ().719
K15 = 1.0355
K16 = 0.6896
K17 = 1.132
CONTRO.... LAW NO. 1~ - CRUISE
8e
(RAD)
h(M/S)------~~
THRUST K3(DIMENSIONLESS)
K1 '" 0.5572
K2 '" 0.000353
K3 = 0.29
K4 = 0.4
K5 = 1.0161
K6 = 2.044
K7 = 2.134
K8 = 1.59
K9 = 0.04998
K lO = 1.048
K11 = 1.172
K12 = 2.044
K13 = 2.134
K14 = -0.0289
K15 = .0.04998
K16 = 0.06
K17 = 10.0
CONTflOL LAW NO. 20 - CRUISE
276
2
. K1 1-+
S :- K4S + K5
r--+
S+ KS
.. 2 . S+ K9S + K6S+ K7
+
2 S + K14 Y'r'\ +~". r'\.. K2 ~ 5 + K 10S + K11~2 S + K15 . '.: C7 'l./S + K12S + K 13 ~+
K3IONLESS)
THRUST
(DIMENS
K1 = 0.587
K2 = 0.0004032
K3 = 0.37
K4 = 1.08
K5 = 0.5116
K6 = 0.2
K7 = 0.02134
K8 = 1.144
Kg = 2.327
K10 = 1.1
K11 = 0.844
K12 = 0.2
K13 = 0.02134
K 14 = 0.466
K15 = 2.327
CONTROL LAW NO. 26 - CRUISE
°ec -------.t(RAD)
VIAS
(MIS)
.
(J
(RAD/S)------~
o
e
(RAD.l
THRUST
(DIMENSION LESS)-----~~
K1 = 0.585SK2 = 0.5623K3 = 0.02289K4 = 0.29
CONTROL LAW NO. 27 - CRUISE
277
°e(RAD) .
K1
.. K2 r----
S+ K5
Ir.. S+ K6 ~ +r +/ r"\ + I' f"\
~ ~+ K9 \.. L.{ ~ ~ \..L1... K3 ~ r--+S) S+ Kg S
KIO
K
'11---+ Kll S+t
.+
.. K4
+~/ ~T .. \..L/SIONLESS)
°ec
(AAO)
.
8
(RAD/
,a
IRAO)
THRUS
(DIMEN
K1 = 0.4140K2 = 0.1147K3 = 0.02287K4 = 0.29K5 .. 0.03718
K6 = 0.001728
'5 = -2.1195
KB .. 0.001728
K9 = 0.535K10 .. 0.082
K
'1
.. 565.0
CONTROL LAW NO. 28 - CRUISE
°ec
(RAD)
.
8
(AAD/S)
S+K8
S+ Kg
8
(RAD) °e(RAD)
THRUST
(DIMENSIONLESS)
K, = 0.628
K2 = 0.02395K3 = 0.006549K4 = 0.000854K5 = 0.25
K.6 = 0.078K
7
= 0.0067
K8 : -38.23K9 - 0:0067K
,0 = 0.1074
K11 .. 0.0061K
'2
= 0.446
K13 .. 0.0067
CONTROL LAW NO. 29 - CRUISE
278
8
e
(RAD)
~
S+ K6
) .. K 1 -.. S+ K7
~
S+ K8
r--+
S+K1OK2 S + K 11) S+ K9 +~r +
I" t"\ ~j"r'\ +/~
\.~ .. \, ,/ .. \...LJ
.+ ~~ j +
----
K5 ~ K3
~
~ K4ION LESS)
VIAS
(M/S)
A
n
(M/S2
THRUST
(DIMENS
K 1 = 0.569
K2 = 0.0001008K3 = 0.564
K4 = 0.29
K5 = 1.0/VTR1M
K6 = 0.65K7 = 0.75K8 = 0.518
Kg = 0.75
K10 = 0.185
K 11 = 0.15
CONTROL LAW NO. 30 - CRUISE
2
K1
S + K5S + K6
•
S + K7S + K8
K2 ~
S+K9 ~ S + K 11 10--) S+K1O S + K 12 + ~ + IrI"
"
~j"r'\ +/ t"\
\..~ .. ~~ .. \..l./S+ K 13 S+ K 15 + +j
-
K3 1-+ S + K 14 1-+ S + K 16
SIONLESSl---+
K4
h
(M/S)
A
n
(M/S2
THRUST
(DIMEN
K1 = 0.5539
K2 = 0.0003149K3 = -0.001653K4 = 0.25
K5 = 0.808K6 = 0.8604
K7 = 0.6
Kg = 0.0675
K9 = 6.528K10 = 0.45
K11 = -0.237K 12 = 0.15K13 = -0.435K14 = 0.45
K15 = -0.0005K 16 = 0.15
CONTROL LAW NO. 31 - CRUISE
279
Dec---....(RAD)
a
(RAD)
o
e
(RAD).
THRUST K4(DIMENSIONLESS)
K1 = 0.5517
K2 = 0.0007739K3 = -1.8317K4 = 0.255K5 = 5.55K6 = 3.5
K7 = 0.5K8 = 1.934K9 = 1.5K10 = 1.934K11 =_ 4.196K12 = 3.5
K13 = 3.2
K14 = 3.6478K15 = 5.434K16 = 6.769
CONTROL LAW NO. 32 - CRUISE
Dec
(RAD)
VIAS
(m/s) ---1~
a
(RAD) -----~
.
e
(RAD/S) -----~
e
(RAD)----~~
THRUST
(DIMENSIONLESS) -----+1
~~_Oe(RAD)
K1 = 0.674
K2 = -0.07996
K3 = 0.26831
K4 = 0.118.03
K5 = 0.04004
K6 = 0.31
CONTROL LAW NO.1 - APPROACH
280
.e
(RAD/S)
e
(RAD)
THRUST
(DIMENSIONLESS)
°e(RAD)
K1 = 0.674K2 = -4.7877K3 = 0.04K4 = 0.303K5 = NOT USEDK6 = 0.58
K7 = 5.7K8 = 0.15K9 = 0.415K10 = 0.83541S11 = 0_~00717K 12 = 6.115
K13 = 2.366
K14 = 1.062
K15 = 0.5049
K16 = 6.115
K17 = 2.366
CONTROL LAW NO.2 - APPROACH
Oec K1(RAD)
(l( K2
S+ K7(RAD) S+ K8
.
°ee(RAD/S) (RAD)
e K4 ~(RAD) S+ K12
THRUST
(DIMENSIONLESS)
K 1 = 0.674
K2 = 0.2976
K3 = 0.1172
K4 = 0.04
K5 = NOT USED
Ka = 0.28
K7 = 0.14
KS = 0.10
K9 = -0.0717KlO = 0.10
K11 = 0.36K 12 = 0.10
CONTROL LAW NO.3 - APPROACH
281
bee K1(RAD)
VIAS K2
S + Kg
(M/S) S+KlO
.()
K3 be(RAD/S) (RAD) .
()
1<4
S +K11(RAD) S+ K12
THRUST
(DIMENSIONLESS) K5
K 1 = 0.6584
K2 = -0.08
K3 = 0.1182
K4 = 0.04
1<5 = 0.29
K6 = 1.0IVTRIMK7 = 2.716 .
K8 = 0.5246
1<9 = 1.447
K10 = 0.5246
K11 = Q.579!J
K12 = 0.5246
bee
(RAD)
a
(RAD)
THRUST
(DIMENSIONLESS)
CONTflOl- J,.AW NO.4 - APPROACH
+
+
K 1 = 0.6457
K2 = 0.3816
K3 = 0.20
K4 = 0.0356
K5 = 0.000318
1<6 = 0.07758
K7 = 0.0227K8 = 1.385K9 = 1.80K lO = 0.0478
K11 = -0.0008052
K12 = 0.07758
K13 = 0.0227
K14 = 0.0024
K15 = 50.0
CONTROL LAW NO.5 - APPROACH
Z8Z
. f
VIAS
(MIS)
ex
(RAD)
Oe
(RAD)
THRUST
(DIMENSIONLESS) K4
K1 = 0.6829
K2 = 1.0IVTRIM
K3 = 0.194K4 = 0.32K5 = 1.0
K6 = 0.8785
K7 = 0.15
K8 = 0.40
Kg = 0.248
K10 = 0.8785
K11 = 1.085
K12 = 0.8785
K13 = 0.0637
K14 = 0.40
K15 = -0.255
CONTROL LAW NO.6 - APPROACH
Oec
(RAD) -------II~
VIAS
(MIS)
THRUST
(DIMENSIONLESS)
68
(RAD)
K1 = 0.6818
K2 = -0.08089
K3 = 0.31K4 = 1.01VTR1M
K5 = 0.978K6 .= 0.25376K7 = 1.05K8 = 0.61738
K9 = 1.9164K10 = 0.6872
K 11 = 1.05
K12 = 0.61738
K13 = 0.000642
K14 = 0.042
K 15 = -0.0034
K16 = 0.042
CONTROL LAW NO.7 - APPROACH
283
Dec K1(RAD)
.
e
.K2(RAD/S)
e
(RAD)
De
AN
(RAD)
(M/S2)
h KS(MIS)
THRUST
(DIMENSIONLESS)
K1 = 0.6687 K4 = -0.000359K2 = 0.1161 KS '" -0.000529K3 = 0.4504 K6 = 0.31
CONTROL LAW NO. 12 - AI'PROACH
Dec K·
(RAD) 1
(j
(RAD)
a
(RAD)
THRUST
(DIMENSIONLESS)
K1 = 0.6687K2 = 0.1161K3 = 0.03879
K4 = -0.0003S9
KS = 0.4116
K6 = 0.32
CONTROL LAW NO. 13 - APPROACH
284
Oee K1(RAD)
.
e K2(RAD/S)
e
(RAD)
°e(RAD)
AN
(M/S2 )
VIAS K5(MIS)
THRUST
(DIMENSIONLESS) •
. K 1 = 0.684
K2 = 0.1216
K3 = 0.04230
K4 = 0.0006827
KS = -0.2297
K6 = 0.32
CONTROL LAW NO. 14 - APPROACH
e(RAD/S)------+I
e
(RAD)
h
(MIS)
°e(RAD)
VIAS
(MIS)
THRUST
(DIMENSIONLESS)
K1 = 0.674
K2 = 0.118
K3 = 0.308
K4 = -0.000345
K5 = -0.07996
K6 = 0.31
CONTROL LAW NO. 15 - APPROACH
285
liec K1(RAD)
.
(J K2(RAD/S)
(J K3
lie
(RAD) (RAD)
.
h K4(M/S)
THRUST K6(DIMENSIONLESS)
K1 = 0.674K2 = 0.116K3 = 0.3084K4 = -0.OO041a .
K5 = NOT USEDK6 = 0.28K7 = 0.284
K8 = 0.20
K9 = 0.329,
K10 = 0.20
K11 = 0.255
K1;2 = 0.20
CONTROl,. I,.AW NO. 16 - APPROACH
liec
2S + K6S + K7
(RAD) 2S + K8S+ K9
..
2
h S +K10S+K11(M/S) 2 'S + K 12S+ K 13 lie
(RAD)
'2
VIAS K5
S + K14S + K 1(M/S) 2S + K16S + K17
THRUST-----.....-j~
(DIMENSIONLESS)
K1 = 0.6809K2 = -0.0003578K3 = -0.08078K4 = 0.313
K5 = 1.0IVTRIM
K6 = 0.467
K7 = 0.01603
K8 = 0.568
Kg = 0.3584
K10 = 0.46
K11 = -0.002325
K12 = 0.568
K13 = 0.3584
K 14 = 0:4655
K15 = 0.01245
K16 = 0.568
K17 = 0.3584
CONTROL LAW NO. 19 - APPROACH
286
Dec
2
K1
S + K4S + K5
(RAD) 2S + K6S + K7
. 2h S + K8S + K9 +
°e(M/S) K2 2S +KlOS+K11 + (RAD)
K12
THRUST
(DIMENSIONLESS)
K1 = 0.6809
K2 = -0.0003487
K3 = 0.3
K4 = 0.4382
K5 = 0.003526
K6 = 0.533
K7 = 0.3488
K8 = 0.4277
K9 = -0.01664K10 = 0.533
K 11 = 0.3488
K12 = -0.0003
K13 = 10.0
CONTROL LAW NO. 20 - APPROACH
THRUST
(DIMENSIONLESS)
+
Se
(RAD)
K1 = 0.6495
K2 = 0.000326
K3 = 0.3
K4 = 0.10
K5 = 0.006816
K6 = 0.20K7 = 0.1757
K8 = -0.659
K9 = -0.1879
K10 = 0.20
K11 = 0.1757
K12 = 0.0005
K13 = 10.0
CONTROL LAW NO. 26 - APPROACH
287
VIAS
(M/S)
.
e
(RAD/S)
+
lie
(RAD)
THRUST -----..-.1
(DIMENSIONLESS)
K1 = 0.6584
K2 = -0.08007
K3 = 0.11818
K4 = 0.31
K5 = 1.0IVTRIM
K6 = 2.9897
K7 = 0.5246
K8 = 1.4474
CONTROL LAW NO. 27 - APPROACH
Kg = 0.5246
K10 = 0.0658
liee K1(RAD)
0: K2
S+ KS S+ K7(RAD) S+ K6 S+ K8
·1 ~ 26 K3 S + K9S+ K10(RAD/S) 2S +K11S+K12
THRUST K4(DIMENSIONLESS)
lie
(RAD)
K1 = 0.6826
K2 = 0.4524
K3 = 0.1179
K4 = 0.33
K5 = 0.3942
K6 = 0.2333
K7 = 0.1205
K8 = 0.2195
K9 = -:-0.643
K10 = 0.1486
K 11 = 0.4528
K12 = 0.0512
CONTROL LAW NO. 28 -APPROACH
288
c';ec
(RADI--....
b(RAD/SI--....
8(RADI--......
+
+
THRUST K6(DIMENSIONLESSI
'----~
K, • 0.6706
K2 • 0.1164
K3 • 0.03896
K4 • -0.0003699'
K5 • 0.31K6 • 0.0006K7 • 0.0307
KS • 3.426
Kg • 0.0307
K
,0 • 0.07616
K
"
• 0.0307
K
'2 • 1.4474
K
'3
• 0.0307
K
'4
• -0.0106
K
,6 • 30.0
CONTROL LAW NO. 29 - APPROACH
6.c ------.t(RADI
VIAS
(M/SI
THRUST-----+1
(DIMENSIONLESS)
~
Ti=lG7
S+ K
,0
s+ K11
~
8+"I<1i
6.
(RAD)
CONTROL LAW NO. 30 - APPROAC~
, ~r
.: ~ . ~
'~ , 289 }!~,.'
",", ,,,~, ;~:::;";;~~::~" ,,:.~;~;'~~::;:Z;,;: ..;· "t.,: ~,,:~: :*"
: +.~.
'. .- t.,
h(M/S) -""-'i~
. ~ .: .
. ,*', ,. ....... ,
"
THRUST IC .l- ".;i.,__.....__-.w
(DIMENSIONLESS) 4
1<1 • 0.6868
K2 • -0.00111
1<3 • 0.0080S
1C4 • 0.26
1C6 ·0.62
1C6 • 0.0736
K7 • 1.20lea • 1.17
~,C
(RAD)
Q.
(RAb)
THRUST
(DIMENSIONLESS)
"'---~
CONTROL LAW NO. 31 - APPROAC~
.."
J-o-...... 6.·
(RAD)
~1 • 0.11633
1(2 • -IUI0123
"3 ·O.84b
1<4 • 0.32
K6 .. 0.621
Ke." 0.604
1C7 " 0.703lCa .. 0.936
Kg .. 0.6267
1C10 • 0.6041C11 • 0.128
K 12 • 0.936
K13 • 0.62151C14 • 0.604
K16 • 0.3386K16 • 0.936
CONTROL LAW No. 32 - APPROACH
APPENDIX 7
FINA~AUGMENTATION CONTROL LAW EQUATIONS
This section contains the control laws expressed in difference equation
form. The gain program for each control law used in the DETAC simulation
is also provided. The rationale leading to the formulation of control laws
in difference equation form is presented in Section 5.
Control Law Equations
The control law equations for all the final control laws are provided
on the following pages.
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FLIGHT CONDITION - CRUISE, . ,".. .
U = 0.0026545 V + 0.114689 0< + 0.0221374 0 + 0.009265 0
FEED FORWARD GAIN = 0.5 CROSSFEED GAIN = 0.29
APPROACH
U = 0.0010931 V + 0.2682790< + 0.1113027; + 0.040040
FEED FORWARD GAIN = 0.64 CROSSFEEP GAIN = 0.31
UNITS: M!SEC, RADIANS
EET CONTROL EQUATIONS - LAW NO.1
PXl = EXP (-10.0 * DT)
PX2 = EXP (-0.1 * DT)
CRUISE
U1 = 0.5 * PILOT COMMAND + U
Zl= Zl .. PXl + Ul * (1 - PX1) ,
22 = Z2 *PX2 + (-0.14514 * Ul + 1.27104 * THRUST - 3.~6985 * 0< + 7.86 + 0 - 0.417 * 0 ) * (1 - PX2)
U = 0.00091 * 21 + 0.63 .. 22 - 0.11387 * 0< + 0.0228~ * 0 + 0.00926 * 0 + 0.29 * THRUST
FEED FORWARD = 0.5
APPROACH
Ul = 0.674 * PILOT COMMAND + U
Zl = Zl * PXl + Ul * (1- PX1) •
22 = Z,2 * PX2 +(-0.11822" Ul + 1.17898 * THRUST -",.52'0g * 0<, + 2.477 * 0 - 1.3Q3, * 0) * (1 - PX2)
U = - 0.00009 * Zl - 0.07996 * 22 +' 0.29757 * 0< + 0.11803 * ~ + 0.04 * 0 + 0.31 * THRUST
FEED FORWARD = 0.614
EET CONTROL EQUATIONS - LAW NO.3
PX1= EXP (-10.0 * DT)
PX2 ;, EXP (-0.3 * DT)
PX3 = EXP (-0.1 .. DT)
CRUISE
Ul = 0.5 " PILOT COMMAND + U
21 = 21*PXl + Ul * (1 - PX1)
22 = 22 * PX2+ (4.57327 * U1 +0.15288 * THRUST + 3.7377 * ; -0.49 * 0) * (1 - PX2)
23 = 23 ~rX3 + (-5.25964 * Ul - 3.03405 * THRUST - 0.84122 *8 +1,455 * 0) *' (1 - PX3)
U = -Om503 * Zl + 0.06645 * 22 - 0.11245 * 23+ 0.06119 *0 + 0.00926 0 + 0.29 * THRUSt
FEED FORWARD = 0.5
APPROACH
Ul = 0.674 * .pILOT COMMAND + U
21 = 21 * PXl + Ul * (1 - PX1) . , ,
22 = Z2 * PX2 + (72.22104 * Ul - 21.81726 * THRUST + 15.23787 *0 - 0.5876 0) * (1 - PX2)
23 = 23 * PX3 + (143.577 * Ul - 42.22785 * THRUST + 50.72387 *0 - 1.93338 0) * (1 - PX3)
U = - 0.17105 * Zl + 0.29523 * 22 - 0.3387 .. 23 + 1.54934 * ~ + 0.04 * 0 "I- 0:31 * THRUST
FEED FORWARD = 0.674
EET CONTROL EQUATIONS - LAW NO.2
292
PX1 = EXP (-10.0 * DT)
PX2 = EXP (-0.3 * DT)
CRUISE
U1 = 0.5 * PILOT COMMAND + U
Z1 = Z1 * PX1 + U1 * (1 - PX1) •
Z2 = Z2 * PX2 + (3.92 * U1 - 1.1792 * THRUST - 0.0122667 * V.-+ 3.643 * 8 - 0.005 * 8) * (1 - PX21
U = - 0.01349 * Z1 + 0.11471 * Z2 + 0.0026543 * V + 0.05766 * 8 +0.00926 * 8 + 0.29 * THRUST
FEED FORWARD = 0.5
APPROACH
U1 = 0.674 * PILOT COMMAND + U
Z1 = Z 1 * PX 1 + 1.493 * U1 * (1 - PX 11 •
Z2 = Z2 * PX2 + (49.7775 * U1 - 15.03726 * THRUST - 0.013270li * V+ 10.586 * 8 + 0.034 81 * (1 - PX21
U = - 0.26831 * Z1 + 0.26831 * Z2 - 0.0011436 * V + 3.66227 * 8 + 0.04 8 +0.31 * THRUST
FEED FORWARD = 0.624
EET CONTROL EQUATIONS - LAW NO.4
PXl = EXP (-10.0 * DT)
PX2 = EXP (-0.8 * DT)
PX3 = EXP (-0.25 * DT)
PX4 = EXP (-0.2 * DT)
CRUISE
Ul = 0.5 * PILOT COMMAND + U
Z1 = Z1 * PX1 + U1 * (1 - PX1)
Z2 = Z2 * PX2 + (-10.8726 * Ul + 2.05745 * THRUST - 1.83644 * a) * (1 - PX2)
Z3 = Z3 * PX3 + 1-79.918 * Ul + 4.31615 * THRUST - 18.297 * a) * (1 - PX3)
Z4 = Z4 * PX4 + (79.777 * U1 - 1.38494 * THRUST + 22.18449 * a) * (1 - PX4)
U = 0.01501 * Z1 + 0.15802 * Z2 - 0.1778 * Z3 - 0.14585 * Z4 + 0.21952 * a + 0.29 * THRUST
FEED FORWARD = 0.5
APPROACH
Ul = 0.674 * PILOT COMMAND + U
Z1 = Zl * PXl + U1 * (1 - PX1)
Z2 = 22 * PX2 + (-7.4035 * U1 + 2.0827. * THRUST - 0.71526 * al * (1 - PX2)
Z3 = 23 * PX3 + (-147.064 * U1 + 46.4056 * THRUST - 7.395 * a) * (1 - PX3)
24 = Z4 * PX4 + (157.61 * Ul - 50.7887 * THRUST + 9.20378 * a) * (1 - PX4)
U = 0.01519 * Z1 + 0.12673 * Z2 - 0.07174 * 23 - 0.06469 * 24 + 0.5598 * a + 0.31 * THRUST
FEED FORWARD = 0.674
EET CONTROL EQUATIONS - LAW NO.5
PXl = EXP (-10.0 * DT)
PX2 = EXP (-0.8* DT)
PX3 = EXP (-0.25 * on
CRUISE
U1 = 0.5 * PILOT COMMAND + U
21 = 21 * PXl + Ul * (1 - PX1)
22 = 22 * PX2 + (16.20791 * Ul - 8.026 * THRUST - 0.126874 * V + 2.279 * a) * (1 - PX21
23 = 23 * PX3 + (-49.0785 * U1 + 20.786 * THRUST + 0.1579 * V - 7.52138 * al * (1 - PX3)
U = 0.00965 * Z1 - 0.00689 * Z2 + 0.00058 * 23 + 0.0019674 * V + 0.11471 * a + 029 * THRUST
FEED FORWARD = 0.5 . .
APPROACH
U1 = 0.674 * PILOT COMMAND + U
21 = 21 * PX1 + U1 * (1 - PX1)
Z2 = 22 * PX2 + (-1.28286 * Ul - 0.36578 * THRUST - 0.063231 * V - 0.00837 * al * (1 _ PX2)
23 _= 23 * PX3 + (-3.77418 * Ul +1.35225 * THRUST + 0.0058868 * V - 0.05624 * a) * (1 _ PX3)
U - 0.01322 * Z1 - 0.00804 * Z2 + 0.14885 * 23 - 0.00246356 * V + 026831 * a + 031 * THRUST
FEED FORWARD = 0.674 ".
EET CONTROL EQUATIONS - LAW NO. 6
293
PXl = EXP (-10.0 * DT)
PX2 = EXP (-0.8 * DT)
PX3 = EXP (-0.3 * DT)
PX4 = EXP (-0.1 * DT)
CRUISE
Ul = 0.5 * PI LOT COMMAND + U
21 = 21 * PXl + Ul* (1 - PX1)
22 = 22 * PX2 + (-1.96557 * Ul + 3.96326 * THRUST + 0.0888095 * V) * (1 - PX2)
23 = 23 * PX3 + (12.4322 * Ul. - 19.8386 * THRUST - 0.1896362 * V) * (1 - PX3)
24 = 24 * PX4 + (-62.14339 * Ul + 31.32692 * THRUST+ 0.203358 * V) * (1 - PX4)
U = 0.01029 * 21 + 0.13913 * 22 + 0.02504 * 23 - 0.00362 * 24 - 0.00563762 * V + 0.29 * THRUST
FEED FORWARD = 0.5 .
APPROACH
Ul = 0.674 * PILOT COMMAND +U
21 = 21 * PXl + U1 * (1 - PX1)
22 = 22 * PX2 + (-2.77793 * U1 -: 0.90596 * THRUST - 0.146831 * V) * (1 - PX2)
23 = 23 * PX3 + (81.6286 * Ul - 31.22271 * THRUST - 0.236749 * V) * (1 - PX3)
24 = 24 * PX4 + (-220.68686 * U1 + 76,0263 * THRUST + 0.123556 * V) * (1 - PX4)
U =0.00783 * 21 + 0.027712 * 22 + 0.2725 * 23 + 0.278 * 24 + 0.0725686 * V + 0.31 * THRUST
FEED FORWARD = 0.674
EET CONTROL EQUATIONS - LAW NO.7
PXl = EXP (-10.0 * DT)
CRUISE
U1 = 0.5 * PILOT COMMAND + U
21 = 21 * PX1 +Ul* (1-PX1)
U = 0.00736 * 21 + 0.02284 * J + 0.00891 * {J + 0.00101706 * (AN - 6.18744 * THRUST)
+ 0.00234827 * V + 0.29 * THRUST '
FEED FORWARD = 0.5
APPROACH
Ul = 0.674 * PILOT COMMANb + U
21 = 21* PXl + Ul *(1 -PXl.l
U =0.01464 * 21 + 0.11981 * (J + 0.04168 * {J + 0.0071194 * (AN"': 1.92469 * THAuST)
-0.003096 * V +0.31 *.THRUST
FEED FORWARD = 0.674
EETCONTROL EQUATIONS - LAW NO. 14
PXl = EXP (~10.0 * DT)
PX2= EXP (-0.8 * DT)
PX3 = EXP (-0.3 * bTl
PX4 =EXP (-0.1 * DT)
CRUISE
Ul '" 0.5 * PILOT COMMAND + U
21 = 21 *PXl +Ul * (1-PX1)
22 = 22 * PX2 + {-9.8747 * Ul + 1.67371 * THRUST - 0.145632 * (AN - 6.18744 * THRUST») * (1 - PX2)
23 = 23 * PX3 + (-13.388 * Ul +0.35893 * THRUST - 0.0241408 * (AN - 6.18744 * THRUST)) *'(1 - PX3)
24 = 24 * PX4 + (9.00817 * Ul +4.01193 * THRUST +0.0714384 * (AN -6.18744 * THRUST)) *(1 -PX4)
U = 0.02528 * 21 + 0.11535 * 22 - 0.21582 .. 23 - 0.0949 * 24 + 0.0016072 * (AN - 6.18744 * THRUST)
+ 0.29 * THRUST . .
FEED FORWARD = 0.5
APr,ROACH
Ul = 0.674* PILOT COMMAND + U
21 = 21 *PXl + Ul * (1 -PXlI
22 = 22 * PX2 + (45.476 * Ul - 12.35196 * THRUST + 0.11441 * (AN - 1.925 * THRUST)) * (1 - PX2)
23 = 23 * PX3 +(-181.178* Ul +54.41* THRUST- 0.20867 * (AN -1.925 * THRUST)) * (1 - PX3)
24 = 24 * PX4 + (259.881 " U1 - 78.592 * THRUST + 0.882648 * (AN - 1.925 * TH RUST)) * (1 - PX4)
U = 0.11707 * 21 -0.13954 *22 -0.18646 * Z3 -0.20546 *24 +0.043328 * (AN -1.925" 'tHRUST)
+ 0.31 * THRUST
FEED FORWARD = 0.674
EET CONTROL EQUATIONS - LAW NO. 26
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PX1 = EXP (-10.0 * DT)
PX2 = EXP (-0.3 * DT)
CRUISE
U1 = 0.5 * PILOT COMMAND + U
Z1 = Z1 * PX 1 + U1 * (1 - PX 1)
Z2 = Z2 * PX2 + (-1.00934 * U1 + 0.19768 * THRUST + 3.226 * 8+ 0.0026 * 0 - 0.0067568 * (AN - 6.189
* THRUST)) * (1 - PX2) •
U = 0.03705 * Z1 - 0.876 * Z2 + 0.07379 * 0 + 0.00618 * 0 + 0.008692 * (AN - 6.189 * THRUST) + 0.29
* THRUST
FEED FORWARD = 0.5
APPROACH
U1 = 0.674 * PILOT COMMAND + U
Z1 = Z1 *PX1-4.676*U1 * (1-PX1) •
Z2 = Z2 * PX2 + (-15.33 * U1 + 14.38 * THRUST +287.1 *0 -20.687 *0 -1.788 * (AN -1.925 * THRUST))
* (1 - PX2) •
U = 0.4167 * Z1 + 0.41495 * Z2 + 0.11705 * 0 + 0.03914 * 0 - 1.0404 * (AN - 1.925 * THRUST) + 0.31
* THRUST
FEED FORWARD = 0.674
EET CONTROL EQUATIONS - LAW NO. 29
PX1 EXP (-10.0 * DT)
PX2 EXP (-0.3 * DT)
PX3 EXP (-0.1 * DT)
CRUISE
U1
Z1
Z2
Z3
U =
0.5 * PILOT COMMAND + U
Z1 * PX1 + U1 * (1 - PX1)
Z2 * PX2 + (172.656 * U1 - 49.0487 * THRUST + 0.2597 * (AN - 6.189 * THRUST) - 0.43039 * V)
* (1 - PX2)
Z3 * PX3 + (-509.375 * U1 + 148.39 * THRUST - 0.9095 * (AN - 6.189 * THRUST) + 1.29456 * VI
* (1 - PX3)
0.01458 * Z1 + 0.0066 * Z2 + 0.00839 * Z3 + 0.0092 * (AN - 6.189 * THRUST) + 0.002348 * V + 0.29
* THRUST .
FEED FORWARD = 0.5
APPROACH
U1
Z1
Z2
0.674 * PILOT COMMAND + U
Z1 *PX1 +U1 * (1-PX1)
Z2 * PX2 + (31.072 * U1 - 9.436 * THRUST + 0.03431 * (AN - 1.925 * THRUST) - 0.003697 * V)
"* (1 - PX2)
Z3 =Z3 * PX3 + (~91.893 * U1 + 28.636 * THRUST - 0.2438 * (AN - 1.925 * THRUST) + 0,01126 * V)
* (1 - PX3)
U = 0.02541 * Z1 + 0.02305 * Z2 + 0.03773 * Z3 + 0.0059368 * iAN - 1.925 * THRUST) - 0.003096 *V
+ 0.31 * THRUST
FEED FORWARD = 0.674
EET CONTROL EQUATIONS - LAW NO. 30
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Gain Programs - DETAC Simulation Control Laws
The gain programs for the Control Laws 1 through 7 which were used in
the DETAC Simulation are provided below:
Control Law No. 1
VES=778.3
Pl=O.00012l6*VES-O.04826
P2=-O. 0002852*VES+O. 33667
P3=-O.000057l5*VES+O.053745
P4=-O.0001767*VES+O.1604
P5=-O.002l2256*VES+18.272
P6=-O.000323l2*VES+O.75l484
Control Law No. 2
Pl=l.O
P2=-1.2033662E-Ol*VES+105.23596
P3=2.3375975*VES-18l0.5927
P4=-2.1355933E-02*VES+20.359
P5=1.8l244l9E-04*VES-O.63l06235
P6=-O.27639l25*VES+209.85567
P7=4.l70l75*VES-34l9.4854 .
P8=-9. 57568985-02*VES+73. 686374
P9=6.2922562E-03*VES-3.442263
P10=2.89730735-04*VES-O.24052743
Pll=-4.2484679E-04*VES+O.39710826
P12=4.20l4856E-04*VES-O.43945l62
P13=-2.7635097E-03*VES+2.2120296
P14=-5.1758774E-05*VES+O.053746674
P15=-2.ll699l65-03*VES+18.267654
P16=-3.23ll977E-04*VES+O.75l484l2
Control Law No. 3
Pl=l.O
P2=-4.99907l4E-05*VES-O.10623222
P3=9.795077E-03*VES+65.20l71B
P4=2.8076l37E-04*VES-l.5883665
P5=7.ll64345E-04*VES+2.3066779
P6=1.644l225E-03*VES-l.6970705
P7=1.8570l02E-06*VES-5.353ll045-04
P8=1.3l842l5E-03*VES-O.396ll748
P9=-7.6404828E-04*VES+O.48078877
P10=-1.7669452E-04*VES+O.16040l34
Pll=-5.7158774E-05*VES+O.053746674
P12=-2.ll699l6E-03*VES+18.267654
P13=-3.23ll977E-04*VES+O.75l484l2
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Control Law No. 4
Pl=-9.l6063l35-04*VES+l.7l297l9
P2=-8.5l57l95E-02*VES+70.l98205'
P3=1.4744816*VES-1215.1522
P4=3. 2548245E-05*VES-0. 23968093
P5=-1.2893l47E-02*VES+13.677756
P6=-7.2237697E-05*VES+0.051212599
P7=4.7320334E-04*VES-0.38l78416
P8=-2.8523676E-04*VES+0.33670977
P9=1.2160471E-04*VES-4.82657755-02
P10=-6.69379755-03*VES+5.2674426
Pll=-5.7l587745-05*VES+0.053746674
P12=-2.11699165-03*VES+18.267654
P13=-3.231l9775-04*VES+0.75148412
Control Law No. 5
Pl=l.O
P2={-0.006442l*VES-5.858739l)
P3={-0.00004694*VES+2.094)
P4={-0.00208l8*VES-0.2l6036)
P5={0.1246553*VES-176.9425)
P6={-0.078l486*VES+65.l395)
P7={-0.020233*VES-2.54l8l02)
P8={-0.14449*VES+192.239l5)
P9={0.09l73l*VES-72.77957)
P10={0.0240859*VES+3.42675)
Pll=-0.00000035l5*VES+0.01527859
P12=0.000057984*VES+0.112885
P13=-0.0001968869*VES-0.0245289
P14=-0.000150727*VES-0.028543
P15=-O.00063l8477*VES+0.7ll29008
P16=-2.ll699l65-03*VES+18.267654
P17=-0.000323l2*VES+O.75l48
Control Law No. 6
Pl=l.O
P2=3.2480538E-02*VES-9.0716931
P3=-0.8l50492l*VES+174.491l5
P4=-2.0650175E-03*VES-O.60962817
P5=4.2475851E-03*VES-l.0270368
P6=-8.4130213E-02*VES+16.400245
P7=2.0677381*VES-418.36538
P8=4.9325l43E-03*VES-l.0799593
P9=-1.3862841E-02*VES+3.2680693
P10=-6.6295264E-06*VES+l.480976E-02
Pll=2.13556l7E-06*VES-8.5521077E-03
P12=-2.7533895-04*VES+0.21487626
P13=1.43773255-04*VES-7.7522729E-02
P14=-2.8523676E-04*VES+O.33670977
P15=-2.1169916E-03*VES+18.267654
P16=-3.231l9775-04*VES+0.75148412
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Control Law No. 7
Pl=1.0
P2=1.5085608E-03*VES-3.1396828
P3=O.51807939*VES-176.l4312
P4=7.74553l25-03*VES-4.422927l
P5=O.12849526*VES+112.44002
P6=O.2ll253l*VES-2079.388
P7=1.5288068E-03*VES-4 0 5033176
P8=O.29441684*VES-291.28801
P9=-4.7559634*VES-5496.4666
Pl0=2.586092l5-03*VES+l.5387l85
Pll=4.568245l5-06*VES+6.7345348E~03
P12=-2.5624883E-04*VES+O.33856847
P13=-4.5953574E-04*VES+O.38269667
P14=-5.2297l21E-04*VES+O.40340849
P15=-2.5375425E-03*VES+l.8764645
P16=-2.ll699l6E-03*VES+18.267654
P17=-3.23ll977E-04*VES+O.75l484l2
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APPENDIX 8
AUGMENTED AIRCRAFT PERFORMANCE
This section contains data d~monstrating the correlation of the Augmented
EET aircraft response to that of the DC-10model for elevator perturbations.
Control laws 1 through 7 are shown for both approach and cruise flight conditions.
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COMPARISON OF BASELINE AND AUGMENTED EET IN CRUISE - CONTROL LAW NO.1
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COMPARISON OF BASELINE AND AUGMENTED EET IN CRUISE - CONTROL LAW NO.2
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COMPARISON OF BASELINE AND AUGMENTED EET IN CRUiSE - CONTROL LAW NO.3
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COMPARISON OF BASELINE AND AUGMENTED EET IN CRUISE - CONTROL LAW NO.4
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COMPARISON OF BASELlN~ AND AUGMENTED EET IN CR,UISE - CONTROL LAW NO.5
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+240.000
+239 .0001-----4-ye.:::::::::::~~"<;:"""-'--+----+_----l----+----+---~
5+237.000l-----+-----+-----+-~....-_lf_----f_----f7'7'L---+----_1
U
D
...
II
:I>
+236. ooof-----I-----.......;I-------1f-----4~~--_l-?"":...::..-_+----_+----__t
...
u
~+238. ooof-~-f-~-+-----+---~~----_l-----l_-'----i----7'i:"=:----_1
,
I:
"
+235.00°+.000000 + 0.0000
lTD DEV • +1.25108
+40.0000 +60.0000
TIME
+80 .. 00 +100.000
(SECONDS>
+120.000 +140.000
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•
E.E r C R U I S E
OC10 CRUISE
AIRCRAFT 40% CG
A.IRCRAFT 28% CG
CONT LAW 7 ELEV-PERT
ELEV-PERT
+.050000
;..
~+. 0400o01------1------6...;;4~-_+----__j1_~~~-+_----+_----+----_lc .
H
E
v+. 03000or-T--j;?,,-.--i-----;--t----I----I-----::::...,;~*=:~.;::::~~=--~
I:~+.020oool--++---+-~---+-----+-----t------+-----+-----+-----i
~ t
+ . 01000060-00 0 O;;--~+~2bo,....-;;0~0";:"0:;:"0-~+~4~0;;-;.o~0"0-;;0---:+~6'-;;:0-.:;:"0:;:"00;;0:0;;0--7+*80;;-;.0;-,:0..0"";;0---:+:-117,"0"0-.o;;O:oMO;---+;-'lh2"'O"".;:;07,"0"0---;+7174'0-;.OMO;-,:O..---J
S TOO Ell· + ._.OJl-?_0_2~. TlI'!E __. ~SECONOS)
._ ..T!ME
0
~~ ~~ I--...~ ~
--
0
'""" ~ r--t--. I
0
,I
'.
0
I
0+.000000 +20.0000 +40.0000 +60.0000 +SO.OOOO +100.000 +120.000 .+140.000+.02000
ero OEV • +.00e814
c
f+·02500
oJ
E:
+.04000
"~+.03500
~
~
II:
"+.03000
+240,000
+239 .oool-----h-,L----:..:~~::----+-----+-----t-----r__----r__---_;
£+237 .OQol-----+---~-+-----1--~~--I-----+-----_b7L..--_+----_"_I
g
oJ
U)-
+236 .oool-----t-----+----+----3o,~;;:----1r-"""7.~=--_+----+---___1
..
u
1+238.oool--...,.L,,£----1------+---~~-_--+_----:....I----_+--___:;;"!_...~---_1
,
c
...
+235.00°+.000000 +20.0000
erD DEV +1.29315
+40.0000 +60.0000
THIE
+80.0000 +100.000
(SECOHOS)
+120.000 +140.000
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•
EET APPROACH AIRCRAFT 40r. CG CONT LAW 1
Del0 APPROACH AIRCRAFT 2Sr. CG
ELEI'-PI~RT
ELE\I-PI~RT
"r" ~ =
,"II ....
.... ow :~: ~. ~ (l <)
~:: :::::: ~_'-_-_~~_--·_··--_l:i_7"'-___\_'T_-_l_--__:Jr- .\ i . I!I ,
1+. 130 00 l--.------l.L---\-\-j-----j7--j K ~,-: ~
..~ 1\1/! ~.~ ..
'. I i J ,I I I i . , i~· .. 12SI)Oori'7-i··------''''''c-:7'7''------r-------j----l--1 I ._~
X 'I [J ; J ' '-1u : ~ i / I ' ,::;+.120000~--~· : .'-----!--~-__+------+-----:, ! :-
Cl- \Y' \ '. I i
+ 11 r ,,,)-- . 1-..... .__ _L__._._L__.. L_..__.._~
.- _'''''''J~•... ' .-:;::·;ff···· ·--::::~;.~OiJ(; ".. ~:::,::'.::(,G:) +800aoo +:'00.000 +1;:~O.IJl)O +~.~.;).fJOI)
<SECONDS)
+.131999:' : -~-:;;t I : ! I (~+,129"9~.\ ~ ~~__: .~",=:: i
~ Ll-f~ I ~ iii
@+.128000, -No Iii'! I~ iii ! I i
.... 126000:-;-; t Ii j I I
I \ ! i!+.124000~d I -, Ii!!
! V ,.. I ! i 1-.-J+.12eooo~,oooooo +20.0000 +40,0000 +60.0000 +80.0000 +100.000 +120.000 +140.000
6 T DOE II • +. 0 I) 1007 TJMI;. _ (SECO@St
II I
-.Jt--_.; I ,
:---.:----+------;-- j--li
I I I
STC OEV • y.e:S385 (SECONDS)
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•
EET APPROACH AIRCRAFT 40? C6
DC10 APPROACH AIRCRAFT 28? C6
CONT LAW 2 E L'E V - PER T
ELEV-PERT
+140.00012J.000+80.0000 +100.000
(SECONDS)
+60.0000
TH!.E__
1'40.0000
0 ~t) I
-
/J \\ /1~ //'-- r--...~ '-.
I 1/ \\ j,1 ~~? ~c ~/ ~'0
1/ ~0
lJ'
0 + I
+.12500
+.14000
:r
u
l:i+.12000
L
10+.1:3500
z:
a:
H
~+.13000
II:
v
+.11500 +.000000 +20,0000
ST 0 D'£~V + , 0 ~ 3 5 24
+140.000+120.000.+80.0000 +100.000
(S~CONOS)
+60.0000
_TJt1E:: _
+40.0000
9 ~ ~ ....
/~ l.Y' ~ ~' ~-0
..
0
0
0 ~+.12200 +.000000 + O.OOOO
STO DEV +.000942
+.13199
+.12600
It:
:r:
~+.12400
a:
;;+.12999
z:
a:
M
1i!+.12800
"
v
+73.8000
+73, 60l)01---I-f~-l---~-+-----4--"';"--~----'-+-----+----+----~
n+73. 400 l) !--.-I+---lj\------t--..,...",.;-.:;----+-----I-----+--
III
III,
E:
""+73.20 l) 0t--+f---++l;----+H--~-'ll:----_jI"'T· ~---",:--+~----_+;;:--=::~--l------1
>-
...
H
g+73.0000
..J
III
>
+72. 800 0f------+--\'r-H'+------I------+
+72 , 60 l) 0 + . 0 ol)ciim+P.O . 0 0 0-0---:+~4-;:;0-.O;::cO;;-;O:;-;O----+:-:6~O:-.-:;0-;:0-;:;0-;:;O----:+'*'8(1':0000 + 100 . 0 l) 0
STO OEV +.164845 TIME (SECIJNOS)
+120,000 +14"D.""OOO
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•
EET APPROACH AIRCRAFT 40?- CG CONT LAW 3
OCIO APPROACH AIRCRAFT ~8?- CG
ELEV-PERT
ELEV-PERT'
I
!
+140.000
• ,131999! : .. ' ,]. i I. I I~
i·"'''h-~I'"l~~ =---l!""."oHn . . I I I !
~+.'126000!-r~ I I I II
i·""oon· .I [ i .
+.122000+.000000 ~20.0000 +40.0000 +60.0000 +80.0000 +100.000 +120.000
S T 0 DE V • +. 00 0 B <,I' 9 TIME.. (SECONDS)
+i'3.8000
I I
+;:>2.8000!-----t--\:\--H-I------iI---=---II-------j-----i-------j----
• IL I
+7,;;' 6000 +. 00 oob C +2:""0-.:;;'C0o"o:"::!),----,+~4-;;'O...,. o"o;-;:o;-;;(',...----;-+-}~,~o -c.0:"::0;-;;o:O;;O----;-+-;!;-8"0-:.o;-;0;-;;0:;::0---:-++10~0::-.-::;0:;::0'::'0---.-++.1 "",(::-,."0:0;;0"0---:-++14"0::-."0:0;;0"0-
-"STP ",O~E II • +. e 154 17 TIME (SECONDS)
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•
EET APPROACH AIRCRAFT 40X CG
DC10 APPROACH AIRCRAFT 28X CG
CONT LAW '4 ELEV-PERT
ELEV-PERT
+.1400001'---
I
T!ME (SECONDS)
40 00+120.000+80.0000 +100.000
(SECONDS)
+60.0000
TIME
+40.0000
r .Atr---.... i : I
....-.... i~ 1=. -J#'" ~.-.-"
I \ (;:::::J~ j ""'" =--'IIF"" i "1:"'-- I-.--- i ; ~..I :r i I I: l jI (; ;i i
!
I
i ! i i'
+1 .0+.120000+.000000 +20.0000
ITO DEV • +.001022
+.124000
f .2+. t22000
+ .132000
·....+.13000.
III
~ir·H~8000
tl
v+. t26000
S":"D D€··~ ~ -i· ... ::::~732 TINE
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•
EET APPROACH AIRCRAFT 40% CG CONT LAW 5
DC10 APPROACH AIRCRAFT 28% CG
ELE ... ·PERT
ELEV·PERT
+.1<45000
,,+ .1<40000 '--------,o--o;:----f-----j------j------j-:--.-----;
III ;
i· Ir .135000, (J
~+ . 130 00 ~tWlil---'1c4.--r---t'-T---l
+.125000 ,----..:~!l',,:--h<.:......--:
z: I I~ I \ i~+.U!OOOO-·-'C2iiC-------l.....------;·--
i VI : j
+ . 11 SO 0 0hOF(iij-:-'-~c~ coo (J HC .0 'e 0 C +60 . GQo'''''0--+~8':''0-0.0"'0''''0-'0--++10.,...0,,-.-.1l-.0-.0---,--!-::-:~c=---;-+:-;~=--'i
,
S TOO c: V '· ~~;_~·_2_o.? . TII'I!;: (SECONDS) 'l:
.._._--_.(-
't140 . 000+120.000+80.0000 +100.000
(SECONDS)
+60.0000
TIM.£:.
+40.0000
9 !.~ II . -..: ~!·7 .,~ /'"
""(;::J -f "V .~ ,I
0"
..I I
0 I
\
0 I
t II i0+.12200 +.000000 +20.0000
ITO DEI,' • +.001045
ii)+.12999
~
i+.128oo
ll'
v
+.131~9
+ .12600
I
~+ .12<400
a:
TIMESTO OEY • p.180S78
+?3. 8000I '
+?3.6000
I
Fj:~---~
+?3 . 4000 /.- I r-----_+---;i<jiF"l~-t-----_+-----
~ llv- ~~+73.200~1 --'S." ""~i---1n-----IW-----t-\;-\----;I.9-I~----'-<'}
g I !~+72 . 8000 ,:--+'\--*+-
+72.6000! -!I---"="---+-----.L.l ----+-----1
+7'" 4000L.__. J :-.o;:::-~l.._-._._-l;;-::;~;:_____:-_h--;::c;:_.,,_-....,_!
... +.0(,01),)') ",o:e.c,ooa ."O.OOCO ';'60.0000 +80.0000
(SECONDS)
COMPARISON OF BASELINE AND AUGMENTED EET IN APPROACH - CONTROL
LAW NO.5
311
•
'EET APPROACH AIRCRAF~ 40X C6
OCIO RPPROACH AIRCRAFT fax C6
CONT LRW IS ELEV-PERT
ELEV-PERT
+..• 1400 0o"'"l-----·-----r..:..:...:....--..-----,------,-----.,...,--c--'----,--:.-----,
,... I
I
~+ .135000i-----·--/.~L-4~---J.----ri~:;:-----+-:-----+------+----_+----__.,
f I
H. h~+.13()OO I \-
+. 1250oo~-1-~'-I----J-----~~-h,L.--I----~l----_1:----_1------_i_--...,...._j
I~ • ~•.~I~~1~I~J--..-.- .. ·I
+20.0000 +40.0000 +6~ .eooo +80.0000 +100.000 +120.000 +140.000~
,.. ,) 0 3 .. 6; ~11~ ~.c~NDS> ._
+140.000+120.000+60.0000 +80.0000 +100.000
TJME._____ <.SECONDS>
+40.0000
9 .~ 1~ .~".
(;:::;J V ~ I I-........ I0 I,
I
0
0
.
0 ,
,'. 13199
-+.12200 +.000.000 +20.0000
;aTO DEW +.000987
i+.~e600
1•.. 124:00
--.3F....~~--
• +13.8000
. ,
+73. 6000'j'-----.f-;~...-:--.:..-~-_,_j~----t------+----+------'---+-----I_~--_j
j
;:;+;;3.4000 I
III ,
I/) I
~~.73 20001--4{----l-\--\-·---+-H----W------;ff--~\"--'-r_........--»=-""'iiii""""__r-----
~
H
!:l+73. 0000!------;--H.-----hl-------+\\~ I
+72. eoool-----,:-.-+cI--_IJ-t.-------l1i--...:.....·--+--- -------r
I J__.~~~:---J. .--J..I,---.,--=--J --.l ~
+72.600°jl-.,jO;''::O(1 "20.0000 +40.0000 ;'67J:-0t-)0-0-. +80.0000 +100.000 +120.000 +140.000
STC Ol;v +.244504 TIME (SECONDS)
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•
EET APPROACH AIRCRAFT 40~ CG CO NT LAW 7
OC10 APPROACH AIRCRAFT as~ CG
ELEY·PERT
ELEY·PERT
aTD DEV
+.1400001
~+. 135000 1-1---f-----:,A---'t----If--------,f""'..,------t---
f
H
~+. 1300 0..-"\-+---"jI-+--\------\~i-_;L=-_f-+-~""""'~=~...",,:==.ii~==:=:f>=.-~Irr-=}=7i!11f::~ J I
Ii+ .12500 0 ----l-.....----I------I------+-----+-----.--I
~+ .120 00 0 1...:"-"",,\H,,---'-----+----4 L" I
L I V' .! I . ----l-
~. IIS000;-.T:-::,"·,j,)':---,T,j . D~-1:-"C ,ee, &~----:::E;-o . 00(;-;,1(::-'--+'-::a\-;:0-.7.'0:0'CC0""O~-+:-!100. 000 +120,000----:-+7-14.,-;(1. (:"'.0"'0'-:'--
(SECONDS>
+140.000
-----J..
+120.000+80.0000 +100,000
';'Si;,CONDS >.
+60.0000
. TIML .
+40,0000
"-
9 I
9 1'\ i\,-; ..a-
1 ;----7 ~~ /-&.'"'-
\
'rJ / ~ -....~0 fI I
• I
0 I
0 ,
1
;
0+.12200 •. 000000 +20.0000
8TO DEli. +.000971
+.12600
E
E+·12400
+.13399
,,+.13199
I
104+.12'999~
"v+ .12aoo
. +.600000\
+.400000 i
'I
,
+ .200000 i-i---/-+-'.--+---'.----Ir----"7c:;:;1"'<::!----''<---+----:;>.-----\,----'---j------!
" I,hi I~+ .0000 0..4~L,H---!~-.-J\-~-I----,f_-l-~y'r--d~:::..~.....::::+:::~,.........c<:::4:::::;z:==::::::~~=--~_l
t \
"' •. 200000L..J
~. i / l~!:oc , I
~ • . 400000:-;--1,""'-+/--I:---'l:--r-If>o.:::::7'------t-----1r-------Ij-------t-----;
Ul i \ / ! I I ·1
•.6000001~:-I----t----+----T----I----!~'
-.80000°t-00oooo +eo.oooo +40.0000 +60.0000 +80.0000 +100.000 +120.000 +140,000;
S T 0 DEli .... 1 9 1 0 1 1 TIME (SECOI'IDS > !
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APPENDIX 9
CONTROL LAW SENSITIVITY
This section contains data showing control law sensitivity to sensor
input parameters which have other than nominal tolerance values. The
method for establishing worst-case sensor tolerance is discussed in
Section 5.
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•OC10 CRUISE
EET CR~IISE
AIRCRAFT e8;'J, CG
AIRCRAFT 40;'1, CG Cl MIN SENS TOl
ElEII-PERT
ElEV .. PERT
+240.000
+239.ooo~----_b.....~~=Sl~~ --_t_----~!-----_t_~--
"t)
LIJ
<e...238. OOOI--__~·
t:
....
~+237 .ooo)----·--+-----.--1-----+---'......,..,....-.--1!------+-------J..."..".£-
lotg
i;l+236.0001_---
:lIo
+235 . 000 .... 00000 0 +c:e~o:-.-:::0-='O-='O-='O----,+-!4~0-.-='0-='O""O""0--+-!6-='O-.~0""0""0"'"0--+-!a'"=o-.""0""0""0"'"0----,+-!1-::0""0-.TO"'0o--i="1eo-:OOCI-;j, 40·:1:""'1o""'o-_...J
6 T 0 DEli + 1 . 229 S 1 TIME (SECONDS)
+.050000
"~+.0400001---­
a:
lot
c
~
"+'.0300001_-1---
i!i+.020000J--t-t--·-+-----If-----+-----II-----+---
...
lot
III..
+.010000 .... 0000 oo-:,.·:-;e!:-:0;-.-;:0c:;0-;:0-:::0--+:-4!-;0:-.-;;O~O-:::0·0--:+,..;6!-:;O:-.-::0·0·0""0--:...c:a!-::0:-.-:::0-::0-::0-::0-----,+,..;17.0~-- +120-:00(-1-+140·"".(""'IO""'O--..J
S TOO E II + . (107206 TIME (SECONDS)
+1.40.000+1<:0.OOll+ao.oooo +100.000
(SECOND~;)
+60.0000
TIME
+40.0000
~ ~..-~ ~~ :J..--, ~
'-"-........ ~ r---_.....~
--'-.-..- f-..
..."",::.
....----- '-::-7'+.020000+.000000 +20.0000
STD DEli +.001479
+.040000
"¥1+.035000
~
c
a:
Ill:
"+.030000
~+. oasooo
III..
ii!
SENSOR TOLERANCE
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•
o C 1 0
EEl'
CRUISE
CRUISE
HIRCRAFT
flIRCRAFT
ca
ca C l. 2 111 N SENS T I) L
ELEV-PERT
ELEV"PERT
+24o.0oo..------,---------,------r---
---'--'-1
J...-...........~.--".­
1-+237.000}-------+---
I-
H
U
c
g+236.000L .[ _
+235 . 000 + . 0 I) 0 000;:--+7:2*'0;;-'.O~O::-;O:-;O:-- +40. 0000 -7+76"0-.7:0;;"07:0 r:0---+;'";e!;;o"'.0~·-:+-t1·0·0-."0;':0(,-+120 . 000---+i 40000-'--
STO DEV +1.24034 TIME (SECONDS)
+239.0 00r-----t4:::=;::==i~=-I--'Ooo~~-I---
"u
III
~+238 . 000 f--_r6£.---t----.--l-
r:
...
+.050000
"~+ .04000 0f-------t-------:..'-:r----+-----'''''''''~...:::_i_
II:
H
Q
I:
'"\I+.030900 }--t---""JIIr--;,,L----+------+-
G+. 02000O!--t+-----+------t------+------r--
I-
H
L
'''''''----11-------- ._-.---
.--+------t-----t---.---
+ . 0 100 I) I) + . 0 0 0 I)00 +20. 000 0 -+·~4;::0-.0r:O;::0~-0~--:+-;6!-:;0:-.-;;0:;;0:;;0:;;0~·+8if:OooO..--·-+-:+1O~O~.0;:-0;::0:~--:+-;1'::2:;;0:-. I) 0O--"--+i 4(1:00'0-'--'
STD DEV +.007206 TIME (SEt:ONDS)
------t-----+----- -'-----'
+80.0000-----+100 :0(;0'- +120 '-~---+i4-0-:000'-'
(SECOI'IOS)
+60.0000
TIME
+40.000u
or--'
~ --I......,
0
,.
-...
...... L.----'T
......
0 -- -
0
0---...,-- ----- -- ---+.02000 +.OOOuOO +20.0000
STD DEV +.001478
+.040')0
~+.02S00
L
.J
II:
"~+.03500
~
Q
II:
'""'+.03000
SENSOR TOLERANCE
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•DC10 CRUISE
EET CRUISE
AIRCRAFT 28Y. CG
AIRCRAFT 4~X CO CL 3 MIN SENS TOl
ElEI/-Pi;:RT
ElEV-PERT
+240.000 -----.----~----T
+239.000
,..
U
ILl
~+23e.000
~
..,
1-+237.000
I-
H
U
o
~+e36.000~--------~--·
:>
~1-----"'r----1------t:::::::iii;:::::::::;t-·
+235 . 00 Q+ . ci60oo·:O-o,---+""'2!-O':"".-:O....0-=0-=0----+-4!-.0,.....""'0-=0-=0-=0----+-,6!-.0,.....-=O-=O-=O-=O----+""'S!-.O,......"O·-00 0 +10 I) . 0OO:-:--+-1~2;-';1)-.-=0·00-'+ 141:;-:-00('
S T DOE V + 1 . 2 e 951 TIME (SECONDS)
+.050000 --_._......,--- .-.,-----------r--.-- ----- --_.-.._-_.._----,
,..
~+.040000
I:
H
~
"'"+.03000 0~-+--:.--~+--7"c:...--_jr--------+-----~r-::::::::~:::::~+-----=~-i= --_--,..,~.=-:::..----1
G+.oeOOOOI---+l'----+-----t-----+-----t------t------t-------I------l
I-
H
L
+.010000 +-:OOOOOO·--,+-;!2c=0-.~0~00~0;:----,+~4-;:O-.:::-0;;"00:::-0;:---'+~6-;:0-.;;"0 O:::-O:::-o;:----'+-;!e-=o-."';:0':0"'00;:----'++:10"'(1.000;:----:-++12;;-0;,--:.0::-:0::-:0,.---+-:+14:;-(·::-'-c.0'-;0'-;0'------'
STO OEV +.007206 TIME (SECONDS)
+.040000 _.
" 4...-.,~J~~_~~~~~t====t:~~~;;;~~==~~----~+.035000 -\ " -........... --------j
I:
H
~
Ill:
"'+ .0390001--+1----+-----11------+-------11-------+------+-·-----;---------i
I:
f+·025000
£
+. 020000 +-:Oi:H~;J;';I)~0·:c;O~-....,+c;!2~0,-,-=0-;::0-=0-;:0----:+-".4~1)-,-;::1)-;::0-;:0-;:0--·--;+~6~O-.-;::0-;::0"';:0:::-0-----:+-,!S~O,-.-;,0-=0.".0.".0-----:+~1-0,;-;:0-.:::-0;;"0("1--.'7+-+1""2"'0'-,O"'O;:-'O;C----'7C+1415-'-:.O::-:O;c:;I),----...J
STD DEV +.00 I 479 TIt1E (SECOND£;)
SENSOR TOLERANCE
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•
e:ET CRUISE
EET CRUISE
AIRCRAFT 40% CG CL 3
AIRCRAFT 4~X C8 CL 3
TH·1.0 ALP'1.0 ELEY'PERT
THoU.9 ALP-I. IELEY-PERT
+240.ooo,......·-----,------,-----.,---.
+239. Ol)o~~---l£~:==::::~~-===:t==~=~~==~::::=t=~t===1==
--1---'--7 - -'-'-"--'-- -_.-......
(SECONDS)
+60.0000
TIME
+40""":0000+Z35.000+.000000 +20.0000
STD DEV +1.32634
"(.)
llJ
~+238.0 I)DI---.,.~-_+-----r----'~_t_--
5
:>-+Z37 . 00 oit-----..:.+-- .---t-.-----+-~­
I-
H
(.)
o
u:l+Z36 . 000 f-------t---....---J-.-----J---
:>
" .~+.0400001__----_t_-­
0:
H
C0:
0.:
v + . 030 00ol-_+---_t_"J',I!::..~-~I__----+----_jl_-----+--"",.,.<;;;C""_I_
+.050000,......----.,------,,......----..,.-------,,......----..,.---
0+.0200001_--++---_t_----:::,..-11_----+----_j1_-----+--
I-
~
+.010000+.000000 +20.0000
STO DEV +.007683
+40.0000 +60.0000
TIllE
+80.0000 --+100.001)- +120-:000----+140:00'0"
(SECONDS)
+.04500 0,......----.,------,-----..,.-------,,------..,.---·----.---...----- --._..._-
(;)+ .0400001-----+-----1------+------It:-...---====I~--=-.-----...---- -.--------1~ 4~ fit. ~ ----r--~0:+ . 035000 - .-=-<i:--.....----j~ '-...... "-. ~ .---
+.03000 0llL--l-=::!:==~~~=*::::::=i=~~=~~=::!:==t=~~::::~==-~.it:::::::::J.::=:.:=::.----
0:
:J:
~+. 0250001__~r_--_t_-----1__----+----_j1_-·-·--t_--·---
0:
--_._---_. --_._---
+ . 020000 + . 00 00 00 +20 . 00 0O----.:-40:-.-:0c~0·~O-0'----+....,6!-:0....,....,.0·c:0'1):-"0'----'-+-:!,e""o-.0:'"":0'"'0·1)--;"100-:-001)-..·• 12o~·Ciii--..,..+·140:00·i~
S T DOE V + . 003100 TIME (SECOND~:)
SENSOR ·TOLERANCE
318
•
EET
EET
CRUISE
CRUISE
AIRCRAFT
AI~:CPAFT
40;:
40 ;:
C G ,C I-
C Gel-
3
3
TH=I.0
T H = 1 1
ALP=I.0
FILP=.'1
ELEV-PERT
ELEV-PERT
._-----+------
.----J----.--.
._--+----._---+_..__._._-----
+,030000
+'070000E
+.060000 ------~---
~+,050000 ------
H
Q
~+,040000
v .
fj+ ,020000
~
~+,010000
+,045000 ,------,--------.-,------,------
+100.000 +lEO .000 +140.000
TIME (SECONDS)
----·-r--·-·--..---r----------,
·--b~:t=--=':<4--=~=f~-.---.-:~:=:~~- ~~~=~~~:~
. ......
----f---- ------ ----... -.-..- 7 L'-----~,
~__=_-+J ..__._..~::~~::~=.-.-::~[~:.=:_.:=_: .._.. ~.~::_.~_.~::_.~:::_.
+60.0000 +80.0000 +100.000 +120.000 +140.000
+40 -:-TII-0-0--+6(1:0000-----+80-~0000
TIME (SECONDS)
+ , 020000 + . 000('"0(,"'+20-:"0'(;06--
STD DEll +.003100
+. 0 30 0 0 0f--H~----+-.----
+.00000°+.000000 +2O:-oooi:i---
STD DEV •. 007663
r::
:x:
~+.025()00
I:
n+ , 0 40 0 00 t--------t------.----
r::
I:
H
~+. 035000
Il'
v
SENSOR TOLERANCE
319
•
DC 1 0
EET
CRUISE'
CRUISE
AIRCRAFT
AIRCRAFT
CG
CG CL 4 11 I N SENS TO L
ELEV-PEf<T
ELEV-PERT
~-_._--_.
--I-
~;~~...k=::::"',,<:,--+---- '--- .------.- -- ..
TMS·"--I------l---.::"-:-~-----+_----_+-------
+23'3.000
+240.1)00
"(,J
UJ
~+23e .000
t:
v
~+237. 000
I-i
(,J
o
~:::: ::: .mooo--:+~2:;;0,....-;;0-;;0-;;0-;;0---+-;-4-!c0;:-c.0;:C0;:C0;:C0;::---:+~6-;::0-.>:il-;;0-;;0-;;0---+:-8tO~.m-"..;.; :C,::-=
STO DEV +1.22951 TIME (SECONDS)
+.1)50000
~
-r-~~~=:=!~":=::::;:f".-=::::::'_-'-'
5+ . 0 2000 I) I--++----!-------!-------,-+-------I-------+-
t-
H
~
"~+.040000
a:
I-i
c
a:
IX
v +.. 0300 0Ol--+-----:i:"....::.....,,~--_+-----+----
+.010000+.000000 +20.0000
STO OEV +.007206
+40.0000 +60.0000
TIME
+80.0000 +100 .OO(j---+120-:-(iOi)-·+1·4-0'~-o(j6···--···---·
(SECONDS)
1---.-----+------+------II------!--------------.-- -.----.....-..--.--
+ . 040000 ,...--------r-------r------,-------,.---,...---,-----.----_------ -,--.----
~+. 03500:tl-;~-!~h=:=:b:::=:===k:::::::::::;;~~~~====t====1=~=~==~.=~.':::"""_~;::-r-_~_-;_-"""Ij+-~---.---...... ---,
H '-'-.t "'-- ..
~ ~"'''''T---1''~
Ct:
v+.0300001--
~+. o250001---+1-----!-------!-------+-------1-------+------+----'- _+---.
~
..J
a:
+ . 020 I) 00 ~OO(,-,TOO---+20"'. 0 0 0 O---+4!-:0,--...,0""0""0""0,-----:-++6"'0-."'0"'0::-(1(::-.1- .""+''''$'''0,....'''''0'70'70:;:-0·--·"'+-10O:Ciij-;:,---.;:-'t20'-:-oOil-·---.;:-'t'4o:-oo-ii"·-----
STD DEV +.001479 TIME (SECONDS)
SENSOR TOLERAI'JCE
320
•
DC10
EET
C R 1I I S E
C R 1I I S E
FIIRCRAFT
AIRCRAFT
2 :3 ~
4 o· ,~
CG
CG C L 5 ~1 I N SEN S TOL
E l. E \I - f' E 1·,:..-
ELEV-PERT
+235.000+. 000001"-:;'20 ,OOOi)"---:j:"40 . 00·0,)'....-· +600000--
8TO OEV +1.e2951 TIME
+240.000
+239.000
"t.)
ILl
~+23a.OOO
t:
v
~+237. oeo
...
t.)
o
iLJ+236.000
)0
+.050000
"~+.040000
tl:
...
o
a:
It:
v+.030.o00
~+.oeoooo
I-
lot
L
,/
-,-_._-
l
··.--.----·--,---r--------- --..-------.. --.---.-- ._-]
-.---- ----- ---- ... --..---- ------ .-.. -_.--._- 7'- -----
~--_..__...
7 L --... ._---_.. _-_... --
__. .__L. _
___. .. , .._1 ..._
+120.000 +140.000
(SECONDS)
.----If--.-.--.--.-+----.---t-----+--.-.-.----
+ . 0 10 0 0 0 + . OOO'i;-ii'ij-"-:j'20 . (iOOO----:;4(1 .0'(;00'--"-';'60 :·0000-- +80 .0000 + 10'0-:-000---+120:0-(0(:--+14o~'iioo--
8TO OEV +.007'~06 TIME (SECONDS)
+.045000 ,.--------,-----....,--.--------,------r-----...-.-----
U;+. 040000r-------+------+---- --+----
z::
a:
~ ~h
1:+.035000
D<
v
+ . 030 0 0 0 I-- 1--'--- f--..-.----- _.--.-..- ....- ..
----_._----,-------
I:
J:
~+ . 025000r--tt-----f------+-----.---t-----
I:
·-----Ir-----·..-
+ . 0 eo 0 0 0 ~OOO-OO-·+2o-~(i(i()o·-:;:;I_O·_:ci·(i'o,)-·-·-..-+60 . 0 00 0 ...._- +SI) . 0 0 00--+1 ci 0 . 00 ·ci'-·..·+12iJ:'Qoo--+140-~ 000
STD DEV +.001479 TIME (SECONDS)
SENSOR TOLERANCE
321
•
DC10
EET
CRUISE
CRUISE
AIRCRAFT
AIRCRAFT
28,t:
40 :y.
CG
C i;l CL 6 MIN S E tt S T I) L
ELEV'PE~:T
ELEV'PERT
+240.000 --....,...-------.------,...-------.---
---_._+-----+----_.. --"-'--'-' -_.._._.._._...
~+237.000 --j--
Ll
o
~:::::::. 00' OO'--"-:!-2'::'0-.~O'-':-O-':-0-':-0--+--,4!-:O,....-::O-::0c::0c::0- ---:+-:6~~0-.-::O-::0-::0-::0,.-·--+-:!-S'::'0-.'::'O":::O":::O""O--+"'l!-.O"'O::-.·-Q-OO---'''~-::=.c.-=
S TOO E V + 1 , 2 2 9 5 1 T J ME (SECONDS)
E+239.00 0 "'-'-"--'---h"""::'..:1=---=;""'Ir~~
~+a38 .000
t:
v
+.050000
--.,---_......._.-._.__._--- -- .----_..- ...-
--/--'''''-<:.,."...'C''''--I------I---.-----+-----..,'"~+ . 040 I) 001-·-----!----'-----:!?""-;;,L----f----
II:
H
C
II:
Dc:
v + ,030 I)00r·T---;;j?-:7c-·--;---·--t------;-----t--....J..·~==:iS;;;:;;;;;;~=
G+, 0 20 0 00I---Hf-----j------j---..- ........-------j-----t------I--
~
H
IL.
+ . 0 10000 + . 000000 +20 :""0""O""0""0~-+""4~O"".~O:-;0:-;0:-;0~-""+-!-6"'0-."'0-:::-0""0"'0-
S TOO E V + . 0 0 720 6 TIME
+80 . 000 (I + 10 0 . 000- +1~ij(i()-- +146-:-~---···
(SECONDS)
+120 .. 000+80.0000 +100.000
(SECONDS)
+1,0.0000
TIME
+40.0000
0 --,._---- -
~ ~ .- ~~.~ ......., ~-- 1-.0 ~ .~ . .~r--"_ or
0 ._----- ---
0
0 ._-."='-:----~, ------- 'c=--:-"-~'-:'-~'
+.04000
+.02000 +.000000 +20.0000
STD DEV +001479
"-
~+.03500
II:
H
C
II:
Ill:
v+. 0300 0
SENSOR TOLERANCE
322
•
DC 10
EET
CRUISE
CRUISE
AIRCRAFT
AIRCRAFT
2a;~ CG
4 O· r. C G Cl 7 In N S E tl S TOl
ElEV-PERT
ElEV-PERT
~140.000+120.001J+eO.OOOO +100.0uO
(SECONDS)
+60.000U
TINE
+40.0000
. ~~-./~ K~ /
J/ "-.~ AV/'0 ~ h v
-.. :"--.. ....~
----0 .'-:-:--"-, -.
+239.000
+235.00 +.oouOOO +~O.OOOO
• T~ DEY ~1 .22951
+240.000
,..
U
w
~+238.000
t
v
>-+237.00
...
I-l
U
ojjJ+236.000
>
o+.OsooOo~------,------ .....------r------r-------r--------r-----,-·
G+. oeooOOf--t-t----+-----+-----+------I---'------t-----+------j------;
...
I-l
G..
,..
~+. 040000l------+-----*~,oG----+------l-~-"""'-=--+-----+------t------;
a:
I-l
c
a:
Ill:
v +.03000 0t-T-----:±?"";;rL---i------:---T-----t-----t---'=''''+:::::::::::ls:;:::~~:=:*~~--___j
+.010000~.000000 +20.0000
STO DEY +.007206
+40.0000 +60.0000
TUIE
+80.0000 +100.000
(SECONDS)
+120.000 +140.000
+140.000+120.00u+100.000+80.0000
(SECOrIDS)TIME
+bO .0000+40.0000
+.001479
~ ~ ~~ 1---1
...............0 ~ ~ ---.lo-....- -
...
0
0
-
STO DEI,'
+.040000
+.02000 +.000000 +2G.0000
,..
~+.03500
a:
H
c
a:
Ill:
v+.03000
a:
:1:+.025000
G..
-I
a:
SENSOR TOLERANCE
323
APPENDIX 10
ADDITIONAL PROPOSED AUGMENTATION FUNCTION
This section ~ontains diagrams of other augmentation functions proposed
for integration with RSSAS into the Flight Augmentation Computer, as discussed
in Section 6. These functions include Yaw Damping, Turn Coordination,
Elevator Load Feel Programming, Flap Limiting, and Stall Warning. The figures
shown describe the existing "DC-10 system architectures.
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A. Inputs
YAW DAMPER INTERFACE TABLE
B. Outputs
Analog
2 Yaw Rate DC
2 Roll Attitude AC
2 Rudder Position AC
2 T-Valve Position AC
29 VDC
2 VG Valid
2 Land Interlock
2 On Ground
1 Inoperative
3 YRG BITE
2 Overhead Test
Di gital
2 MACH (ADC)
1 Maintenance
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SIMPLIFIED SYSTEM SCHEMATIC - AUTOPILOT YAW AXIS
A. Inputs
Analog
ELF/FL INTERFACE TABLE
B. Outputs
4 Tach FB AC
2 Position FB AC
28 VDC
2 Monitor
2 Warning Lights
Digital
2 Airspeed (ADC) .
1 Maintenance
Power Servo
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1 Inter-Computer
2 Actuator
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SIMPLIFIED SYSTEM SCHEMATIC - ELEVATOR VARIABLE LOAD FEEL AND FLAP
LIMITER PROGRAMMER
A. Inputs
.STALL WARNING INTERFACE TABLE
B. Outputs
Analog
2 Angle of Attack AC
1 Flaps AC
28 VDC
2 Slats
2 AOA Valid
1 On Ground
Digital
1 Maintenance
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1 Slat
2 Stick Shaker
2 AOA Test
2 SW Test Overhead
1 Slat Test
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SYSTEM SCHEMATIC - STALL WARNING
APPENDIX 11
EET ELECTRICAL SYSTEM
The primary power system. for the EET is a two-generator, 115/200-vo1t
(at point of regulation in the electric power center), 3-phase (4-wire, grounded
neutral), 400-Hz alternating current system. The two generators, one on each
engine, are supplemented by an identical generator on the APU which is both
ground and flight-operable. The main engine channels may be operated paralleled,
unparalleled, or isolated. The system also provides emergency power, supplied
by an air-driven generator and a battery .. The APU generator or the external
power supply is never paralleled with the main generators, or with each other.
A 28-vo1t dc supply is derived from the ac system by transformer/rectifiers
(see electrical system schematic).
The airplane can be dispatched with one main generator channel inoperative,
providing the APU generator channel is operative.
The airplane can be dispatched with anyone transformer/rectifier unit
(except T/R-2) inoperative.
No single fault can caus~ the loss of more than one generator channel.
AC System Description
The EET derives its electrical power from 90-kva, 120/208-vo1t, 3-phase,
400-Hz, wye-connected brush1ess generators. The neutral of the wye connection
is grounded to the airplane structure in each case.
The two main ac generating channels of the basic system are designed to
operate equally well paralleled, unparalleled, or isolated. Design prevents
these channels from being paralleled with the external ground supply or the
APU generator.
Theac bus system is configured so that each main generator is .connected
through a generator relay to its own generator ac bus. The generator buses are
used as load distribution buses for heavy 3-phase loads, including the ac buses
and the emergency ac buses on the No. 1 and No.2 systems. The ac buses are
then used as load distribution buses for light 3-phase loads and single-phase
loads.
Two bus tie relays, one for each main generator channel, are configured so
that they connect the two generator buses through an ac tie bus. Both relays
are closed during paralleled operation. Flight crew controls permit the bus tie
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relays to be individually opened manually, thus isolating the two distribution
systems.
Automatic circuits, when initiated by flight crew action, will parallel the
two primary channels if system conditions are proper. If unparalleled operation
is desired at startup, no action is required by the flight crew. If isolated
operation is required, the bus tie relays can be manually switched open by the
flight crew.
Auxiliary Power
Auxiliary power, derived from the generator driven directly by the onboard
APU (located in the unpressurized portion of the aft fuselage), can be used to
supplement the main system supply. The control arrangement allows connection
of the APU generator output to a choice of one or both of the main distribution·
bus systems, or to the ac generator ground service bus only, without energizing
any other ac bus.
DC System Description
The dc electrical power is derived from the ac system through four unregu~
lated transformer/rectifier (T/R) units. Each unit is convection-cooled with
a capacity of 75 amperes. The No. 1 and the No. lA T/Rs receive power from
the No. 1 generator bus. The No. 2 T/R receives power from the right ac
emergency bus. The .No. 2A T/R receives power from the ac generator ground
service bus. Accordingly, during ground service operation, only the No. 2A
T/R unit is energized. This provides power to the dc ground service bus and
through a blocking diode to the battery bus. The four transformer/rectifier
units are normally operated isolated, but can pick up another dc load bus
through the manually controlled tie relays and cross-tie circuit breaker.
Redundant power is provided to the battery bus from the No. lA T/R. Blocking
diodes are installed for power. source isolation and to prevent the battery from
supplying power to dc buses.
Electrical System Fault Tree
A fault tree for the loss of electrical power is shown in the following
figure. The initial configuration assumed is for dual generators without an
APU. The calculated probability of electrical power loss is shown to be
Q = 2.6 x 10-8.
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